










































Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-SA 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen 











































in Contemporary European Society
Studying Jihadism
Band 14
Herausgegeben von Kurt Appel, Christian Danz,
Jakob Helmut Deibl, Rüdiger Lohlker, Richard Potz
und Sieglinde Rosenberger
Die Bände dieser Reihe sind peer-reviewed.
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-SA 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen 
















































Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-SA 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen 










































Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen
Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über
http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.
Veröffentlichungen der Vienna University Press
erscheinen im Verlag V&R unipress GmbH.
An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of libraries working
with Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality books
Open Access for the public good. The Open Access ISBN of this book is 978-3-7370-0938-6.
More information about the initiative and links to the Open Access version can be found at
www.knowledgeunlatched.org.
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Robert-Bosch-Breite 6, D-37079 Göttingen
Dieses Werk ist als Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der Creative-Commons-Lizenz BY-NC-ND
International 4.0 („Namensnennung – Nicht kommerziell – Keine Bearbeitungen“) unter dem
DOI 10.14220/9783737009386 abzurufen. Um eine Kopie dieser Lizenz zu sehen, besuchen Sie
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
Jede Verwertung in anderen als den gesetzlich zugelassenen Fällen bedarf der vorherigen
schriftlichen Einwilligung des Verlages.
Umschlagabbildung: RaT-Logo (Gerfried Kabas, Wien).
Redaktion: Marlene Deibl
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage | www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com
ISSN 2198-5235
ISBN 978-3-7370-0938-6
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-SA 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen 
ISBN Print: 9783847109389 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737009386
Inhalt
Rüdiger Lohlker
Introduction: Confusion meets Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Rüdiger Lohlker
Collective Organizers: Lone Wolves, Remote Control, and Virtual
Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Ali Fisher
Interrogating the electronic ribat: Data Science in the study of the
Jihadist movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Ali Fisher / Nico Prucha
A Milestone for “Islamic State” Propaganda: “The Clanging of the
Swords, part 4” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Clemens Holzgruber
“Now You See Me – Now You Don’t”: Analysing Jihadists’ Online
Privacy-Enhancing and Counter-Surveillance Strategies . . . . . . . . . . 157
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-SA 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen 
ISBN Print: 9783847109389 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737009386
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-SA 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen 
ISBN Print: 9783847109389 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737009386
Rüdiger Lohlker
Introduction: Confusion meets Confusion
As confusing as the role of religion in jihadism1 seems to be for those not familiar
with Arab culture and Islam, almost as confusing is the role of the Internet in
invigorating jihadism for many researchers. The chapters of this book will try to
reduce the level of confusion, based on an understanding of theology and history
of Islam and based on insights from Data Science, thereby going beyond the state
of play of much Western conventional research on jihadism.
In 1991 in the aftermath of the first war of the USA (and allies) against Iraq an
referring to the American Civil War Manuel De Landa stated:
“The development of the metallic cartridge and breech-loading firearms caused a
revolution in tactics that took military commanders over a hundred years to digest.”2
Things did not change, another technology is applied today. As in former times
the impact of these new technologies is still not understood.
We are living in a period of military innovations in which terrorists have
weaponized the Internet3 and Jihadi technicians demostrate their ability to adopt
to new technological developments The chapters of this volume seek to bring
together developments in social media, the innovations of jihadists with devel-
opments in the strategic thinking of jihadists, based mainly on evidence based
research into Arabic language sources and documents from the jihadists
themselves.
This volume seeks to remedy a deficiency of much Western research on ji-
hadist terrorism, namely its disregard for religion and the Internet. We will leave
aside that the surprising fact that terrorism research at least at 9/11 tends to
ignore the role of thea coherent theology and religion underlying jihadism. The
1 Jihadism means a transnational movement with a specific Islamic theology and the use of
violence as the main distinction from other contemporary Islamic movements.
2 Manuel De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, New York: Swerve Editions 1991,
p. 29.
3 See the remarks on the consumerization of warfare in the chapter by Lohlker.
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authors rely mainly on evidence produced by the jihadis themselves, not ig-
noring it as much of conventional research does.4
Rüdiger Lohlker describes the technical aspects of recent jihadist dis-
semimation of operational ressources. The chapter includes further remarks on
jihadists online strategies.
Ali Fisher criticizes the technical deficienties of current research on jihadism,
not understanding the real operations of jihadists online.
Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha present a case study on the dissemination of
jihadist videos online.
Clemens Holzgruber analyzes the jihadist discussion on secure communi-
cation online giving insides into the tools used by jihadists.
All the chapters introduce ressources that are ignored in conventional re-
search because they are in Arabic and religiously contextualized. This makes it
necessary to do a close reading of the sources to enable the research community
to leave the mainstream discourses. Stressing a coherent theology of jihadism
does not mean jihadism is understood by referring to Islam, the Qur’an etc. We
subscribe to the idea recently written down by Ould Mohamedou:
“In time the problem emerged thus: to understand Western terrorists of the 1970s such
as the German Red Army Faction or the Italian Red Brigades, one is invited to examine
the societal condition of post-war Germany Italy, the ambient malaise in these countries
25 years after Nazism and fascism, and their relationship with their rebellious youth; to
make sense of al-Qaeda or IS, one is asked to read the Qur’an.”5
The present volume tries to give insights that may remedy this approach turning
to the practice of jihadists, not focussing on the speculations about what they
think and what is Islam or not.6
We have to thank our reviewer for helping us to clarify some ideas in this
volume.
4 By way of exception, in the case of the attackers of the WTC in 2001, the role of the “Spiritual
Manual” and its religious content has been recognised (Hans G. Kippenberg/Tilmann Sei-
densticker (eds.), The 9/11 Handbook, London/Oakville, CT: Equinox 2006).
5 Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, A Theory of ISIS: Political Violence and the
Transformation of the Global Order, London: Pluto Press 2018, pp. 8–9.
6 Shahab Ahmed, What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic, Princeton/Oxford: Princeton
University Press 2016.
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Rüdiger Lohlker
Collective Organizers: Lone Wolves, Remote Control, and
Virtual Guidance
Intro
Terrorism ‘research’ is dominated by media-induced vocabulary, which tries to
demonize and hype the imminent threat of terrorist violence: lone wolves or
remote control terrorism are two of the most prominent phenomena.1 What is
neglected, however, is an attempt to understand what is happening on the ground
in jihadist practice.2
The chapter is organized in a rhizomatic way mirroring the swarm-like
movement of jihadi online communication (see below); the chapter is not fol-
lowing a linear story line. It is based on a careful selection of jihadi online com-
munication during the last years and uses Arabic language sources to close the gap
of knowledge that is evident in current mainstream research on jihadism. Since the
knowledge of Arabic sources in this research is negligeable we feel forced to offer as
much information as possible. Any attempt of synthesis would be premature and
stand in the way of a thorough understanding of jihadi communition.
Discussing jihadi swarms means analyzing collective processes of self-or-
ganization evolving intentionally but also non-intentionally.
Collective Organization
Talking about collective organizers in the context of Jihadism studies is some-
what unusual. A brief remark on the concept of the collective organizer by
someone who would nowadays be called an ‘expert’ may be helpful in order to
1 For an overview on the literature on jihadi lone wolf terrorism see Sarah Teich, Trends and
Developments in Lone Wolf Terrorism in the Western World: An Analysis of Terrorist Attacks
and Attempted Attacks by Islamic Extremists (http://www.ctcitraining.org/docs/LoneWolf_
SarahTeich2013.pdf) (accessed March 4, 2018).
2 The ideas presented were inspired by discussions during Jakarta Geopolitical Forum 2017. I
have to thank Ferdinand Haberl for reading a pre-final version of this chapter.
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gain a better understanding of the phenomena we are talking about. Vladimir
Ilyich Lenin, quoting himself in his seminal treatise titled What is to be done?,
says:
“A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a
collective organizer. In this respect it may be compared to the scaffolding erected round
a building under construction; it marks the contours of the structure and facilitates
communication between the builders, permitting them to distribute the work and to
view the common results achieved by their organised labour.”3
Understanding the media as an organizing force of an underground organization
is a crucial part of the argument lied out in this article. However, we will not argue
that there is a fixed structure, “a scaffolding”, within Jihadi online structures, but
rather that there is a collective aspect to Jihadi online communication. Not
Bolshevik-style organized collective, but a collective organizing itself as a swarm.
Ali Fisher has used the word of ‘swarmcast’ in this context4 but a longer quotation
may be useful in order to clarify this concept:
“In the Swarmcast model there is no longer a clear division between the audience and a
content producer in control of the means through which to broadcast content to that
audience. Instead, once content is produced and released, it is often the distributing
network of media mujahideen, rather than the original producer, that ensures con-
tinuing content availability. This type of activity can be understood with the help of the
concept of netwar ; defined as ‘lower-intensity conflict at the societal end of the spec-
trum’ in which ‘a combatant is organised along networked lines or employs networks
for operational control and other communications’ […] in their most extreme in-
carnations, beyond that which Ronfeldt and Arquilla envisioned, the media muja-
hideen, and other dispersed networks, cease to depend on centralised direction, and
instead adopt genuine swarming behaviours as observed in nature. This extends the
understanding of netwar and requires netwar to include the importance of emergent
behaviour and collective action in complex systems. […]
The recognition and approval of the media mujahideen, the decision to engage via
social media and the increasing violence in Syria provided an opportunity for jihadist
groups such as ISIS and JaN to evolve their online strategies which became increasingly
aligned with the concepts of netwar. In doing so both ISIS and JaN have enabled them to
disseminate content through an interconnected network that is constantly re-
configuring, akin to the way a swarm of bees or flock of birds constantly reorganises in
flight. It marks a shift from the hierarchical and broadcast models of communication
during conflict to a new dispersed and resilient form which embraces the strength of
emergent behaviour; the user curated ‘Swarmcast’. […] Resilience against takedowns
and account suspensions has become an important element of the Jihadist Swarmcast.
This resilience has emerged over the last two years as jihadist groups have moved from
3 Vladimir I. Lenin, What is to be done? Burning Questions of our Movement, New York: Inter-
national Publishers 1969, p. 105.
4 See his chapter on data science in this volume and the chapter of Nico Prucha and Ali Fisher.
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broadcasting content via a few ‘official’ accounts to a dispersed network of media
mujahideen who have been able to ensure that jihadist content maintains a persistent
online presence. […] this dispersed form of network structure is attuned to the in-
formation age, in which a mode of conflict based on netwar is largely about ‘who knows
what, when, where, and why, and about how secure a society, military, or other actor is
regarding its knowledge of itself and its adversaries.’ The structures imagined by Ar-
quilla and Ronfeldt in their vision of netwar are sufficiently interconnected to re-
configure after disruption, as a flock of birds reconfigures after avoiding a predator. In
other words, loss of a few important nodes cannot inhibit overall operational ability to
maintain a persistent presence.”5
The Swarmcast has been reconfigured by the emergence of Telegram as the main
jihadi communication platform, which has been largely ignored by mainstream
jihadism research, remaining clueless as to how this platform may work. We
must to stress – again and again – that there is no disrupt between the com-
municative and the operative aspect of jihadism, which has long been known to
be an important factor of jihad doctrines. Real life and virtual life go together well
– including what has been aptly called ‘consumerization of warfare.’6 Indeed,
there is a coherent worldview with a coherent mind-set and a consensus on the
basic military concepts. As Norman Cigar wrote several years ago in his seminal
book on Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency7:
“In many ways, Al-Muqrin’s Guerilla War reflects a general consensus on doctrine
present within the QAP8 leadership, arguably the product of shared experiences and
discussions over the years, which he codified. […] Al-Muqrin had apparently long
pondered the issues involved in the text and had already taught the ‘Practical Course’ in
Afghanistan. The QAP’s teaching of basic military and political concepts reflects the
dissemination of a collective outlook and extreme commitment to transcendental goals,
which created an atmosphere where ideas ceased to be proprietary and became part of
the movement’s accepted canon of operative art.”
Again, we may notice the collective aspect of jihadi thought, even at a relative
stage of recent jihadi history. The entanglement of technical experience-based
operational art combined with ‘military and political concepts’ and the ‘com-
5 Ali Fisher, Swarmcast: How Jihadist Networks Maintain a Persistent Online Presence, in
Perspectives on Terrorism 9iii (2015) (http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/
article/view/426/html) (accessed January 8, 2018). For references see this article. Further
remarks on the lack of robust data analysis in http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/inter
preting-data-about-isis-online?platform=hootsuite ( accessed January 8, 2018).
6 Andrea Zapparoli Manzoni/Paolo Passeri, Consumerization of Warfare, in Hackmageddon
June 16, 2011 (http://www.hackmageddon.com/2011/06/16/consumerization-of-warfare/) (ac-
cessed January 14, 2018).
7 Norman Cigar, Al-Qa’ida’ Doctrine for Insurgency: ‘Abd al-’Aziz al-Muqrin’s A Practical Guide
for Guerilla Warfare, Dulles, Va: Potomac Books 2009, p. 12.
8 Al-Qa’ida on the Arab Peninsula (RL).
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mitment to transcendental goals’ (read: a coherent theological worldview as a
basic structure of Jihadi activities) has been lost in the turmoil of short-sighted
and short-termed reactions to jihadi operations. Jihadism research has indeed
lost its momentum due to its loss of understanding.
It is a truism that research on jihadism is still far away from holistically
understanding the phenomenon it claims to research.9 Even worse, once the
Internet enters the debate “online illiterates” join the community of researchers
and claim to be competent critics.
Marc Sageman’s insights with respect to the most recent developments may be
characterized as ‘leaderless Jihad’,10 whilst they have never been systematically
integrated into reflections on terrorist phenomena.11 The following pages are to
outline a new approach towards an understanding of the combined operational
jihadi efforts aimed at adapting to ever-changing circumstances. This approach
is based on first-hand knowledge of Arabic language sources, which are the main
linguistic resource of jihadi communication. What Malcolm W. Nance wrote
several years ago still holds true: “The field of terrorism […] is a specialized
subject that requires serious study, and requires that those in the front line of
defense be as knowledgeable as possible.”12 In this regard, jihadi operations
– especially online but also offline – still need ‘serious study’.
One of the most significant phenomena still in need to be seriously studied is
the ability of jihadists to create new technical applications to be used at an
operational level.
Turning Offline
Recent research has convincingly demonstrated the fashion in which ISIS blue-
collar technicians13 have been developing their manufacturing process. A good
example may be Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who “received a degree in me-
9 For the case of lone wolf-jihadism see Raffaello Pantucci, A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preli-




logy_of_lone_wolves_preliminary_an.pdf) (accessed March 4, 2018).
10 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, Philadelphia,
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press 2011.
11 The first instalment of ‘leaderless terrorism’ or ‘lone wolves’ grew out of the white su-
premacist movement in the US, namely by Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis in the 1990s.
12 Malcolm W. Nance, Terrorist Recognition Handbook: A Practioner’s Manual for Predicting
and Identifying Terrorist Activities, Boca Raton et al. : CRC Press 20143, p. 1.
13 It’s not only media mujahideen and fighters that should be looked at.
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chanical engineering from North Carolina A& T State University, the Associated
Press reported, he received permission to build a vacuum cleaner from scratch.
Mindless hobbyism, according to his CIA holders, or the mark of a maker. The
schematics had been downloaded from the Internet.”14
IS cadres did something similar. When they were running out of supplies
“they did something that no terrorist group has ever done before and that they continue
to do today : design their own munitions and mass-produce them using advanced
manufacturing techniques. Iraq’s oil fields provided the industrial base – tool-and-die
sets, high-end saws, injection-molding machines – and skilled workers who knew how
to quickly fashion intricate parts to spec. Raw materials came from cannibalizing steel
pipe and melting down scrap. ISIS engineers forged new fuzes, new rockets and
launchers, and new bomblets to be dropped by drones, all assembled using instruction
plans drawn up by ISIS officials.”15
The next step may be the utilization of 3-D printers in order to produce the
resources they need, using information readily available on the Internet. Even if
this technology may be used up to now only for providing supply parts for
weapons it is an innovation that may be important for jihadi operations in the
future. Here we can see another aspect of merging real and virtual life. In fact, this
is already happening right now – not using 3-D printer devices – but distributing
jihadi knowledge online. For the moment, let’s leave aside other supply chains
from Eastern European Countries, China, the USA, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Libya,
Sudan, etc. – ranging from battlefield captures to diverted materiel – adding to
IS-produced ammunition (see above). Let us focus instead on IS widely using
IEDs: “IS forces have manufactured and deployed improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) across the battlefield on a quasi-industrial scale.”16 Yet again, we can see
the IS blue-collar technicians at work.
The knowledge these technicians can easily be detected by following jihadi
Arab-language communication.
14 Brian Castner, Exclusive: Tracing ISIS’ Weapons Supply Chain – Back to the US, in Wired
(https ://www.wired.com/story/terror-industrial-complex-isis-munitions-supply-chain/)
(accessed January 6, 2018).
15 Ibid.
16 Conflict Armament Research, Tracing the Supply of Components Used in Islamic States IEDs.
Evidence form a 20-months Investigation in Iraq and Syria, London: Conflict Armament
Research 2016, p. 7.
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Turning Online Again
Since January 2016 a large amount of resources has been disseminated online
under the title ‘lone wolves’ or ‘al-dhi’āb al-munfarida’ – the Arab equivalent for
lone wolves.17 Contrary to the common perception of terrorism research the
main target is not ‘the West’; other targets are in fact also mentioned in a pro-
grammatic series posts in a telegram channel called wilāyat sainā’ (province of
Sinai), a channel which at is part of the milieu of IS-related channels on this
platform.18 The post reads (just an except):
“Stand up! Take up any weapon and massacre the infidels and don’t spare anyone […] O
lone wolves, know that this world is ephemeral and will not exist forever […] The lone
wolves are the secret weapon of the [Islamic] State. They are the unit of revenge for god,
the prophet, and the believers […] By god, by god! O you rejectionists (rawāfid)19, you
hypocritical Arabs (munāfiqı̄n)20, you will not live in peace […] You will not be able
to forget that there are lone wolves who will take revenge for their brothers on the
battlefield […] You heretic (murtadda) organizations, you may have cut off the way of
migration (hijra) [to the Islamic State], but you won’t be able to cut off the trail of the
wolves.”21
The telegram channels related to IS,22 bearing the name of “lone wolves” etc. ,
which were used for dissemination of ideas are to some extent inactive by now.23
The files are still available through other groups and channels on that platform
regardless – demonstrating the resilience of jihadi online operations, the swarm-
like movement of the jihadi online sphere.
Al-Qa’ida followed the example of IS in using telegram channels for the dis-
semination of ideas on effective military operations.24 Since some examples of
17 ‘Lone wolves’ are described as a very innovative, but often misunderstood as loners although
being integrated in a virtual or real network (Marcel Serr, Einsam, innovativ & brand-
gefährlich. ‘Lone wolf ’-Terrorismus: Einführung und aktuelle Entwicklungen, in Österrei-
chische Militärische Zeitschrift, 1 (2018), pp. 71–75). We are in need of an integrated concept
to avoid chasing after any new operation of jihadis.
18 We are not talking about ‘official’ channels, a ridiculous attempt to create a state-like enemy.
If we understand ISIS – and al-Qaeda – as swarm-like entities the desperate search for
structures that can be identified with European-US structures is such endeavours are helpless
and inefficient.
19 A derogatory term for Shiites.
20 A derogatory term going back to the early times of the Islamic community.
21 telegram September 22, 2016 (channel wilāyat sainā’).
22 Since the use of ISIS seems to be the result of ignoring the changing configuration of the
Islamic State we stick to IS as the official designation of this entity. For the important link of
(proto-)state building jihadi style and black markets see Aisha Ahmad, Jihad & Co.: Black
Markets and Islamist Power, Oxford et al. : Oxford University Press 2017.
23 The time of writing is September 2017.
24 This study is based on material collected online and archived by the author.
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the cross-over use of resources by several armed groups will be given, we shall
only occasionally mention the specific Jihadi organization or group dissem-
inating the resources.25
There have been earlier attempts to build an online structure supporting
jihadi operations. A study on online courses in al-Qa’ida related jihadi fora
concludes26 in 2013:
“Jihadi e-learning courses are a marginal phenomenon, yet they should not be ignored.
While there are still very few active participants in such courses, they attract large
interest among online jihadists. The quality of the courses has improved over the last
few years, and there are dedicated people online who are interested in developing them
further. As training in jihadi conflict areas has become difficult, more recruits are likely
to try and obtain paramilitary skills before going abroad – or before attempting to carry
out a terrorist attack at home. Some of these would-be jihadists might consider joining
regular armed forces or private shooting clubs in their home country. A far less risky
venture is to seek out jihadi training courses online because they allow the participants
to remain anonymous while conducting their training.”27
The turn towards the “individual jihad” in the form of lone wolf terrorism
becoming famous in recent times is not new:
“Due to the extreme pressure on Al-Qaeda’s current sanctuaries abroad, Al-Qaeda
leaders seem to be expanding their strategy to include so-called ‘leaderless jihad.’ The
concept is not new. The jihadi strategist Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri wrote and lectured on the
idea back in the 1990s, and held several lecture series to trainees in jihadi training
camps. The strategic concept developed by al- Suri became known as al-muqawama al-
islamiyya al-‘alamiyya, ‘The Global Islamic Resistance.’ He praised ‘lone wolf ’ terrorist
attacks that were conducted by individuals that had no connection to Al-Qaeda Central,
but who nevertheless carried out attacks supporting Al-Qaeda’s global ideology.28 In-
dividuals praised by al-Suri included El Sayyid Nusayr, an Egyptian- American who
shot and killed the American-Israeli politician Meir Kahane in New York in 1990, and
Ramzi Yusef, who carried out the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993.”29
Generally speaking, lone wolf-terrorism is not merely a jihadi phenomenon and
it can be found with respect to other terrorist groups too. White supremacists
25 One of the view media articles mentioning the telegram level of communication (although
only using English-language sources) is Mary Ann Russon/Jason Murdock, “Welcome to the
bizarre and frightening world of Islamic State channels on Telegram”, in IB Time UK, posted
June 2, 2016 (https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/welcome-bizarre-frightening-world-islamic-state-
channels-telegram-1561186) (accessed March 18, 2018).
26 Conclusions are to be modified for the present situation, esp., since it is no more “due to the
pressure” but to a continuing process of innovation and adaptation that online activities are
promoted by jihadis.
27 Anne Stenersen, “‘Bomb-Making for Beginners’: Inside al Al-Qaeda E-Learning Course”, in
Perspectives on Terrorism VIIi (February 2013), pp. 25–37, p. 35.
28 We would use the term theology instead of ideology in this context (see theology matters).
29 Ibid., p. 26.
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like Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis in the US have actually coined this term in the
1990s. Recent right-wing lone wolves are to be understood as based on certain
independence with regards to their planning and operational processes. How-
ever, they are nevertheless part of a swarm connected through the mutual ac-
ceptance of a certain ideology or varieties of an ideology, facilitated via the media
– especially the Internet –30 and face-to-face connections.31 The structure of a
swarm is to be detected among jihadi lone wolves whose ‘loneliness’ is a tactical
means.
What apparently is new in the present situation, is the fact that lone wolf-
resources are put online without attempting to organize online courses for
tasked like bomb-making, as discussed by Stenersen. Courses are put online to
allow for the acquisition of practical knowledge by letting the user study on their
own and then joining the swarm and its operations. This is due to the fact that the
relatively controlled environment of jihadi fora has changed to a more open
environment on platforms like telegram.32
Former attempts of disseminating knowledge on terrorist operations – as they
are well known from the online magazine Inspire (and others) – have been
restricted in their scope. The special issue on the package bomb, which brought
down a UPS cargo plane in 2010, included a detailed technical description of the
bombs used (Inspire No. 3 – Special Issue)33, handling of pistols, remote control
explosion, legitimizing of jihadi based on “Targeting the populations of coun-
tries that are at war with the Muslims” (all Inspire No.8), the praise of the “knights
of lone jihad”, torching parked vehicles, causing road accidents, creating lethal
poison as a means of “open source jihad” (all Inspire No.10), or the praise of the
Boston bombings (Inspire No.11) (see below), all indicate an awareness of the
strategic importance of individual jihadist operations for the jihadi subcultures
(see below).34
But there are also weapons that are as dangerous as the individual jihad, i. e.
chemical and biological weapons. Here we must take the emergence of a new
30 Anders Breivik is the prime example of a right-wing milieu although the striking difference is
the media framing trying to deny the influence of the right-wing extremist online milieu on
his attacks (see the very instructive contributions in Rainer Just/Gabriel Ramin Schor (Hg.),
Vorboten der Barbarei: Zum Massaker von Utoya, Hamburg: Laika-Verlag 2011).
31 Cf. Armin Pfahl-Traughber, “Das ‘Lone-Wolf ’”-Phänomen im Rechtsterrorismus in Skan-
dinavien: Eine vergleichende Betrachtung von Fallbeispielen aus Norwegen und Schweden,
in Interventionen 8 (December 2016), pp. 4–17: 16.
32 We are aware that invite links may be regarded as a restriction of access. But empirical
evidence from our onging research shows that this actually no fundamental problem to get
these files.
33 All Jihadi material quoted is archived at the Oriental Institute, University of Vienna, Austria.
34 This holds true for other contexts see Warren Hinckle, Guerilla-Krieg in USA, Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlagsanstalt 1971 for the readings of US-underground fighters.
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group of blue-collar jihadi technicians (see below) into account we mentioned
before. The overall assessment of the possible use of chemical and biological
weapons by jihadists made in 2007 by Stenersen still holds true to some extent:
“Online CBW manuals and discussions indicate that jihadists display a particular in-
terest in easily obtainable chemical agents, such as cyanide, rather than sophisticated
agents that require considerable skill and resources to produce and deploy. Participants
in online discussions also tend to draw ideas and inspiration from past CBW plots.
While this is not surprising, it is notable that on jihadist websites, news articles of plots
to use crude chemical agents are posted along with simple, do-it-yourself recipes of the
same agents. The online manuals and discussion forums raise the possibility that the
most imminent chemical-biological threat now comes from Al-Qaeda-inspired en-
thusiasts, especially those with relevant academic or professional backgrounds, rather
than professional jihadist planners. That the online manuals seem too vague to result in
a successful attack does not preclude the possibility that more sophisticated weapons
are being developed offline.”35
Looking at the technical capabilities of jihadi engineers, which has emerged in
the last years in other fields (see below) “the possibility that more sophisticated
weapons are being developed offline” is to be taken for granted.
A historical remark has to be made in order to stress the present state of play
in jihadism research. The strategy of isolated fighters using sabotage in guerrilla
warfare has already been mentioned by Alberto Bayo Garoud (d. 1967), the
teacher of Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara36, in Question no. 120 of his One
Hundred Fifty Questions to a Guerrilla.37 Thus, stressing the novelty of “lone
wolves” can only be considered the result of a lack of historical knowledge and
falling into the trap of trying to reconstruct jihadi activities without under-
standing basic sabotage and Guerrilla techniques. Bringing together the lone
wolves acting in swarm-like collective organization, the technical capabilities of
jihadi engineers, and the tradition of terrorist operations, we will have to turn to
other technical innovations of jihadis. A good example of this approach to ji-
hadism research is the case of drones.38
35 Stenersen, Anne (2007), Chem-bio Cyber-class: Assessing Jihadist Chemical and Biological
Manuals, in Jane’s Intelligence Review September 2007, pp. 8–13: 13.
36 Himself learning from the North African guerrillas of Abd-el-Krim (see Er, Mevliyar, “Abd-
el-Krim al-Khattabi: The Unknown Mentor of Che Guevara”, in Terrorism and Political
Violence 27 (2015), pp. 1–23), reminding us of the network of influences in modern terro-
rism.
37 http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/bayo.htm (accessed September 25, 2016).
38 We should bear in mind, however, alternative methods of using drones, e. g., Radjawali,
Irendra/Pye, Oliver, “Drones for Justice. Inclusive Technology and river-related action res-
earch along the Kapuas”, in Geographica Helvetica 72 (2017), pp. 17–27, Radjawali, Irendra/
Pye, Oliver/ and Flitner, Michael, “Recognition through Reconnaissance? Using Drones for
Counter-mapping in Indonesia”, in Journal of Peasant Studies 44 (2017), pp. 817–83.
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Drone Wars Jihadi-Style
The issue of using drones for warfare is relevant to the discussion due to the large
number of publications related to the use of drones as a weapon by IS especially.
Those who have not read or seen any of the related material apart of the group’s
official videos may only know that IS has utilised drones as a tool for producing
impressive video footage. Yet, they were also used for reconnaissance and in-
telligence gathering purposes and the step of using them as weapons was to be
expected. As predicted, the weaponisation of drones occurred and spread
throughout the year 2016. After two Kurdish soldiers were killed in the same year,
this development could no longer be ignored and the Combating Terrorism
Center (CTC) published the first overview on the issue in January 2017.39
However, despite previous experiences the CTC report attempted to downplay
the role of consumer drones whilst Jake Godin has pursued a more realistic
approach, calling drones “the industrial revolution of terrorism”.40
Avery apt commentary reads: “Some here also say they don’t possess enough
of a skill level to do it, or that toy/hobby grade aircraft/drones will never be used
by terrorist.”41 This very commentary could truly be the motto of most terrorism
research trying to catch up with terrorists until it is too late. We can furthermore
interpret the case of utilizing drones for Jihadi purposes as yet another example
for terrorism research trying to catch up with jihadi innovations and not fol-
lowing the insights gained from other fields of consumerization of warfare.42
IS has used jihadi-attack-drones, whilst other jihadi forces have also used
them for an attack on a Russian airbase near Latakia in early 2018.43 The number
of drones44 used for the attack was reported to be 13 – a small swarm. Out the
39 https://fortunascorner.com/2017/01/31/the-islamic-states-drone-documents-management-
acquisitions-diy-tradecraft/ (accessed August 07, 2017).
40 https://www.newsy.com/stories/isis-drones-and-the-industrial-revolution-of-terrorism/
(accessed August 07, 2017). For an overview of the products of this ‘industrial revolution’ see
Nick Waters, “Types of Islamic State’s Bombs and Where to find them” (https://www.be
llingcat.com/news/mena/2017/05/24/types-islamic-state-drone-bombs-find/?utm_content
=buffer4d8e0& utm_medium=social& utm_source=twitter.com& utm_campaign=buffer)
(accessed August 07, 2017).
41 https://www.rcgroups.com/forums/showthread.php?2833203-Some-Here-Say-This-Kind-
of-Thing-is-Untrue-and-Not-Really-Happening (accessed August 07, 2017).
42 For a recent example of Jihadis dropping bombs from drones see the most recent files since it
is an ongoing practice.
43 https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/jihadist-drone-attacks-russian-airbase-southwest-
latakia/ (accessed February 8, 2018). This source uses the word “rebels” to cover the adhe-
rence of forces participating to other jihadi forces than ISIS.
44 https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/russian-military-shoots-13-jihadist-drones-hmay
mim-airport/ (accessed February 8, 2018).
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borders of the Syrian/Iraqi area of operation, more drone attacks are to be
expected. An article from September 2017 reads:
“The terror group’s technicians claim to have perfected modifications which would
allow a drone to carry a devastating payload of up to 20 kg – some 20 times the current
maximum. The jihadists’ online material now regularly exhorts sympathizers to use the
devices to launch attacks and experts have told that a successful atrocity using a drone
against countries including the UK is one of the terror group’s highest priorities.”45
Also on a telegram channel entitled “Islamic State” (al-dawla al-islāmiyya) we
could watch a series of tutorials on drones as early as in March 2016.46 However,
the use of drones by IS goes back to even 2014 and we may argue that this
knowledge on the possible utilisation of drones was out there in the jihadi swarm
already at very early stages – yet often ignored.47 This spreading of information
on drone-warfare within jihadi circles can be interpreted as an example of virtual
leadership.
Drones are discussed in jihadi magazines (see below). In al-Īhā‘āt al-jihā-
diyya, a magazine published by the Centre for Jihadi Preachers (markaz du‘āt al-
jihād min ard al-Shām al-mubāraka) close to the jihadi preacher al-Muhaysinı̄, a
leading figure in the al-Qa‘ida related organizations in Syria, published some
comprehensive articles on drones.48 The first article describes the ways in which
drones might be operated whereas the following article attempts to convince
jihadis of its feasibility. Another interesting article in this part of the magazine
discusses operational art in times of drone surveillance. By analyzing the way in
which they reflect on new developments of warfare, we could easily understand
how jihadist operate. In fact, this is the only way of achieving such an under-
standing.
Moreover, an essential aspect of this approach is to holistically consider that
jihadis produce a coherent theology as discussed in the issue of al-Īhā‘āt al-
jihādiyya. Consequentially, the following article in this magazine covers the role
of women in the jihadi subculture, whilst another two-pager displays Arab cal-
ligraphy and demonstrates the importance of the Arabic language for the jihadi
imaginaire. Jihadi magazines are still an important part of jihadi communication
even at operational level. This apect of jihadi communication will be discussed
later in this chapter.
This communication ultimately contributes to the overall coherence of jihadi
45 https://inews.co.uk/news/uk/drone-terror-attack-jihadists-britain-matter-time-security-
sources-warn/ (accessed February 8, 2018).
46 See telegram.me, channel al-dawla al-islāmiyya, March 24, 2016.
47 For a first report on the ISIS drone program see http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/isis-
drones-evolution-leadership-bases-operations-and-logistics/#_ftn55 (accessed February 8,
2018).
48 al-Īhā‘āt al-jihādiyya No.3 (Dhu l-hijja 1437h), pp. 61–67.
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virtual guidance and is another example of the need of a historical understanding
of terrorist operations. A lack of historical knowledge means being surprised
again and again by jihadi operations in reality.
Virtual Guidance
A “community” or a “network” has been identified as the source of most terrorist
attacks. The attempt to identify a “community of criminals” as the force behind
the anarchist attacks in France can be seen as an example for a learning network
– some kind of an emergent swarm – promoting ’illegal’ actions in the 1890s.
This “community of criminals” allows us to understanding how a diffuse net-
work of individuals, journals and small groups of activists have been (mis-)
understood as an organization with permanent internal structures. This sit-
uation in France at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of 20th century
may serve as an example for a learning network – again, a kind of emergent
swarm – promoting ’illegal’ actions without a permanent internal structure.49 A
situation we may find to be rather similar to the present circumstances.50
Although some of the material analysed in this chapter has been disseminated
for predominantly organizational purposes, we cannot deny the importance as
much as quantity of religious-theological resources online and on conservative
Islamic online platforms. Although the material presented here is operational in
nature, technical, and military in general, the overall framework of virtual
leadership is still based on a theology of violence. This theology of violence
produces the coherent way of thinking that is needed for terrorist attacks and the
framework within which operatives guide the attackers who in turn carry out
these ideas.51 This coherent theological framework is also distributed across
several virtual platforms – first and foremost telegram – and create the cohesion
needed for Jihadi operations. The virtual guidance aspect of jihadi communi-
cation is not to be ignored unless research will not fall into the trap of beginning
again after any new jihadi operation occurs. One of these new modes operations
has been called virtually planning or remote control terrorism.
49 For a detailed account of the development of the illegalist anarchist networks in France at that
time in a leftist perspective see Richard Parry, Die Bonnot-Bande, Vienna: bahoe books
20172.
50 For an account by a revolutionary socialist see Holitscher, Arthur, Ravachol und die Pariser
Anarchisten, Frankfurt a. M.: Verlag Freie Gesellschaft s. d. (Reprint of the first edition Berlin
1925), pp. 78–83.
51 Lohlker 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, and 2017 for the larger religious milieu.
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Virtually Planning or Remote Control Terrorism
This is another Internet-based mode of operation, which can often perceived as a
lone wolves attack at first glance.52 Later on, one can uncover direct communi-
cation lines between the attacker and jihadist organizations. For such operations
the terms “remote control”, “virtual plot” or “virtual planning”53 are commonly
used. In the Hyderabad plot of 2016, for instance, the structures associated with
the virtual planning of operations became visible.54 In said plot, a promising
young jihadi recruit, willing to carry out attacks, had been identified. Virtual
planners guided him through every step of the plan, which was thought to be the
Islamic State’s first attack in India. The planners also helped recruiting other
attackers, organized the delivery of weapons and chemicals from Syria to India in
order to make explosives. Lastly, they also arranged for the logistics behind the
attack and for the delivery and pick up of weapons and explosives. In order to
achieve this, they had to remain in constant connection with the attackers until
shortly before they got arrested.
“In the most basic enabled attacks, Islamic State handlers acted as confidants and
coaches, coaxing recruits to embrace violence. In the Hyderabad plot, among the most
involved found so far, the terrorist group reached deep into a country with strict gun
laws to arrange for pistols and ammunition to be left in a bag swinging from the
branches of a tree. For the most part, the operatives who are conceiving and guiding
such attacks are doing so from behind a wall of anonymity. When the Hyderabad
plotters were arrested last summer, they could not so much as confirm the nationalities
of their interlocutors in the Islamic State, let alone describe what they looked like.
Because the recruits are instructed to use encrypted messaging applications, the
guiding role played by the terrorist group often remains obscured.”55
But the recruitment process may also work in another way :
“In early August, Kassim posted an audio recording on Telegram in which he instructed
future attackers to send him a video message prior to their operation. According to
Belgian journalist Guy Van Vlierden, who first reported on the recording, Kassim
specified that the video ‘must contain an oath of allegiance and a message of dawa’ that
encourages others to carry out attacks. Kassim promised that once he received the video
52 We may add the cases of persons with psychological problems following some elements of
online and media discourses driving them to violent action.
53 Bridget Moreng, “ISIS’ Virtual Puppeteers: How they Recruit and Train ‘Lone Wolves’”, in
Foreign Affairs (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-21/isis-virtual-puppeteers)
(accessed June 9, 2017) (posted September 21, 2016).
54 I am following the report by Rukmini Callimachi, “Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All: How ISIS
Guides World’s Terror Plots from Afar”, in The New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/04/world/asia/isis-messaging-app-terror-plot.html?_r=0) (accessed June 9, 2017)
(posted February 4, 2017).
55 See Callimachi, “Not ‘Lone wolves’.”
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he would have it translated and broadcast. ‘I am involved in this area, which means that
in two seconds they will be translated Arabic-French,’ he explained in his Telegram
message. ‘They will be transmitted to the entire world.’”56
The report on the Indian case demonstrates that there is a wide range of activities
beyond the European (and the US) assessment on the deliberate planning of
jihadis – despite some organizational restructuring:
“As has become clearer over time, ISIS’ strategy for external operations in Europe is not
haphazard – its methods are deliberate and carefully organized under the direction of
one of its wings, the Amn al-Kharji.”57
This holds true for the organized networks and for groups guided by a central
body of IS. However, there are additional activities connected to IS, AQ, and
others. There
“are fundamental differences between centrally planned operations (such as the Is-
tanbul airport attack) and attacks coordinated by virtual planners, with the latter
generally being less sophisticated and less lethal. But it is remarkable, and worrisome,
how many of the Ramadan attacks [2016] are clearly linked to the Amn al-Kharji. And
the group’s ability to use encrypted online communications to interact with operatives
abroad leaves open the possibility of links that have not yet been discovered.”58
Taking into account the elements of virtual planning and guidance, there are still
other terrorist attackers who operate individually and whom the coherent the-
ologies of violence59 – IS or al-Qa’ida style – may have inspired.60 These in-
dividual attackers are in need of knowledge and technical resources to carry out
their operation. Although there are many non-jihadi resources available online,
jihadis put other Arabic-language resources online.
Technical Resources
Some of the resources published online date back to the beginning of Jihadi
transnational operations in Afghanistan. We can find five volumes61 of the
56 See Moreng, “ISIS’ Virtual Puppeteers.”
57 See Moreng, “ISIS’ Virtual Puppeteers.”
58 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross/Nathaniel Barr, “Bloody Ramadan: How the Islamic State Coor-
dinated Global Terrorist Campaign”, in War on the Rocks (https://warontherocks.com/2016/
07/bloody-ramadan-how-the-islamic-state-coordinated-a-global-terrorist-campaign/) (ac-
cessed June 9, 2017) (posted July 20, 2016).
59 For this concept see Rüdiger Lohlker, Theologie der Gewalt. Das Beispiel IS, Vienna: facultas
2016.
60 This word is intentionally used to remind the reader of the semantics of the magazine of al-
Qa’ida titled Inspire.
61 The volumes were published electronically in 1424 hijri.
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“Encyclopaedia of Large Weapons” (mausū’at al-asliha al-kubrā) about the
handling of i. e. machine guns, mortars etc. published by the “Bureau of Services”
(maktab al-khadamāt) and the “Directorate of Training Camps and Frontiers”
(qiyādat al-mu’askarāt wa’l-jabahāt) in the Taliban-Islamic Emirate of Afgha-
nistan. The “Encyclopaedia of Large Weapons” is dedicated to Usāma bin Lādin,
who contextualised it within the creation and stabilization of a jihadi tradition.
One questions comes to our mind. Is the republishing of such material due to a
mere historical interest in somewhat out-dated material? We may consider this
to be partly true; but on the other hand, when thinking about the highly diverse
global weapons market, knowing how to handle a Sten gun may still turn out to
be useful…
A telegram channel62 started on the 25th of November 2016, focuses on such
operational issues.63 It starts with a post on ammunition, a description of the
Russian sniper rifle Dragunov, some guidelines for fighters on trench warfare,
mortars, anti-tank weaponry and missiles. Also, we can find the biography of an
early Muslim master-spy ; yet again another aspect of Jihadi reliance on early
Islamic history in order to create an imaginaire supporting the theological
cohesion.
Furthermore, the publishers provide us with an example of a subterranean
tunnel system taken from the Indochina war including plans of the structure of
this system. A post referring to this illustration stresses the high number of losses
by the US-troops in Vietnam.64 Lastly, a text of twenty pages demonstrates how to
launch anti-tank operations, whilst another post contains a tiny spy drone.
In this channel we can also find the reminder that “it is true that god obliged us
to lead jihad, but obliged us to prepare for it…”65 and the descriptions for
practical preparations within theological programs of jihadism.
Several other posts are dealing with Kalashnikov rifles,66 whereas cross-or-
ganizational references are available from Jihadi online sources. For instance, a
series of videos by an offshoot of the Free Syrian Army (FSA)67 offers an online
course on urban warfare. Amongst the videos we can find the content on: secure
handling of guns (video No. 02), asymmetrical sniping (video No. 034), physical
fitness (video No. 059) using and cleaning of handguns (video No. 066), a sub-
62 At the time of writing having 484 members.
63 Taktı̄kāt ‘askariyya: ma’lūmāt yahtajuhā al-mujāhidı̄n.
64 A more regional approach exploring the experience from the tunnels in and out of Gaza and
its application in Syria is to be found in “al-Anfāq bayna al-Shām wa-Ghazza”, in al-Īhā‘āt al-
jihādiyya No.3 (Dhu l-hijja 1437h), pp. 56–59.
65 Taktı̄kāt ‘askariyya: ma’lūmāt yahtajuhā al-mujāhidı̄n, telegram.me, December 1, 2016.
66 See for a detailed history C. J. Chivers, The Gun: The Story of the AK-47, London et al.:
Penguin 2011.
67 We will not discuss here the present status of the FSA, its affiliations, etc. , a discussion that is
futile in our context.
Collective Organizers: Lone Wolves, Remote Control, and Virtual Guidance 23
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-SA 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen 
ISBN Print: 9783847109389 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737009386
terranean (video No. 072), self defense (video No. 076; several additional vid-
eos), handling and constructing a flamethrower operating with napalm (video
No. 077).
Without assessing the practicability of the information provided in these
videos we could consider them a resource for, a) fighters on the ground in Syria,
and b for) fighters worldwide who are seeking information and training in urban
warfare. Also, referencing non-Jihadi resources has happened in earlier periods
of Jihadi online training.
The aforementioned videos were produced at the beginning of the Syrian
uprising. Based on the general title the videos are indented for “the protection of
the peaceful Syrian revolution” – this part of the title was, however, dropped in
later videos. Having said this we may turn to guides to produce explosives; the
importance of IEDs we mentioned before.
Explosives
Since the Afghanistan period of violent jihad we are aware of the (offline) courses
on explosives, which have been transferred to other media outlets like jihadi
magazines in the real world or in cyberspace. At first we will have to take a look
into jihadi magazines as an important hub of jihadi communication and part of
the collective organizational process of the jihadi swarm.
Spy Drone
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Magazines
We have introduced the idea of collective organizers with a quotation on the role
of a newspaper in the beginning of this chapter. Hence, it may be appropriate to
turn out attention to jihadi magazines in order to understand the operational
aspects of jihadism, which are not limited to propaganda but can also include
action.
Jihadi magazines have a long tradition, which dates back to the early 2000s.
The most prominent publications of this time period ones are the Saudi “Voice of
Jihad” (sawt al-jihād)68, a religio-theological magazine, and “al-Battar69 Training
Camp” (mu‘askar al-battār) (see below), which was once called “a representative
example of the way insurgents are using the internet to spread their ideas.”70 This
description clearly demonstrates the close relation of religious and military-
operational ideas at the very beginnings of modern jihadism. By looking into
some of these journals we shall attempt to analyse this dimension of jihadi
knowledge.71
The Journal al-Wa‘d al-ākhir72, one of the lesser known jihadi magazines as it
is published in Arabic published a series of articles on the “engineering art of





askariyya). The first article provides us with a short in-
troduction on the various categories of explosive “for a general study of [ex-
plosives] in respect of their use and application”.73 The second article deals with
hollow charge ammunition used in RPG-7, RPG-29, or in the 9M133 Cornet anti-
tank guided missile and with some remarks on their effective use.74 The third and
fourth article describes cluster bombs used against light to medium armed
transporters, arriving at the conclusion that they are not useful against civilians
68 The first – and up to now only – comprehensive study of this magazine is Nico Prucha, Die
Stimme des Dschihad, Hamburg: Dr. Kovać 2010 with an introduction by the author of this
chapter.
69 The name is referring to a sword of the prophet Muhammad, another reference to the religio-
theological aspect of jihadi thought.
70 http://misc.survivalism.narkive.com/EnEmtHRr/mu-askar-al-battar-al-queda-training-ma
nual (accessed February 6, 2018).
71 A recent attempt of analysis focussing only at magazines in English (and one in English and
Somali, I. e. , the English language part of it) ignoring the much more important Arabic
language magazines is Maura Conway/Jodie Parker/ Sean Looney, Online Jihadi Instructional
Content: The Role of Magazines, in Conway, Maura et al. (eds.,) Terrorists’ Use of the Internet:
Assessment and Response, IOS Press, Amsterdam 2017, pp. 182–193. The focus on bomb-
making is erroneous. The conclusions are insufficient as it is demonstrated below.
72 Another religious reference in the title. The magazine is covering the Palestinian jihadi
movement. The Internet site has the transliteration wrong.
73 al-Wa‘d al-ākhir No. 1 (Jumāda al-ākhira 1436), p. 13.
74 al-Wa‘d al-ākhir No. 2 (Raǧab 1436), p. 17.
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and only to be used against armoured vehicles. Lastly, also the range and possible
targets of the explosives and the best way in which to penetrate armoured pro-
tection are mentioned.75
Another article from this series describes remote ignition explosives and their
utilisation against individual humans,76 whilst next issue’s article deals with
hand grenades.77 The following issue contains an article on rockets and on how to
inspect the functionality of the related electronics.78 The eighth instalment of this
series deals with the basic components of explosives79 and further discusses other
aspects of military operative art. One series of articles – possibly hinting at the
Palestinian context – has been entitled “Know your enemy!” and describes units
of the Israeli army, to whom the journal refers to as the elite of the enemy.
“Information about guerilla warfare” is provided by another series, which de-
scribes basic tactics, elements of guerrilla warfare and the its stages of this kind of
warfare etc.
In summary, we could say that al-Wa‘d al-ākhir is offering some basic
knowledge on guerrilla warfare with respect to tactics and operations and that
adds some useful intelligence on the most dominant enemy – the Israeli Defence
Forces.80 Aspects on operational security, mobile phone security amongst other
practical information are further intended to prepare the mind-set of the future
fighters. This may also be considered a kind of true virtual guidance that has
reached completion by theological, historical, and political articles.
In this regard, Fustāt al-muslimı̄n is another interesting magazine. In its first
issue81, we can find an Arabic summary of one chapter of The Revolution in
Warfare by Liddell Hart82 on the “strategy of indirect approach”. This is an
example of the jihadi study of military knowledge (see below), whilst a second
article on the ideas of the Syrian army succeeds the presentation of Liddell Hart’s
work.
The second issue of Fustāt al-muslimı̄n83 provides the reader with a de-
scription of minesweeping technology used in the Russian armed forces, in-
cluding one article on an armoured bridge layer. Yet another example of how
hard one tries to “know your enemy”. Consequently, another part of the analysis
75 al-Wa‘d al-ākhir No. 3 (Ramadan 1436), p. 20 und al-Wa‘d al-ākhir No. 4 (Shawwāl 1436),
p. 21.




da 1436), p. 24.




ijja 1436), p. 21.
78 al-Wa‘d al-ākhir No. 7 (S
˙
afar 1437), p. 24.
79 al-Wa‘d al-ākhir No. 8 (Rabı̄
˘
al-awwal 1437), p. 25.
80 The counter intelligence of jihadis is still a field of research that may be called an assemblage
(Latour) of lacunae.
81 Fustāt al-muslimı̄n No. 1 (Dhu l-qa‘ida 1438h.).
82 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, London: Faber and Faber 1946.
83 Fustāt al-muslimı̄n No. 2 (Dhu l-qa‘ida 1438h.).
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of Liddell Hart’s The Revolution in Warfare has been included. Issue no. 384 and
the fourth instalment of this series continue to take the same line and thus
another article in the “military studies” section of the same magazine includes a
detailed description of the Steyr-Mannlicher HS-50 .50 BMG single-shot anti-
materiel sniper rifle and its effectiveness against US forces in Iraq.85 Fur-
thermore, one info-graphic on the SA-21 Growler anti-aircraft system has been
made available, whilst the succeeding 5th issue of the magazine contains a de-
scription of the Russian T-60 tank and the shoulder-launched anti-tank weapon,
commonly known as a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). Lastly, an info-graphic
on the GBU 43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast – the acronym “MOAB” has
commonly also been referred to as “Mother of all Bombs” – a large-yield bomb
only once used by the US up to now.86 Indeed, particularly the last example shows
how Fustāt al-muslimı̄n offers information on the weaponry of the most im-
portant enemies like the US or Russia. A series of articles on strategic approaches
also include approaches towards understanding their movements on the ground,
whilst this information may also be aimed at the individual fighters or the
command level on the ground in order to increase the operative abilities of jihadi
units.
Newer magazines less frequently offer militarily relevant info-graphics. The
new al-Anfāl ISIS-related magazine publishes one-page articles and just a few
examples should be sufficient at this point. No. 387 describes the production and
mixture of acetone peroxide, a primary high explosive including the necessary
security precautions. No. 488 provides a guideline on how to produce an acetone
peroxide device, which is introduced with some instructions of which appro-
priate religious formula is to be recited at the beginning of this process. No. 5
contains another one-page article on the preparation of an explosive device using
acetone peroxide, which receives further attention in follow-up articles in the
next issues.89 How to build a do-it-yourself-pepper is thoroughly explained in the
issue no. 8, which also includes some necessary security remarks and the
mentioning of the proper religious formula, which is to be quoted before starting
the mixing process.90 With respect to the assessment of the Site Institute, which
84 Fustāt al-muslimı̄n No. 3 (Muharram 1439h.).
85 Fustāt al-muslimı̄n No. 4 (Safar 1439h.).
86 Fustāt al-muslimı̄n No. 5 (Rabı̄‘ al-awwal 1439h.).
87 Al-Anfāl No. 3 (22. Rabı̄‘ al-awwal 1439h.), p. 2.
88 Al-Anfāl No. 4 (2. Rabı̄‘ al-ākhir 1439h.), p. 15.
89 Al-Anfāl No. 5 (13. Rabı̄‘ al-ākhir 1439h.), p. 16.
90 Al-Anfāl No. 8 (14. Jumādā al-ūlā 1439h), p. 16.
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concluded that al-Anfāl provides “weapons manuals”, one might be tempted to
consider it slightly overstated.91
The Somali magazine Gaidi Mtaani (also partially available in English and
thus accessible to ‘experts’) and its symbols refer to ISIS and only offer a small
number of articles. Issue no. 9, however, contains a piece on martial arts combat
training and physical fitness,92 whilst no. 3 reflects on mysteriously disappearing
drones and helicopters, which is explained as a supernatural intervention. A
short guide on how to build Molotov cocktails and one on mobile phone security
are to be found under the telling headline ‘Irhab wa Ghetto’93 and one can find
ads for a guide on how to use AK-47 rifles. In sum, Gaidi Mtaani can be con-
sidered as a propaganda magazine, which only minimally contributes to op-
erational aspects.
The Arab magazines are one of the resources English language jihadi mag-
azines are based on. We may have a short look at Inspire, Dabiq and Rumiyah
since they are the most prominent magazines of the jihadi subcultures, and
better known to most experts.
Considering Rumiyah as the first English-speaking example and leaving aside
its distribution in other languages aside, we can find a one-pager on the military
use of white phosphorus including appropriate safety measures in issue No. 12.94
In No. 995 We are provided with an article on “Just Terror Tactics”, which advices
the reader on how to operate in the US or Europe. The article covers the topics of
hostage-taking, the acquisition of firearms, possible targets, executions, con-
ducting operations without firearms, deception and luring targets into traps.
This article is followed by a separate entry on truck attacks but instructions are
not provided in such great detail as we could find it in in Inspire (see below). For
now, lets move on to some other publications.
Due to the lack of a sizeable amount of operational material in Dabiq we may
characterize this magazine as primarily theological and in line with the tradition
dating back to Sawt al-jihād (see above). Also the IS-news magazine al-Nabā ˘,
still one of the most important IS magazines is not covering operational issues
explicitly, whilst in South Asia, the structures of the Taliban-related magazines
are quite different.
Booklets are collected in order to give practical advice to fighters or would-be-
fighters. The guide to the Hijrah to the Islamic State, now only of historical
interest, may be a good example as it provides detailed information on the travel
91 https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/pro-is-magazine-anfal-borrows-naba-
news-format-features-threats-and-weapons-manuals.html (accessed March 1, 2018).
92 Gaidi mtaani No. 9 (Dhul hijja 1438h), p. 41.
93 Gaidi mtaani No. 3 (Rabi‘ al-Thani 1434h).
94 Rumiyah No. 12 (Dhul-Qa‘dah 1438h), p. 39.
95 Rumiyah No. 9 (Sha‘ban 1438h).
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routes to Syria so that those interested can find their way to the Islamic State (in
2015). The traveling routes, suggestions for packing including the advice of using
an informal piece of language, experiences gathered on passing the border
controls in Turkey, and reports of successful travellers can be found.96
Even more famous yet, the Lone Mujahid Pocketbook, published in 2013 as a
collection of articles taken from Inspire No. 1 to No. 10 has become part of the
series on the open source jihad. The angle and approach taken by the publishers is
clear : “Well, there is no need to travel abroad, coz the frontline has come to you.”
Some of the possible operations discussed concern torching parked vehicles
using petrol and matchsticks, causing traffic accidents by spilling oil on the road
or by at busting tyres with thick nails. Another suggestion is starting forest fires
including precise information on how to specifically start the most devastating
fire. Furthermore, a special feature describes pickup trucks as the “ultimate
mowing machine”, whereas the next article mentions the destruction of build-
ings through chemical explosions. How to make the actual bombs is discussed in
the following article entitled “kitchen fun” and “make a bomb in the kitchen of
your mom”. A very detailed description, including a guide on how to make
acetone peroxide or on how to construct a remote control detonator can also be
found.97 We can further find instructions on the handling of handguns and
Kalashnikovs and some general advice on how to operate in the US, followed by a
Q& A section. The last section concerns secure communication on the Internet
using an encryption program called Asrar al-Mujahideen.98
Inspire No. 11 (see above) is mainly praising the Boston Marathon bombings
without giving any further information on technical details or the modus ope-
randi.99
Inspire No. 12 sets out to establish a new concept entitled the “city wolves”.
The articles on the “Open Source Jihad” deal with car bombs in the US – but also
in the UK and France – and they further identify several targets, followed by the
detailed yet infamous illustrative guides.100
Inspire No. 13 contains programmatic articles on economic targets in the US.
These parts on economic warfare are followed by another detailed and illustrated
guide on how to build a DIY-hidden bomb. The guide shows the reader how to
assemble all parts of the bomb including the main charge and its components,
the explosion starter, a quick burning fuse or the detonator. Lastly, some ex-
periments are conducted with bomb, using security scanners at airports, a
thorough analysis on which airlines best to attack and the steps needed in order
96 Hijrah to the Islamic State, s.l. : 2015.
97 As mentioned in Arabic-language magazines (see above).
98 Lone Mujahid Pocketbook Spring 1434 (2013), s.l. : al-Malahem Media 2013.
99 Inspire No. 11, Spring 1434 (2013).
100 Inpire No. 12, Spring 1435 (2014).
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to succeed in this endeavour. The article ends with an identification of potential
targets for an attack on important economic figures in the US.101
Inspire No. 14 begins with an introduction to the “Open Source Jihad” (OSJ)
and with a hint that a water bottle might be more likely to be confiscated by a
security officer than a bomb. The OSJ section furthermore covers a guide to
assassination operations in the already established usual detailed manner. A
guide on how to build a homemade hand grenade with a timer follows, whilst this
issue concludes with a more detailed identification of high profile economic
targets previously discussed in issue no. 13.102
The cover of Inspire No. 15103 features a threatening illustration of a man with
a hoodie, looming in the dark and watching a family home with all its windows
illuminated. The issue has been titled “professional assassinations” with the
subtitle “home assassinations.” The first article related to the context of our
research is a call for a “knife revolution” in the US referring to the knife attacks of
Palestinians in Israel. In the following article on the “lone jihad” and the pro-
posed strategy and tactics we can find this definition:
“It is a term made up of two parts: The first is Jihād: It is to make every effort to strive,
and to endure in fighting the enemy. The second is fardy (individually): and what is
intended by Lone Jihād is that the brother should implement jihād, as we have defined,
but individually and independently in the land of the kuffar without having to report to
the Mujahideen leadership. And this individualism and independence is the main
reason for it (Lone Jihād) to be termed as a Lone Wolf attack.”104
The reference to the “mujahideen leadership” indicates that the concept means
to not engage in centralized operations, which, however, does not mean non-
organized operations. This is a good example of the collective organization of
lone wolf attacks. Inspire No. 15 consequently continues with a guide to pro-
fessional assassinations, with the techniques associated with home assassi-
nations and with illustrated guides on how to build parcel bombs, magnetic car
bombs or door-trap bombs.
Inspire No. 16105 introduces the Inspire Guides series featuring attacks in New
Jersey, Minnesota, and in the Chelsea neighbourhood of New York by stabbings
and pressure cooker bombs. The next article contains an illustrated overview of
the use of pressure cooker bombs, whereas later in this issue, the rulings for this
kind of operations, embedding them explicitly in the coherent jihadi theology of
violence, become a central theme.
101 Inspire No. 13, Winter 1436 (2014).
102 Inspire No. 14, Summer 1436 (2015).
103 Inspire No. 15, Spring 1437 (2016).
104 Inspire No. 15, Spring 1437 (2016), p. 43.
105 Inspire No. 16, Autumn 1438 (2016).
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Inspire No. 17106 deals with “train derail operations” and US railways are
consequently identified as a crucial part of the country’s infrastructure. Indeed,
transportation is described as a primary target for economic warfare107 and a
tabular presentation offers an overview over four lone wolf operations. The
attached interview with the leader of the al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghrib
(AQIM), Abu Musab Abdel Wadud, states the following:
“For example, America, France and other countries which have faced this form of Jihadi
operations have not been able to devise fool-proof methods of countering this phe-
nomenon. Intelligence is often useless with regards to an individual Mujahid, since he
doesn’t need mobile communication or social media networks. Investigation is also
ineffective because in most situations he doesn’t need weapons, storage dumps or
explosives. So before the execution phase, it is very difficult for even the most pro-
fessional of intelligence agencies to detect the likelihood of such an operation.”108
This passage may indicate the confidence Abdel Wadud may have in the oper-
ations and showcase the insecurity he aims to likes to instil within the European
and North American societies. In the next part of the journal, which features a
timeline of train accidents in the US since 1904, further encouragement can be
distilled from the writings. The following article deals with the “security for the
lone mujahid” and especially with “psychological security”, linking it to jihadi
theology. Derailing operations and their preparation is central to the next sec-
tion, especially since the focus has ben put on building a homemade derail tool
and on the fact that is approach does not involve suicide and can thus be re-
peated. The section concludes with an overview of the US railway network.
To the complex of publications related to Inspire we may add the – now
offline – telegram channel Inspire Muslims and the related Inspire Guides:
– No. 1 “Orlando Operation” includes a) a description of the attack on the
nightclub in Florida, b) analysing the “advantages”, c) stressing character-
istics, and d) a guideline for future attacks109.
– No. 2110 “Nice Operation, France” contains a) a description of the attack,
b) stressing characteristics, c) the message of the attack and d) reference to
Inspire No. 2 (see above) for additional ideas for attackers.
– No. 3111 “Commenting on the arrests od Muslim sisters in France” is basically a
short commentary on the arrests in France.
106 Inspire No. 17, Summer 1438 (2017).
107 Economic warfare is understood as a vital aspect in other – Arabic language (!) – com-
munication of AQAP. See Rüdiger Lohlker, Roadmap to Terror in Saudi-Arabia (https://
islamicstudiespapers.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/astop-8.pdf) (accessed March 17, 2018).
108 Inspire No. 17, Summer 1438 (2017), p. 51.
109 Inspire Guide No. 1: Orlando Operation, June 17, 2016.
110 Inspire Guide No. 2: Nice Operation, France, July 17, 2016.
111 Inspire Guide No. 3: Comment on arresting Muslim Sisters in France, September 10, 2016.
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– No. 4 is to be found in Inspire No. 16 (see above).
– No. 5112 “The British Parliament Operation in London” features a) a general
analysis of the attack, b) its message, and c) comments and advice.
Some of the guides and articles from the Inspire magazines113 are translated into
Arabic, which closes the cycle reaching the military practice of al-Qaeda in the
Arab Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen in the Arabic language using original sources
in English. We shall not discuss the cross-organizational reference to AQAP
materials by IS-related online communication at this point.
In sum, looking at the aforementioned summaries of jihadi magazines we
might say that the impact of Arabic language communication, contrary to evi-
dence-based research, is still widely ignored. Indeed, only considering English-
language as a valid expression of the overall strategy of i. e. IS propaganda
magazines appears to be a rather limited and narrow approach.114 Burying ones
head in the sand is – and has never been – a valid strategy for understanding
jihadism. The “implications” of such a strategy may in fact be negligent since
magazines are just a small part of the military information that circulates within
jihadi circles. Of far greater importance is the Arabic-language material dis-
seminated via telegram and on other platforms in cyberspace. The impact of that
ignorance may be demonstrated by the ‘news’ of jihadi weapons markets.
How to buy Weapons via telegram-channels
In November 2017 the – not so new – news of a market for weapons and other
military ordnance at telegram were published by Foreign Policy.115 Leaving aside
the fact that not 5000 users are buying and selling in the group “Market of
Mujahideen – Weapons- Souq Sham” any more, we have to state only 189
members are still active. Quite a loss of customers. Still available are firearms,
mobile phones, ammunition, sandals, running shoes, a German passport and
some sheep (may an error?). There are other similar groups available on tele-
112 Inspire Guide No.5: The British Parliament Operation in London, March 23, 2017.
113 E. g., Harrid No. 8 (2011/1432h).
114 Haroro J. Ingram, Islamic State’s English-language magazines, 2014-2017: Trends & im-
plications for CT-CVE strategic communications, March 2018 (ICCT Research Paper)
(https ://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ICCT-Ingram-Islamic-State-English-Lang
uage-Magazines-March2018-1.pdf) (accessed March 17, 2018).
115 Adam Rawnsley et al., The Messaging App Fueling Syria’s Insurgency, in Foreign Policy
(http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/06/the-messaging-app-fueling-syrias-insurgency-tele
gram-arms-weapons/) (accessed May 10, 2018).
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gram established in May 2018, none of them active. These black markets evi-
dently do not work. Arms trafficking in Syria is done by using other channels.116
Comparing these ‘shocking’ newsbit with the reality of arms trafficking in the
Arab world, the importance evidently is in decline. On Facebook you easily find
news about arms being sold, e. g., in Cairo117 or in Libya, calling itsellf “Facebook
the principal market for weapons in Libya”. Arab Facebook groups on weapons
have 115,846 likes (sūq al-silāh al-’arabiyy li-muhibbi l-asliha al-nariyya) or –
run by a gun store in New York, NY (!) (al-silāhlı̄k), having 49,157 likes.118
Grabbing the headlines may be a way to promote telegram as the ultimate evil
– leaving aside the ominous dark web – online without understanding the Arab
contexts of a peripheral region of the world system breaking apart – when
Facebook is available. Let us return to serious research about jihadi military
knowledge disseminated online!
Military Knowledge
Talking about lone wolves etc. should not lead us to the idea that virtual warfare
does not include an attempt to understand the military apparatus and concepts
of jihadis. Indeed, jihadi telegram-channels provide a basic reminder in this
regard since they also explain how to take care of weapons.119 Some basic rules
are:
1) clean the weapon regularly and without being negligent
2) check and test the weapon before and after it is used
3) clean the weapon with oil
4) avoid the weapon being exposed to high humidity
5) wrap the weapon in a piece of cloth soaked with a little bit oil when not using
it.
This example for a virtualized training camp (see above) provides information to
the mujahids, which can be applied in combat situations. We will discuss some
examples and additional material in future research.
Of immediate concern for the mujahidin on the battlefield is a precise iden-
116 E. g., Small Arms Survey, Fire and Forget: The Proliferation of Man-portable Air Defence
Systems in Syria (The Proliferation of Man-portable Air Defence Systems in Syria) (accessed
May 05, 2018).
117 http://aswatmisriya.com/new/details/55676 (posted March 13, 2013) (accessed June 02,
2018).
118 Via https://www.middleeast-online.com/ (posted April 09, 2016) (accessed June 02, 2018).
119 Taktı̄kāt ‘askariyya: ma’lūmāt yahtajuhu l-mujāhidı̄n, telegram.me, September 23, 2017.
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tification of the weaponry used by the enemy.120 This is can be achieved through
technical briefs and illustrations of i. e. F-18 Hornet fighters, unmanned Boeing
X-45, B2 and B 52 bomber together, F-22 Raptor fighter, A-10 Thunderbolt II,
MIG-29, Sukhoi T-50 amongst other aircrafts mentioned. Cluster bombs are of
concern too, which is demonstrated in a video and in great detail featuring iron
arrows. We can compare this to the magazines mentioned above. Magazines and
online information of this kind can be regarded as reinforcing each other
through feedback loops.
Often discussed (see below) are training instructions for snipers and the
principles of sharpshooting.121 The same channel debates long distance guns like
the Steyr-Mannlicher HS-50.122 Yet another channel contains detailed descrip-
tions of a twin-barrelled anti-aircraft ZU 23-23-2 autocannon which is used by
the Iranian armed forces. This may be another example of knowing the enemy
and his weapons in case of their acquisition by jihadis. An illustrated guide on
how to construct a handle for a gun is also mentioned123 aside of a series of posts
that deal with a detailed explanation of other weapons and further means of
warfare. In this regard, a very detailed 86 pages booklet on “military chemistry”
– a necessary prerequisite for bomb-making – has been made widely available on
several telegram channels.124 In the following parts of this series of articles we can
continue tracing the readily available military guides and their different char-
acter. For now, we will turn our attention to two comprehensive packages of files
that represent jihadi military knowledge.
The second package of files has been titled “lone wolves” (see above) but we
shall turn to another one first. Carrying the title “making small and high ex-
plosive IEDs” the package contains an illustrated guide in twelve pictures. We can
assume that this knowledge has already been available before the actual mag-
azines mentioned above were published. This part of the audio-visual-scriptural
complex of jihadi knowledge,125 a complex discernible in the material analysed
below, will be looked at in connection with an impressive repository of jihadi
120 The following data are to be found in the telegram channel Taktı̄kāt ‘askariyya: ma’lūmāt
yahtajuhā al-mujāhidı̄n, telegram.me.
121 E. g, Al-qunnāsa ‘al-rimāya’, telegram.me, interestingly the same channel offers a guideline
for the use of radar by the Yemeni army (Taktı̄kāt ‘askariyya: ma’lūmāt yahtajuhā al-
mujāhidı̄n, posted January 10, 2018) another case of knowing if you are able to acquire his
weaponry and technical means.
122 Taktı̄kāt ‘askariyya: ma’lūmāt yahtajuhā al-mujāhidı̄n, posted January 1, 2018.
123 Abū Khattāb al-‘Irāqı̄ li‘l-akhbār al-‘āmma, posted March 5, 2018. This channel is now
offline.
124 Mukhtasar Kitāb Dalı̄l al-Kı̄miyā‘ al-‘askariyya via Taktı̄kāt ‘askariyya: ma’lūmāt yahtajuhā
al-mujāhidı̄n, posted March 5, 2018.
125
˘
ubuwwāt nāsifa saghı̄ra shadı̄dat al-infijār via different channels on telegram.me (accessed
March 6, 2018).
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military knowledge. Lets continue in the correct order now and focus on the first
package entitled “lone wolves”.
The Knowledge of Lone Wolves
The collection of the numerous files titled “Lone Wolves” (al-dhi ˘āb l-munfarida)
starts with an animated cover stating: “It is not allowed to use the content against
Muslims” – Thinking of the many feuds among jihadi groups, this advice appears
to not be followed strictly.
In a separate section, we can find videos on jihadi training camps, i. e. of the
Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan including a mixed soundtrack of mostly Arabic re-
ligious hymns and depicting physical training, combat training, and even
medical check-ups of the fighters. These kinds of videos demonstrate the
readiness of the fighters and try to increase the appeal of the group and its
“Mujahideen Special Group” (MSG) for young men who are seeking an oppor-
tunity and context in which to act as true men.126 Furthermore, the video can also
be understood as a counter-propaganda attempt and showing the skilful prowess
of the MSG in comparison its enemies.
In the text section of the “Lone wolves” collection, we can find a booklet on
security and intelligence within an Islamic context127, followed by a second and
third issue.128 The next booklet discusses general principles of security, like
Lone Wolves
126 Research into jihadi masculinities is still to be done.
127 Markaz al-fajr li‘l-i‘lām, Barnāmaj sinā‘at al-irhāb, Vol.1: July 24, 2010 (Sha‘bān 13, 1431h).
128 Same dates.
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mindfulness and prevention of faulty operations.129 Two other booklet deal with
the same issues.130
The first English-language videos feature instructions on how to build simple
detonators, fuses, etc. and further present several examples of various bombs,
which is intended to demonstrate the wide range and different kinds of ex-
plosions. Most of these explosions are shown in the open countryside, a few
detonations happen underwater, others destroy buildings or detonate some-
where in the woods, but most of them are merely collected from the Internet and
put into a new jihadi context.
Another video from the old Shumūkh al-islām und al-Fallūja jihadi forum
shows the mixing of some basic material needed for explosives. A course for
building these explosives is called “Explosives made easy” (al-mutafajjirāt al-
sahla),131 which provides detailed introduction, rich illustrations and very pre-
cise descriptions. A list of the material used concludes the course, whereas some
other issues that are discussed include IEDs (see above), suicide bomber vests,
hand grenades etc. Another, similar course is called “Explosives popular” (al-
mutafajjirāt al-sha‘biyya).132 Here, a video demonstrates how to build a deto-
nator by using a remote centerlock device. In the background we can hear music
– a jihadi nashı̄d. An Arabic version on “How to make a bomb in your mother’s
kitchen” (see above) has been provided too – An English/Arabic blend of jihadi
military information (see above).133
Turning to texts again we can encounter a short written piece on IEDs – es-
pecially cluster bombs – and on how to be apply them.134 A one-pager lists the
prerequisites for building a smoke bomb.135 Another text contains a detailed
description of cylindric IEDs, focussing on bullets and shrapnel,136 whilst a text
on the different kinds of hollow charges is also available.137 Remote-controlled
mines, like Claymore mines are described in another text138, some thoughts on
how to build a directed charge are available too139 and a variety of explosives are
described as IEDs that can be used against armoured vehicles.140 Truly, we have a
comprehensive encyclopaedia of explosives at our disposal.






Abdallāh, al-Mutafajjirāt al-sahla, s.l. Rabı̄‘ al-awwal 1430h.
132 Tāriq Ismā‘ı̄l Kākhiyā, al-Mutafajjirāt al-sha‘biyya.
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Another group of texts discusses cluster bombs (
˘
unqūdiyya)141, some basic
knowledge on rockets142, toxicology143, and – yet again – an introduction to
explosives.144 Other texts provide us with short introductions to explosives145,
which gives the aspiring jihadi a more general idea where more detailed guides
might be found. We could continue to explore this large number of files on
explosives but for now we must close this section with the “Special course on
Explosives for the beginning jihadi” by Dhu l-bijadayn, a well-known jihadi
writer on this very issue.146
This special course available as several Arabic-language videos introduces the
use of binoculars (even offering a Q& A session), night-vision goggles and some
multi-purpose tools – as usual, embedded in a religious context. Another Arabic-
language and web-harvested video includes tutorials on kick-boxing, which in
turn has been supplemented by a video on self-defence. A special text covers the
military use of knives.147
A chapter of the older and slightly out-dated jihadi magazine Mu‘askar al-
battār (see above) encompasses a good introduction to the handling of an RPG
– the most-frequently used anti-tank weapon system148 – and an analysis of
Russian tanks hints towards selecting these tanks for the next attack.149 The
analytical part, however, does not stop there and also includes Russian rocket
launchers,150 which once more illustrate the jihadi attempt to know the enemy.
A five-part series also offers a course in sniping, which has been published
by the Palestinian
˘
Izz al-dı̄n al-Qassām brigades.151 The very detailed course
covers basic principles of camouflage (part 1), training in precision shooting
(part 2), precision shooting of rifles and their handling (part 3), sniper rifle
stand, mechanics and the riflescope (part 4) and lastly the influence of wind








144 Abū Hafs al-Lubnānı̄,
˘
Ilm al-mutafajjirāt with several pages introduction on jihadi theo-
logical contexts.
145 al-Hashwa al-mutafajjira ma‘a al-suwar, al-Mutafajjirāt, al-Mutafajjirāt al-qāsima, al-
Mutafajjirāt al-sahla (mentioned above), and Sawa‘iq al-mutafajjirāt.
146 Rüdiger Lohlker, “Al-Qaeda Airlines: Jihadi Self-Assessment and the Ideology of Engi-
neers”, in Rüdiger Lohlker/Tamara Abu-Hamdeh (eds.), Jihadi Thought and Ideology, Ber-
lin: Logos 2013, pp. 5–15.
147 Abū al-Hasan al-Hanafı̄, al-Sikkı̄n al-‘askarı̄: silāh al-muqātil al-salafı̄, s. l. : s. d.
148 Al-Barrā‘ al-Qahtānı̄, Mudāddāt al-durū‘; older versions of RPGs are described.
149 al-Dabābāt ; interesting the use of some German language illustration.
150 Rāgimat al-sawārı̄kh al-muta‘addida al-mahāmm.
151 The military wing of the Palestinian HAMAS.
152 Silsilat “wa-‘iddū” 2, part 1–5. The title of the publication is referring to the Quran.
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package, is a video about/against Copts in Egypt making sense if we con-
textualize in jihadi theology.
A jihadi theological collection of texts gives answers to questions on the
legitimacy of the military jihad.153 The text has been written by the most
prominent – at least for some time – author of IS named Bin‘alı̄.154 Again, we can
notice the fusion of theological and military aspects, whilst a wide range of other
theological texts is also readily available. For example, one of these other texts
(evidently referring to Saudi Arabia) links the military forces, police units, na-
tional guard to pure unbelief as they are considered to be a force against true
Islam (=jihadism).155
Mobile phones and Internet security is also frequently discussed in many texts –
most prominently, in this very collection, we can find a twelve-part course on
mobile phone security.156 Other texts deal with “Electronic Warfare and the Neg-
ligence of Supporters of the Islamic State”157, security on Twitter158, or with a ten-
pages text on mobile phone protection.159 The platform telegram is also discussed
and the writer engages in a monologue on its usefulness and problems. Of utmost
importance are the documents on chemical and biological warfare, which we will
assess in the following part of this series. For the moment, we shall restrict our-
selves to only mentioning an article on anthrax, which in turn contains an analysis
on the Aum Shinrikyo attack in Japan160, one document on nerve gas161, one on
nicotine162 and a fundamentals document on concentrating liquids.163
153 Turkı̄ bin Mubārak al-Bin‘alı̄, al-Qindı̄l fı̄ radd al-abātı̄l, s. l. : al-Wafā‘ 2014–15.
154 For him and his theological positions see Lohlker, Theologie and more recent postings on
jihadica.com.
155 al-Āyāt wa‘l-ahādı̄th al-dālla
˘
alā kufr.
156 Dawrat amn al-hawātif al-dhakiyya. Compare the contribution of Clemens Holzgruber in
this volume.
157 Al-Harb al-iliktrūniyya wa-ghaflat ansār al-dawla al-islāmiyya.
158 Kayfa tugharrid fı̄ Twitter bi-amān (bi‘dhn allāh).
159 Dalı̄l al-himāya al-iliktrūniyya li‘l-hawātif al-dhakiyya.
160 al-Jamra al-khabı̄tha. For the case of Aum Shinrikyo see Ian Reader, Religious violence in
contemporary Japan: the case of Aum Shinrikyo, Richmond: Curzon 2000; for their bio-
logical and chemical weapons program see Richard Danzig et al. , Aum Shinrikyo: Insights
into how Terrorists develop biological and chemical Weapons, Washington, DC: CNAS 20122.
161
˘
Abdallāh Dhu l-Bijadayn, Hal kammiyya 27 cm3 min ayy mādda sāmma aw mushsha‘a
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Silencer
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Jihadism and Arabo-Islamic Mainstream
As seen in many other fields and activities, jihadis pick up materials that may
appear like mainstream Arabic-language texts on the first glance. After a careful
re-contextualization jihadi channels use these works, distribute them as jihadi
ideas and embed their thought in Islamic thought and history.164 One important
aspect of jihadi thought in this regard is the appropriation of Arab heroes of the
early Arabo-Islamic conquest as a point of reference. The prominent military
commander Khālid b. al-Walı̄d, for example, has often been referred to by jihadi
groups, linking the jihadi framework to Arabo-Islamic tradition.165
As mentioned above some comprehensive general courses on jihadi warfare,
strategies, operational art, tactics are commonly available. A series of audio files
(39 MP3 files) provides us with insights ranging from principles of security to a
detailed description of guerrilla warfare – partly based on the history of different
theatres of war. The title of the series is quite programmatic “The Art of ter-
rorism” (sinā‘at al-irhāb) and very prominent among jihadi media products.
In this context, we can consider such publications an important aspect is
jihadi tradition building. One important element essential to this process is the
republication of older jihadi magazine like Mu‘askar al-battār (see above). We
can find several articles referring to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (another
cross-conflict movement), an article on different varieties of Uzi submachine
guns, texts on physical training, advices on identifying urban targets, techniques
of camouflage and general security and counterintelligence matters in issue
No. 7 of this very publication. Also Arabo-Islamic poetry and traditions are
interspersed in the Mu‘askar al-battār166 and we can immediately identify the
unique jihadi blend of political analysis, operational art, weapons, counter-
intelligence and the theological input, which in sum produces a coherent
worldview.
Other issues of the magazine that have been republished are No. 1 up until
No. 6. Some of the issues cover specific problems like rural or mountain warfare
(No. 5), the M-16 gun (No. 4), or moving secretly in urban areas and cities
(No. 6). Many other issues of the ‘classical’ jihadi magazine Mu‘askar al-battār
are available and now link the newer ‘lone wolves’ to the jihadi tradition of urban
warfare. A recent series of posts thus include audio files by the ‘historical’ leader
of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Yūsuf al-‘Ayerı̄ (d. 2003) and on his
164 To give one example: Bassām al-‘Asalı̄, Fann al-harb al-islāmı̄, Vol.1–4, Beirut: Dār al-fikr
1988. The publishing house is a large Arabic publisher. Interestingly the fourth volume
reaches until the crusades being a link to contemporary jihadi ideas – at least for jihadis.
165 See Ahmad Bek al-Lahhām,
˘
Abqariyya Khālid b. al-Walı̄d al-‘askariyya, Jeddah: Dār al-
manāra 1986.
166 Mu‘askar al-battār No 7 (Safar 1325h).
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views on guerrilla warfare in general and urban warfare in specific.167 Hence we
can recognise the multidimensional republishing of sources from the jihadi
tradition, which has been tailored towards the operational needs of present day
jihadis.
The lone wolves repository – we have only selected a few resources to give us
an idea of what is readily available – demonstrates the ability of jihadis to con-
struct and use a wide range of weapons, military materials and devices to attack
their enemies. With regards to the utilization of drones, the ability to produce
ammunition and possibly engage in gunsmithing in the future on a large scale,
we can conclude that all the information that has been put on the Web and what
has been practiced and thought by well trained and experienced technicians,
capable to disseminate their knowledge, may paint a more comprehensive pic-
ture of what jihadism means online – and in Arabic – today.
A last remark: Regarding the most recent attacks using cars (not car
bombs!168) another perspective may be useful in order to understand the rela-
tionship between jihadi operations and the broader specter of societal violence.
Since even Wikipedia provides entries on “vehicular homicide,” “rampage
killing,” and “road rage” it is clearly case of misattribution if one attempts
contextualize these attacks as mere varieties of jihadi operations. Some recent
cases committed by a driver in Germany, killing civilians and ultimately ending
in the suicide of the driver (Münster, Cottbus 2018) gave birth to the discussion if
this suicide method by car and committed by drivers with psychical problems
could perhaps be caused by the “echo chamber” of jihadi car attacks. However,
this simply ignores decades and numerous cases of attacks in which cars have
been used as weapons.169 Indeed, another example that illustrates the common
refusal to understand that jihadis are adopting societal possibilities in their
pursuit of attacking societies.170
The material we presented is collected through careful research of many
different jihadi online resources and tries to give an idea of the ongoing highly
interconnected Arabic-language discussion of Jihadis online. Without knowing
this discussion a thorough understanding of what is meant by jihadism and the
operational capabilities of jihadis globally is impossible.
167 Published on telegram channel dawla al-khilāfa (posted April 14, 2018).
168 Although car bombs are part of the imaginaire of cars as weapons (see Mike Davis, Buda’s
Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb, London/Brooklyn, NY: Verso 2017 who gives some
other links to the history of jihadism) attacks by cars driving into groups oh humans are
often separated from it.
169 E. g., Josef Augstein, “Auto-Attacke in Münster : Islamistische Hintergründe”, in Der Spiegel
April 9, 2018 (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/muenster-islamistische-hinter
gruende-kolumne-von-jakob-augstein-a-1201922.html) (accessed April 10, 2018).
170 We may remember that Inspire was created by an US citizen being well aware of the role of
cars in US society.
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Ali Fisher
Interrogating the electronic ribat: Data Science in the study of
the Jihadist movement
The internet has become a great medium for spreading
the call of Jihad and following the news of the mujahideen.
Anwar al-Awlaki1
In the 1980s scholars had to find ways to physically gather print material, audio
tapes, VHS and later DVD. However, the growing use of the internet by the
Jihadist movement since the 1990s created the opportunity for sympathisers and
scholars around the world to accesses, read, watch, listen and engage with that
content digitally. What began as electronic scans of print material and video
content transfered from VHS and DVD, is now a digital publishing system de-
livering content simultaneously in physical and digital form.
The rationale for this was set out in a statement issued by al-Fajr on May 6th
2011;
Internet is a battlefield for jihad, a place for missionary work, a field of confronting the
enemies of God. It is upon any individual to consider himself as a media-mujahid,
dedicating himself, his wealth and his time for God.2
Anwar al-Awlaki in his 44 Ways to Support Jihad suggested a range of ways in
which the brothers and sisters could be “internet mujahideen” by contributing in
one or more of the following ways:
– Establishing discussion forums that offer a free, uncensored medium for
posting information relating to Jihad.
– Establishing email lists to share information with interested brothers and
sisters.
– Posting or emailing Jihad literature and news.
– Setting up websites to cover specific areas of Jihad, such as: mujahideen news,
Muslim POWs, and Jihad literature.3
1 Anwar al-Awlaki, 44 Ways to Support Jihad, Victorious Media.
2 Quoted in; Nico Prucha, “Online Territories of Terror – Utilizing the Internet for Jihadist
Endeavors”, ORIENT IV (2011), p. 46.
3 Anwar al-Awlaki, 44 Ways to Support Jihad, Victorious Media.
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As the available technology has changed, the Media Mujahidin have continued to
evolve, reconfigure, and explore the opportunities as part of the Swarmcast.4
They have purpose-built programs such as the 2007 release of Asrar al-Muja-
hidin intended to facilitate secure communication with Islamic State Iraq
amongst other jihadist groups, the Dawn of Glad Tidings Twitter app, Telegram
bots, and browser plugins for Chrome and Firefox. Equally, the volume of con-
tent and range of platforms used to disseminate content has expanded rapidly
including beacons such as Twitter and Telegram, and content stores such as
YouTube and Vimeo, Archive.org, Amazon Cloud and OneDrive.
This has created the potential for researchers to access and study the content
which circulates within the Jihadist information ecosystem, and indeed to take a
macroscopic view of the information ecosystem itself. Unfortunately, while the
opportunity to gather data on the authoritive elements of the jihadist movement
exists, few studies which claim to conduct data analysis have genuinely embraced
the opportunity of Data Science based approaches.
Instead of genuine data science, there has been an explosion in ‘tweet-ready’
punditry which fails to grapple adequately with the challenge of integrating
genuine subject matter expertise with the methodological rigor required for Data
Science. Dogged by poor data acquisition, substandard analysis and misleading
graphs, many studies have become entangled in the challenges identified in the
articles which created the foundations for ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’. As a
result, Just as John Vasquez noted in The War Puzzle, “much has been written
about the causes of war ; little has been learned about the subject” similar could
be said for the volume of content and commentary produced about the use of the
internet by the jihadist movement.5
This chapter examines current uses of data in the study of the Jihadist
movement and highlights some significant limitations in studies which are
emblematic of wider problems in the field. It then provides an outline of what
data science is, and how the study of the jihadist movement must be built on data
science which provides an authentic representation of the movement. It con-
cludes with a framework for how data science could be employed to produce an
authentic representation of the movement to avoid the many methodological
shortcomings exhibited by current analysis which has pushed claims of decline
and ‘total collapse’.
4 Ali Fisher, “How jihadist networks maintain a persistent online presence.” Perspectives on
Terrorism, 9.3 (2015).
5 John Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) p. 3.
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The online Jihadist movement
Reviewing the massive increase in articles since 9/11, Richard Jackson observed
“the vast majority of this literature can be criticised for its orientalist outlook, its
political biases and its descriptive over-generalisations, misconceptions and lack
of empirically grounded knowledge”.6
Over generalisation and lack of empirical grounding in the extensive archive
of Jihadist documents in Arabic has lead the attempt to understand the jihadist
movement in terms of street criminals, gangsters, individuals obsessed with
computer games (particularly first-person shooters), and a desire to go from
zero-to-hero.7 As highlighted by Nico Prucha:
these interpretations often lack any attempt to address the theological aspects of the
movement … and prominence of scholars within the Jihadist movement’s overall in-
terpretation of theological concepts, including an Islamic State model of governance.8
6 Jackson, Richard. “The Study of Terrorism 10 Years after 9/11: Successes, Issues, Challenges.”
Uluslararası İlişkiler 8.32 (2012): 1–16. Jackson, R. ‘Constructing Enemies: “Islamic Terro-
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Interpreting the work of the media mujahidin as marketing or in terms of their
‘brand’, fails to comprehend the role of their work within the movement.9
Similarly, focusing social media, images, infographics and videos as ways of
branding the jihadist movement, confuses the purpose of Jihad and da’wa;10 As
Abdullah Azzam highlighted in one of the modern foundational documents of
the Jihadist movement,
Jihad is Da’wah with a force, and is obligatory to perform with all available capabilities,
until there remains only Muslims or people who submit to Islam.11
Da’wa is not focused on marketing or nor branding jihad – it is the purpose
toward which Jihad is conducted. The confusion stems from, as Richard Jackson
wrote about the study of terrorism more generally, “large numbers of new
scholars lacking adequate grounding in the existing literature; and a persistent
tendency to treat the current terrorist threat as unprecedented and excep-
tional”.12
Instead of building the understanding of the foundational documents of the
Jihadist da’wa, research falls back onto familiar western frames of reference such
as Hollywood, rather than deep-rooted research on Islamic theology.13
These interpretations originate from the attempt to view the subject matter
– Jihadist media – through a Western and predominantly English language lens.
In this lens, not even Latinized Arabic key words from the rich blend of Arabic
dominated theological motifs are reflected upon sufficiently. This traps the in-
terpretation within specific perceptive dispositions that Pierre Bourdieu calls
9 van Lieshout, Jan, and Robert Beeres. “Strategic Counter-Marketing to Fight ISIL.” Nether-
lands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017. TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2017.
181–194.Gates, Scott, and Sukanya Podder. “Social media, recruitment, allegiance and the
Islamic State.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9.4 (2015). Ingram, Haroro J. “Three traits of the
Islamic State’s information warfare.” The RUSI Journal 159.6 (2014): 4–11. Liang, Christina
Schori. “Cyber Jihad: understanding and countering Islamic State propaganda.” GSCP Policy
Paper 2 (2015): 4. Saltman, Erin Marie, and Charlie Winter. “Islamic state: The changing face
of modern jihadism.” London: Quilliam Foundation (2014): 1–71. Charlie Winter (2018)
Apocalypse, later : a longitudinal study of the Islamic State brand, Critical Studies in Media
Communication, 35:1, 103–121, Winter, Charlie. “The virtual ‘caliphate’: Understanding
Islamic State’s propaganda strategy.” (2015). Atwan, Abdel Bari. Islamic state: The digital
caliphate. Univ of California Press, 2015. Speckhard, Anne, and Ahmet S. Yayla. “Eyewitness
accounts from recent defectors from Islamic State: Why they joined, what they saw, why they
quit.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9.6 (2015).
10 https://twitter.com/ICSR_Centre/status/866222658169524224; https://twitter.com/ICSR_
Centre/status/911201218101481472.
11 Hashiyat ash-Shouruni and Ibn al-Qasim in Tahfa al-Mahtaj ‘ala al-Minhaj 9/213Quoted by
Abdullah Azzam, Defence of the Muslim Lands, (English translation work done jihadist
media).
12 Richard Jackson, The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and
Future Developments, Political Studies Review, 7, 2, (171–184), (2009).
13 Marshall, Alex. “How Isis got its anthem.” The Guardian 2015 (2014).
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habitus.14 These interpretations frequently lack any attempt to address the
theological aspects of the movement, even the simple references in the titles of
media products go unnoticed.
This, as a consequence, leaves the analysis dislocated from the repeated ref-
erencing of the concepts, which link together to construct chains that anchor
contemporary media to the foundations created by scholars stretching back
through the history of Jihadist writing, (and furthermore, the selective, yet co-
herent use of historical writings used by jihadists to enhance and enrich their
posture).
For example, most discussion and interpretation of the series Salil al-Sawarim
(SAS), located in a Western habitus, focused on the Hollywood style or slick
production values – just as understanding of the movement often revolves
around ideas of ‘brand’ and ‘marketing’. However, Salil al-Sawarim:
is particularly illustrative of this emphasis on theology. Readers sufficiently initiated
into the mainly Arabic language corpus of Sunni extremist theology will understand the
title’s particular reference right away ; it refers to the book al-Sarim al-maslul ‘ala
shatim al-rasul, “the Sharp Sword on whoever Insults the Prophet.” Its author is 13th
century Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328 AD).15
Equally consider the sound effect used to underscore references to Ibn Tay-
miyya’s writings in numerous AQ and IS videos. It is no coincidence that it is a
high pitched metallic sound effect which recreates a sword being drawn from its
scabbard. Without an attempt to address the theological aspects of the move-
ment, nor encoded cultural understandings, and the meaning evident to those
from (or sufficiently initiated into) an alternative habitus.
As William Rowlandson argues, definitions are “really a debate about who
owns the words”.16 Framing the interpretation of Jihadist media within a Western
habitus focuses interpretation firmly within the comfort zone of English
speaking commentators who often have little familiarity with the theological and
historical reference points used by the movement, nor a nuanced understanding
of the concepts expressed by Jihadists in over 300,000 pages of Arabic. To
maintain their ownership over such interpretations, it has become increasingly
important for some commentators to downplay the role of theology, talk up the
importance of pictures, and research the use of western languages.17




16 Rowlandson, W. 2015. Imaginal Landscapes: Reflections on the Mystical Visions of Jorge Luis
Borges and Emanuel Swedenborg. London: Swedenborg Society.
17 https://www.nzz.ch/international/bei-islamistischer-radikalisierung-schauen-zu-viele-weg
-ld.1328748.
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– along with content easily found by western researchers – attempts to wrest the
analytical locus of the jihadist movement away from the complex, and unfamiliar
Arabic core – instead locating understanding within a Western habitus. This
approach fences off alternative world views and further seeks to extend Western
hegemonic ownership over meaning – developed since 9/11 became a moment of
universal temporal rupture.18
The impact of an approach dominated by a western habitus, further ex-
acerbates the frequently observed imbalance between the level of subject matter
and data analysis expertise and often leads to western assumptions about the
movement impacting study design, data acquisition and limiting the utility of
any research. For example, the data analysis of ISIS networks on VK, deployed a
robust data analysis approach for the online phase of the research, but from the
outset the research struggled with the subject matter. The authors appeared
surprised to find women prominent in the digital outreach efforts. However, as
Saudi former Usama bin Laden bodyguard and first-generation leader of AQAP
Yusuf al-‘Uyayri wrote in ‘The Role of the Women in Fighting the Enemies’:
the woman is an important element in the struggle today, and she must participate in it
with all of her capacity and with all of her passion. And her participation does not mean
the conclusion of the struggle – no. Rather, her participation is counted as a pillar from
amongst the pillars that cause victory and the continuation of the path.19
The document highlights women as fighters and participants in battle (muja-
hidah being the female form of mujahid):
[T]o show the importance of your role in this clash today between the religions of Kufr
and the Religion of Islam, and especially in the new crusade that the world is waging
against Islam and the Muslims under the leadership of America, then we must remind
you of an aspect of your role, reflected in the image of the Mujahidah of the Islamic
Golden Age.20
While acknowledging limitations on the involvement in battle – outside of
specific circumstances – the document states
… we want you to follow the women of the Salaf (female companions of the prophet) in
their incitement (inspire) to fight and their preparation for it and their patience on this
18 Toros, Harmonie. ““9/11 is alive and well” or how critical terrorism studies has sustained the
9/11 narrative.” Critical Studies on Terrorism 10.2 (2017): 203–219. http://www.tandfonline.
com/doi/full/10.1080/17539153.2017.1337326.
19 Yusuf Bin Salih Al-‘Uyayri, The Role Of The Women In Fighting The Enemies, (Translated
version) At-Tibyan Publications http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/2/6/e1501742.full.
20 Yusuf Bin Salih Al-‘Uyayri, The Role Of The Women In Fighting The Enemies, (Translated
version) At-Tibyan Publications http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/2/6/e1501742.full.
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path and their longing to participate in it with everything in return for the victory of
Islam.21
Far from being unlikely to be involved in online activities, this emphasis on
incitement, preparation, and participation should highlight the expected role
women may play within the online struggle – including on VK. Familiarity with
these texts is not just a niche historical interest. It is essential if research is to
continue without exhibiting content blindness.
AQAP theologians such as Yusuf al-‘Uyairi and their many writings have long
mattered to ISI(S) (not just in the time since they caught the attention of com-
mentators as they swept into Syria). Many of the Arabic language productions by
ISIS have strong lingual and theological ties to content produced by the original
incarnation of AQAP, yet ISIS was the first group to have the room, territory and
thus resource to apply the otherwise theoretical theology that was brought into
organized existence by key leaders and theologians such as al-‘Uyairi. His study
circles, strategic writings, and sober analysis of U.S. intervention into Iraq are
reflected in the structure and output of contemporary ISIS media releases and
notions. Furthermore, a eulogy of al-‘Uyairi (died 2003) by his brother in arms
al-‘Awshan (who was also killed shortly after) was downloaded nearly 3,000
times in just one core IS-Telegram channel.
Increasingly problematic for the production of authentic data science re-
search, are what Caron E. Gentry and Katherine E. Brown have shown to be the
dominance of particular approaches, including cultural essentialism and neo-
Orientalism, which can cause a ‘subordinating silence’ which veils particular
groups or perspectives from view.22 These, like many of insights derived from the
work on subordinating gendered narratives about terrorists who are perceived to
be biologically female, provide valuable perspectives and parallels closely the
issue of which parts of Jihadist ideational content matter to, or get attention from,
Western researchers and policymakers.
In the research on the electronic ribat, there is an ongoing disconnect between
Arabic sources and European language research, which is reflected in the ob-
session with English language magazines such as Dabiq,23 Rumiyah24 or com-
21 Yusuf Bin Salih Al-‘Uyayri, The Role Of The Women In Fighting The Enemies, (Translated
version) At-Tibyan Publications http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/2/6/e1501742.full.
22 Brown, Katherine E. 2011. “Blinded by the Explosion? Security and Resistance in Muslim
Women’s Suicide Terrorism,” in Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, eds. Women, Gender,
and Terrorism. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 194–226.
23 Krishna-Hensel, Sai Felicia. “Legitimizing the Caliphate and its politics: Moral disengage-
ment rhetoric in Dabiq.” Authoritarian and Populist Influences in the New Media. Routledge,
2017. 148–174. Nadia Al-Dayel & Aaron Anfinson (2017) “In the Words of the Enemy”: the
Islamic State’s reflexive projection of statehood, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11:1, 45–64.
Droogan, Julian, and Shane Peattie. “Mapping the thematic landscape of Dabiq magazine.”
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paring AQ and ISIS through their magazines such as Inspire and Dabiq.25 Despite
the hundreds of thousands of pages of content produced in Arabic, researchers
such as Haroro J. Ingram focus their analysis on English magazines, to “explore
the strategic logic of Islamic State (IS)” and specifically how “IS uses Dabiq to
‘sell’ [their] vision to English-speaking audiences, especially in the West”.26 This
echoes what Caron E. Gentry has shown from analysing which female partic-
ipants in martyrdom operations, gain media attention. The women who gain
attention are those “that present threats to the Western ‘us’ and not the Middle
Eastern ‘other’.” By contrast, for ‘women who did not (yet) pose a threat to
Western interests…, virtually no image exists in the public eye. They almost do
not exist’.27 One finds similar emphasis in the comparison of European language
content and ‘Foreign Fighters’ compared to Arabic documents and Arab fighters.
However, as the late Reuvan Paz noted in 2007, the movement is “almost entirely
directed in Arabic and its content is intimately tied to the socio-political context
of the Arab world”.28 Yet the vast majority of research focuses on European
language or secondary sources (or English Language social media accounts),
with significantly fewer studies of the Arabic sources and online presence –
despite Arabic being the primary and vastly more heavily used language of the
Jihadist movement.29
Australian Journal of International Affairs 71.6 (2017): 591–620. Gambhir, Harleen K.
“Dabiq: The strategic messaging of the Islamic State.” Institute for the Study of War 15 (2014).
Ingram, Haroro J. “An analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine.” Australian Journal of
Political Science 51.3 (2016): 458–477. AZMAN, NUR AZIEMAH. “ISLAMIC STATE’(IS)
PROPAGANDA: DABIQ AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF ‘ISLAMIC STATE.” Counter Ter-
rorist Trends and Analyses8.10 (2016): 3–8. Musial, Julia. ““My Muslim sister, indeed you are a
mujahidah”-Narratives in the propaganda of the Islamic State to address and radicalize
Western Women. An Exemplary analysis of the online magazine Dabiq.” Journal for Derad-
icalization 9 (2016): 39–100.
24 Wignell, Peter, et al. “A mixed methods empirical examination of changes in emphasis and
style in the extremist magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11.2 (2017):
2–20. Mahzam, Remy. “Rumiyah–Jihadist Propaganda & Information Warfare in Cy-
berspace.” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 9.3 (2017): 8–14.
25 Haroro J. Ingram (2016) An Analysis of Inspire and Dabiq: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic
State’s Propaganda War, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40:5, 357–375, Vallee, Charles.
“Digital Jihad: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Dabiq vs. Inspire.” International Institute for
Counter-Terrorism (2015). Reed, A. G., and Haroro J. Ingram. Exploring the Role of In-
structional Material in AQAP’s Inspire and ISIS’Rumiyah. Europol, 2017.
26 Ingram, Haroro J. “An analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine.” Australian Journal of
Political Science 51.3 (2016): 458–477.
27 Gentry, Caron E. 2011. “The Neo-Orientalist Narratives of Women’s Involvement in al-
Qaeda.” In Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, eds. Women, Gender, and Terrorism. Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 176–193.
28 Paz, Reuven. “Reading Their Lips: The Credibility of Jihadi Web Sites as ‘Soft Power’ in the
War of the Minds.” (2007).
29 Emblematic of this phenomenon see: Berger, J. M., and Heather Perez. The Islamic State’s
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Perhaps this is the content Western researchers are able to find, or because so
few researchers are able to listen to and understand the nuances of spoken Arabic
nor read Arabic quickly enough to digest the volume of content which circulates
in Arabic each week. It is hard to tell definitively which of these two interrelated
problems cause the phenomena, but the result is a vast overexposure of sources
in English compared to those texts meaningful to the core of the movement –
written in Arabic. This veil of silence significantly skews some computer science
based work towards English language sources, rather than the full breadth of the
movement.
For the understanding of the electronic ribat (and the movement more
broadly) the focus of analysis must first be core Arabic content. Any subsequent
transition to translations or content shared in other languages based on the
analysis of the core. Credible data science cannot focus on proxy metrics derived
from the periphery of the movement as a substitute for the much deeper and
more complex understanding required to penetrate the core.
Here the study of rhetoric in gender subordination provides a valuable ex-
planation of how such a process can cause a ‘veil of silence’ to descend over an
entire area of study perpetuating content blindness around Arabic Jihadist ar-
chive.
As Caron E. Gentry wrote:
Across time and place in global politics, rhetoric has often been used to perpetuate
certain social ‘truths’ and norms. A speaker or author uses language to direct an
audience toward a manufactured truth, one in which some information is emphasized
while other information is concealed. In this way, the speaker designates certain ideas,
norms, and events superior to others and ignores actions or events that might challenge
them.30
With a particular focus on neo-Orientalist Narratives, Gentry highlights:
The othering so intrinsic to neo-Orientalism is deeply troubling because it blinds
scholars, researchers, and law enforcers to any deeper realities or nuances in people’s
lives.31
Diminishing Returns on Twitter : How Suspensions are Limiting the Social Networks of Eng-
lish-speaking ISIS Supporters. George Washington University, 2016. Gambhir, Harleen K.
“Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State.” BACKGROUNDER (2014). Wignell,
Peter, et al. “A mixed methods empirical examination of changes in emphasis and style in the
extremist magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11.2 (2017): 2–20.
30 Gentry, Caron E. 2011. “The Neo-Orientalist Narratives of Women’s Involvement in al-
Qaeda.” In Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, eds. Women, Gender, and Terrorism. Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 176–193.
31 Gentry, Caron E. 2011. “The Neo-Orientalist Narratives of Women’s Involvement in al-
Qaeda.” In Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, eds. Women, Gender, and Terrorism. Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 176–193.
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No matter the particular cause, a persistent blindness amongst researchers to the
nuances and complexities of the jihadist movement contained in the Arabic
texts, undermines attempts to analyse the movement.
Solving the problems of the State
In addition to the veil cast over Arabic content, the research specific to the
jihadist movement and the electronic ribat (if ribat is understood at all) is
dominated by what Cox called a ’problem-solving’ approach.32 Specifically rel-
evant to the electronic ribat, “much of the research inquiry is largely restricted to
the assembling of information and data that would solve or eradicate the
‘problem’ as the state defines it”.33
As the earlier discussion of female bombers highlighted, threats to Western
interests can dominate research questions, rather than a genuine attempt to
understand a Jihadist group as the research subject. As Richard Jackson noted,
32 Robert Cox, 1981. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol.10, no.2, pp. 128–9. Gunning,
Jeroen. “A case for critical terrorism studies?” Government and Opposition 42.3 (2007):
363–393. Richard Jackson, The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems,
Challenges and Future Developments, Political Studies Review, 7, 2, (171–184), (2009). Ri-
chard Jackson, Harmonie Toros, Lee Jarvis & Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2017) Introduction: 10
years of Critical Studies on Terrorism, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 10:2, 197–202.
33 Richard Jackson, Jeroen Gunning, Marie Breen Smyth ‘The Case for a Critical Terrorism
Studies’, Paper prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, August 30 Gunning, Jeroen. “A case for critical terrorism studies?”
Government and Opposition 42.3 (2007): 363–393.
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“It is fair to say that the vast majority of terrorism research attempts to provide
policy-makers with useful advice for controlling and eradicating terrorism as a
threat to Western interests”. This problem-solving approach can “be a real
problem when it distorts research priorities, co-opts the field and turns scholars
into ‘an uncritical mouthpiece of state interests’”.34
Gender studies approaches have also highlighted the problem of adopting a
Western habitus. For example, as Katherine E. Brown showed the Western State
security frame in the discussion of istishhadiyyat (female martyrdom oper-
atives):
in this mainstream view in which the principal frame of reference is the state, and in
particular Western states, female suicide terrorism simply becomes a variant of an
already known threat to the state. This security approach consequently leads to ho-
mogenization based on method of attack and its security impact rather than a recog-
nition of the politics of those involved…. Research that adopts the security approach is
thus blinded by the glare of the explosion: the corporality and immediacy of the
violence and state responses are overexposed at the expense of other features of the
phenomenon.35
In the current study of the movement on the electronic ribat, for example, the
security frame takes the form of scouring ISIS English language magazines for
European locations, which repeats the overexposure of threats to Western States
and prioritises a Western security frame of reference.36 This is a problem that is
further exacerbated by the focus on (returning) Western Foreign Fighters where
the research priorities become distorted away from the core of the movement
and focus instead on the priorities of the Western state.37 As with the linguistic
34 Jackson, Richard, “The Study of Terrorism 10 Years After 9/11: Successes, Issues, Challenges”,
Uluslararası İlişkiler, Volume 8, No 32 (Winter 2012), p. 1–16 quoting, Ranstorp, “Mapping
Terrorism Studies after 9/11”, p. 25.
35 Brown, Katherine E. 2011. “Blinded by the Explosion? Security and Resistance in Muslim
Women’s Suicide Terrorism,” in Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, eds. Women, Gender,
and Terrorism. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 194–226.
36 http://www.voxpol.eu/online-jihadi-instructional-content-iss-rumiyah-2017/.
37 Klausen, Jytte. “Tweeting the Jihad: Social media networks of Western foreign fighters in
Syria and Iraq.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38.1 (2015): 1–22. Benmelech, Efraim, and
Esteban F. Klor. What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?. No. w22190. National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2016. Byman, Daniel, and Jeremy Shapiro. Be afraid. Be a little
afraid: the threat of terrorism from Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Brookings,
2014. Briggs, Rachel, and Tanya Silverman. Western foreign fighters: innovations in res-
ponding to the threat. Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. Rich, Ben, and Dara Conduit.
“The impact of jihadist foreign fighters on indigenous secular-nationalist causes: Con-
trasting chechnya and syria.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38.2 (2015): 113–131. Weg-
gemans, Daan, Edwin Bakker, and Peter Grol. “Who are they and why do they go? The
Radicalization and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters.” Perspectives
on Terrorism 8.4 (2014). Hegghammer, Thomas. “Should I stay or should I go? Explaining
variation in Western jihadists’ choice between domestic and foreign fighting.” American
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bias toward European languages, this method of understanding the jihadist
movement through the emphasis on Western fighters and threats to Western
interests, only touches on the periphery of the movement, which cannot be used
as a proxy for the Arabic core.
For the data analysis of the electronic ribat, one of the issues which has
dominated articles in recent years has been providing advice for controlling and
eradicating terrorist content online, to paraphrase Richard Jackson. This effort
has focused on ways to measure or show decline and is often predicated on
framing devices of the state, such as the emphasis on ‘official propaganda’. This,
as shown below, has resulted in a series of studies using proxy metrics to produce
a two dimensional ‘measurement’ of content – the purpose of which is defined
through western concepts such as ‘Utopia’. These two-dimensional approaches
have over the years taken the form of measuring the average number of followers
on Twitter or counting the number of pictures published. This produces a proxy
metric rather than an authentic view of the aims of the movement. An authentic
view needs to be based on assessing the success of ISIS or Jihadist strategy, based
on the discussion of Jihadist strategy in Arabic documents, audio and video all of
which is currently almost entirely missing from the research design, data ac-
quisition and data analysis.
Versions of these measures have been used, co-opted or adopted by Western
policymakers, such as the White House promotion of the RAND study.38 This
study, the findings from which were promoted by the White House, “claimed to
detect ‘a clear decline in the number of Islamic State supporters tweeting on a
daily basis’ starting in April 2015”.39 The problem solving approach to the study
of the jihadist movement had problems with both data acquisition and data
analysis.
From a data acquisition perspective,
Political Science Review 107.1 (2013): 1–15. Bakker, Edwin, and Roel De Bont. “Belgian and
Dutch jihadist foreign fighters (2012–2015): Characteristics, motivations, and roles in the
War in Syria and Iraq.” Small Wars& Insurgencies27.5 (2016): 837–857. Bakker, Edwin, et al.
Dealing with European Foreign Fighters in Syria: Governance Challenges & Legal Implica-
tions. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. Bakker, Edwin, and van
Zuijdewijn J. de Roy. “Jihadist Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in Western Europe: A Low-
Probability, High-Impact Threat.” ICCT-Research papers 2015 (2015): 22. Basra, Rajan, and
Peter R. Neumann. “Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures.” Perspectives on Terrorism 10.6 (2016):
25–40.
38 Bodine-Baron, Elizabeth, et al. Examining ISIS Support and Opposition Networks on Twitter.
RAND Corporation Santa Monica United States, 2016. Islamic State’s Twitter traffic drops
amid US efforts, AP, 09 July 2016. https://apnews.com/21c9eb68e6294bdfa0a099a0632b8056/
ap-exclusive-islamic-states-twitter-traffic-plunges.
39 Frampton, Martyn, Ali Fisher, and Dr Nico Prucha. “The New Netwar : Countering Ex-
tremism Online” (London: Policy Exchange, 2017) pp. 59–60.
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the RAND study focuses on a variety of terms for ISIS. However, during the time period
of the study, ISIS supporters increasingly used tags relating to a specific province,
which are not included in the list of search terms used in the study …. An apparent lack
of access to the nuances of jihadist strategy, meant that, however good the lexical
analysis, data collection was not looking in the right place.40
From the data analysis perspective,
the report’s authors suggested two potential causes [for the drop in pro-ISIS Twitter
content]; ‘first, the reduction may be a result of the Twitter suspension campaign’, and
second, ‘the trend may partly be an indication of reduced global support for Islamic
State’.41
Both suggestions assume the Western backed response to ISIS are the cause of the
results. No suggestion is made that ISIS and the Media Mujahidin could have
changed tactics or that changes in content were the result of strategy. In fact, not
only had the way ISIS tagged content changed, but they had moved away from
core communication via Twitter to engaging with their vanguard via Telegram.42
Looking beyond the US government, a UK Government backed report pro-
duced by VOX-Pol, sought to assess whether is it worthwhile for pro-IS users to
return to Twitter in 2017.
As a result of disruption,
one of the stated aims of the Global Coalition against Daesh is to undermine ISIS by
making them appear unsuccessful. This creates the potential for research to become co-
opted and could turn scholars into ‘an uncritical mouthpiece of state interests’ were the
research focus and Coalition goals to become closely aligned. In the extreme, the
potential distortion of research priorities and co-opting of the field would be partic-
ularly problematic if any individual or institution were posing as academic
researcher(s) or independent journalists but had an undeclared conflict of interest, as
has occurred in previous conflicts.43
Were that to happen, for example with researchers commenting on the success of
operations conducted by the Global Coalition against Daesh and its members or
making claims about the decline of ISIS, while they were also collaborating with
40 Frampton, Martyn, Ali Fisher, and Dr Nico Prucha. “The New Netwar : Countering Ex-
tremism Online” (London: Policy Exchange, 2017).
41 Frampton, Martyn, Ali Fisher, and Dr Nico Prucha. “The New Netwar : Countering Ex-
tremism Online” (London: Policy Exchange, 2017).
42 Prucha, Nico. “IS and the Jihadist Information Highway–Projecting Influence and Religious
Identity via Telegram.” Perspectives on Terrorism 10.6 (2016).
43 Previous examples of undisclosed conflicts of interest are documented in: Saunders, Frances
Stonor. Who paid the piper?: the CIA and the cultural Cold War. Granta Books, 2000. Lucas,
Scott. Freedom’s war : The US crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945–56. Manchester Uni-
versity Press, 1999. The CIA’s Cultural War: how the CIA secretly funded the magazine
Encounter, BBC World Service, 19 Nov 2015, https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p037t501.
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or working for the Coalition – without disclosing the conflict of interests to the
readers – there is a risk this would cease to be distortion or co-option of the field,
and become covert collusion.44 Such covert collusion could influence the avail-
able information about the fortunes of groups such as ISIS, in a similar way to the
UK government information operation to pay for content in “the Arabic
broadcast media and posted online with no indication of British government
involvement” as reported by the Guardian.45
The focus on European languages, along with the potential distortion of re-
search priorities by the ‘problem solving’ approach, creates significant in-
hibitions to an authentic understanding and interpretation of the movement, but
these are only half the challenge with Data science. Appropriate data collection
and analysis methods are also a vital component in robust data science.
Data quality
Rather than detailed data science, much of the work over recent years has taken
the form of ‘tweet-ready’ punditry, providing ad hoc responses based on what an
individual personally saw on Twitter, (or Nashir channels on Telegram) rather
than explanations based on research that carries predictive value. Finding
problem-solving proxy metrics that could show ISIS digital presence in decline
began with the specific claims of disruption in September 2014 in which
J.M.Berger claimed “It’s very clear now that Twitter suspensions have seriously
degraded IS ability to game hashtags and distribute content”.46 Six months later,
Berger and Morgan still doubted the “purported resilience of the ISIS social
network”.47 As 2016 began, almost eighteen months after those first claims of
serious degradation and disruption, there was optimistic talk of cyberbombs and
wiping ISIS off the internet.48 2016 also witnessed a CTC study produce a massive





47 Berger, Jonathon M., and Jonathon Morgan. “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and des-
cribing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter.” The Brookings Project on US Relations
with the Islamic World 3.20 (2015): 4–1. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf.
48 Richard Forno and Anupam Joshi, ‘How U.S. “Cyber Bombs” against Terrorists Really Work’,
The Conversation, Scientific American, 13 May 2016, https://www.scientificamerican.com/
articl e/how-u-s-cyber-bombs-against-terroristsreally-work/.
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underestimate of the content being produced, likely due to the failure to examine
content from Telegram, despite ISIS using it consistently for almost a year.49
In 2017 a VOX-Pol study “pro-IS accounts are being significantly disrupted and
this has effectively eliminated IS’s once vibrant Twitter community”. Fur-
thermore, “IS’s ability to facilitate and maintain strong and influential com-
49 Milton, Daniel. Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic States Media Efforts. US
Military Academy-Combating Terrorism Center West Point United States, 2016. For com-
parison see: Frampton, Martyn, Ali Fisher, and Dr Nico Prucha. “The New Netwar: Coun-
tering Extremism Online” (London: Policy Exchange, 2017 p. 38.
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munities on Twitter was found to be significantly diminished”.50 However,
during the same period of the VOX-Pol study, Twitter represented 40 % of known
referrals to ISIS content.51 As predicted, in 2014 the Swarmcast reconfigured. The
failure to find the accounts and recognise the methods through which ISIS was
driving traffic to content meant the report’s “up-to-date account of the effects of
Twitter’s disruption strategy on IS supporter accounts” reflects western as-
sumptions on what ISIS are doing – rather than an authentic representation of
what ISIS is doing.52
In January 2018 Jade Parker and Charlie Winter announced “a full-fledged
collapse” in ISIS media.53 January 2018 also witnessed a 48 % increase in ISIS
content production and in March 2018 ISIS videos are getting over 12,000 views
on Twitter.54 Ironically, in May the same researchers were producing updates on
what ISIS were producing – four months after the purported ‘total collapse’.
It is hard to square the large-scale viewing of ISIS videos via Twitter and recent
month-on-month increase in ISIS branded productions, with the pronounce-
ments of degradation, decline and collapse made over the last three and a half
years. Instead of degradation and collapse, the nature of the ISIS Swarmcast
means it can appear to be degraded, but it has really only reconfigured, as it has
repeatedly since the phenomena was first identified in 2014.55
Unfortunately, while there has been no let-up in the quantity of analysis being
published about ISIS media activities, there have been limitations in the quality
of that analysis. Particular in the way such research contributes to an authentic
representation of the Jihadist movement.
These studies often rely poor statistical work and linear approaches. The lack
of appropriate and genuine data science has led to persistent content blindness
amongst computer science-based analysis, while subject matter specific research
has suffered from the Falling Follower Fallacy, and the 6th Grader Problem.
A few recent examples of problems of data collection are emblematic of a
50 Conway, Maura, et al. “Disrupting Daesh: measuring takedown of online terrorist material
and it’s impacts.” (2017): 1–45. http://doras.dcu.ie/21961/1/Disrupting_DAESH_FINAL_
WEB_VERSION.pdf.
51 Frampton, Martyn, Ali Fisher, and Dr Nico Prucha. “The New Netwar : Countering Ex-
tremism Online” (London: Policy Exchange, 2017.
52 Fisher, Ali, and Nico Prucha. “ISIS is winning the online jihad against the West.” The Daily




54 Analysis: IS media show signs of recovery after sharp decline, BBC Monitoring, (23rd Fe-
bruary 2018) https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c1dov471#top.
55 Fisher, Ali, and Nico Prucha. “ISIS is winning the online jihad against the West.” The Daily
Beast 10 (2014). https://www.thedailybeast.com/isis-is-winning-the-online-jihad-against-
the-west.
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wider problem. First, the difference between what is ‘found’ and what is ‘pro-
duced’. In October 2017 graphics were published which purported to show that
“#IS’s media machine is contracting. A large proportion of the propaganda
apparatus is now almost totally dormant”.56 ‘Almost totally dormant’ in this
context actually meant any foundation or Wilayah from which the researcher had
found 4 or fewer pieces of content. The methodological problems behind this
claim, include accuracy of data acquisition, counting all content as having the
same value and a profound misunderstanding of timeseries research. In the case
of data acquisition, based on what the researcher found, al-Furat, Somalia,
Khurasan, Bayda’, Anbar, & West Africa were all claimed to be ‘almost totally
dormant’. However, all these actually produced more than the four pieces of
content in September required for them to be considered active. It was not that
the entities were dormant, but that the researcher had not been able to find the
content. Hence what this research was measuring was the researcher’s ability
rather than ISIS production. This echoes, previously published findings which
showed ISIS weekly content production actually exceeded the CTC estimate of
monthly production. This was because CTC, just like these more recent claims of
decline, were based on tracking the declining ability of the researchers to find
content, not the ability of ISIS to produce it.57
In addition, basing the claim on four pieces a month highlights a clear mis-
understanding of timeseries data. This is because any magazine which is pub-
lished weekly (for example The Economist) would be dormant for 8 months of
2018.58 In the case of the Economist, founded in 1843 and publishing 51 issues a
year (there is a Christmas double issue), there are only 4 months in which there
are sufficient Fridays for it to be published more than four times.59 Yet in the
terms of the research, the economist would be considered ‘almost totally dor-
mant’ – an obvious nonsense. Furthermore, it is problematic to count different
types of content as the same. For example, the organisation that published the 46
minute speech by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, at the end of September 2017 is re-
corded as dormant because it only produced the first recording of Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi to be released in the last 10 months. Claiming it was dormant does not
56 https://twitter.com/charliewinter/status/920651518172332032.
57 Milton, Daniel. Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic States Media Efforts. US
Military Academy-Combating Terrorism Center West Point United States, 2016. For com-
parison see: Frampton, Martyn, Ali Fisher, and Dr Nico Prucha. “The New Netwar: Coun-
tering Extremism Online” (London: Policy Exchange, 2017 p. 38.
58 The exact number of publications on the day of publication of this book cannot be given due
to the ongoing process of publication.
59 The Economist is published weekly, 51 times a year, with the Christmas double issue re-
maining on sale for two weeks. The issue is dated Saturday and goes on sale each Friday.
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provide an authentic view of content production, nor the authority and relative
value of the particular types of content.
Equally, because the content is undifferentiated, photos represent around to
80 % of the content. As such, any change in photo production will massively
impact the overall impression regardless of proportionally larger fluctuations in
other media types. For example, the emphasis on decline between 2015 and
February 2017 is based on the number of photos, as video production increased.
By adding all media types together, a decrease in easily produced photographs
hides an increase in the higher resource requirement and greater impact of video
production.
The impact of the methodological limitations, in design, data acquisition and
analysis are subtle, but they make all the difference in producing an authentic
understanding of the jihadist movement through credible data science.
Counting Content
A further aspect of the problem-solving approach has been the attempt to make
links between changes in ISIS activity and the activity of the Global Coalition,
just as previous connections were made between content found on Twitter and
ISIS global support. For example, it has been claimed “the destabilization of the
Islamic State’s territorial strongholds is correlated to a decrease in the volume of
media production”.60
For a data scientist interested in the electronic ribat there are a number of
problems with this type of research. Beyond the issues of data acquisition and
analysis;
– There is no calculation of correlation in the published research, so it is an
assumed pseudo-correlation which is not based on any demonstrable rela-
tionship in the data.
– The apparent relationship between territory and production can only be
maintained by cherry picking certain points in time.
To show how the pseudo-correlation is produced we need to understand how the
timeline is constructed, and then how it is compared to territory.
The use of cherry picking particular timepoints is particularly illustrative of
the impact of the distortion caused by the ‘problem solving’ approach. The
familiar narrative of anti-ISIS forces and problem solving research is that ISIS
reached a highpoint in 2015, and has been in decline ever since.
60 Mehdi Semati & Piotr M. Szpunar, ISIS beyond the spectacle: communication media, net-
worked publics, terrorism, Critical Studies in Media Communication Vol. 35, Iss. 1,2018.
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This narrative is built on a range of cherry picked points which highlight the
problems of contemporary applications of data science. As Richard Jackson
noted there is “persistent tendency to treat the current terrorist threat as un-
precedented and exceptional” and ISIS activity in the electronic ribat is a par-
ticularly good example.61 Specifically the ‘highpoint’ argument gives little at-
tention to the period before August 2015. However, the Jihadist movement online
has been learning and refining its operations for two decades.
Beyond the unreliability of counting content as a measure of success, the
attempt to present ISIS as new belies the need to consider a wider history of
jihadist media and analyse whether 2015 was a two dimensional ‘highpoint’ or an
outliner in a much more complex and three-dimensional information ecosys-
tem.
From a historical perspective, for example, this video of ‘oh allah bestow on us
paradise’ published in 2013 features a now familiar nashid, with
familiar themes that appear in contemporary ISIS collections and videos. This
despite most commentary beginning with ISIS in 2014 or in some cases 2015 and
presenting it as something unprecedented.
Previous research has already shown why the summer of 2015 is cherry picked
61 Richard Jackson, The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and
Future Developments, Political Studies Review, 7, 2, (171–184), (2009).
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as a start point if your goal is to contribute to claims of decline.62 As discussed in
depth elsewhere, Summer 2015 was Ramadan, 1 year of the Caliphate, and wit-
nessed a major push to launch wilayat media production. When this is consid-
ered the two dimensional ‘highpoint’ becomes an obvious outlier based on a
confluence of factors within the ongoing fluctuation of content production.
In addition to using an outliner rather than an authentic representative of the
content production, the claims of decline, including those by the Global Coali-
62 Frampton, Martyn, Ali Fisher, and Dr Nico Prucha. “The New Netwar : Countering Ex-
tremism Online” (London: Policy Exchange, 2017).
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tion, then head straight to 2017. This allows them to present “huge and steady
decrease” by drawing a metaphoric straight line between 2015 and 2017.63
This presents a range of problems. First, journalists writing about the 2015
‘highpoint’ have claimed ISIS “was producing more than 200 videos, radio
programmes, magazines and photo reports each week” resulting in “just under a
thousand [892] unique data points, ranging from radio bulletins and electronic
magazines to videos and photographic essays”.64 However, in September 2017
Charlie Winter, who claims 2015 as the ‘highpoint’ told a Wired security event
about the ‘Virtual Caliphate’ that there are “hundreds and hundreds of unique
media products, videos, magazines, radio bulletins, in lots of different languages
coming out every single day”.65
It does not take a data scientist to calculate ‘hundreds a day’, will be higher
than the 200 a week highpoint, but it is the second problem, that is particularly
troubling: The way problem-solving researchers have presented 2015 and 2017
data. This is particularly illustrative of the challenge posed by claims of ‘decline’.
To produce the effect, problem-solving researchers have had to become creative
with their display longitudinal data, which fall well outside the accepted stand-
ards of academic research.66
Contrary to the ideas about displaying time series data, the bars in the graph
are spaced evenly. The effect is the impression of a steep, linear decline, even
though the chronological space between data points varies significantly.67 In fact,
while two of the time points are only a single month apart, the other gaps were 6
and 17 months respectively.
When the image is redrawn, so all months are represented equally – both
months with and without data – the problems become evident. First, the im-
pression of sharp decline is reduced. Second, what happened to 2016? It is now
easy for the viewer to realise 2016 is completely missing.
Using data previously presented elsewhere, weekly data from February 2016
63 Lakomy, Miron. “Cracks in the Online “Caliphate”: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in
the Battle for Cyberspace.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11.3 (2017).
64 Winter, Charlie. “Apocalypse, later : a longitudinal study of the Islamic State brand.” Critical
Studies in Media Communication35.1 (2018): 103–121. Actual number (892) added for cla-
rity.
65 https://onlinejihad.net/2017/11/23/how-decliners-get-data-so-wrong/#_edn7.
66 Edward Tufte, has “set out a detailed analysis of how to display data for precise, effective,
quick analysis” in his Visual Display of Quantitative Information. This includes demon-
strating that inappropriate use of data can lead to an apparent, but entirely spurious, con-
nection between the fortunes of the New York Stock Exchange and the level of Solar Ra-
diation.
67 http://www.wired.co.uk/article/isis-islamic-state-propaganda-content-strategy. The same
trick was also used to the same effect at other occasions suggesting it was not a just a
miscommunication between author and designer : https://twitter.com/charliewinter/status/
920651729393389568.
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to March 2017 shows production fluctuated, despite claims of a “huge and steady
decrease” or 30 % to 40 % reduction.68
Equally the issue of outliers and a problem with an interpretation which
claims a single direction of ‘decline’ becomes more pronounced. Genuinely
longitudinal data, rather than cherry-picked, seemingly random, points show
Original graph featured in Wired
68 Lakomy, Miron. “Cracks in the Online “Caliphate”: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in
the Battle for Cyberspace.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11.3 (2017)Charlie Winter, ICSR In-
sight: The ISIS Propaganda Decline, 23rd March 2017. http://icsr.info/2017/03/icsr-insight-
isis-propaganda-decline/.
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there is much more to the story than drawing an imaginary line across a 17-
month gap and claiming correlation.69
Content fluctuated on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. This means you can
cherry pick points to claim large-scale decline or increase. Taking a longer-term
view, there were times in 2016 where the rolling mean of weekly content pro-
duction was rising, at others falling. Fluctuation, often during periods of re-
configuration, is entirely consistent with content production by the Jihadist
movement during the last two decades. The persistent tendency to treat ISIS as
‘unprecedented and exceptional’ means this history and nuance are entirely
missing from the linear, decline centric, data analysis whether from Coalition
Information Operations or recent journalism.
Using rolling mean to examine how production changed over 2016 uncovers
some important results. Most important, there was an increase of 132 % in the
rolling mean of content production between the low points of September / Oc-
tober 2016 and the cherry-picked month of February 2017.70 This means, as
previous research has shown, February 2017 occurred during a period of rising
content average production.71 An authentic representation of ISIS production
during 2016 directly contradicts the claims of a single downward direction, as the
Global Coalition imply and some punditry explicitly claims.72 While the in-
dividual fluctuations are interesting, the more important conclusion is that
fluctuations in content production by jihadist groups are normal, they do not
necessarily represent the impact of western activity, and cannot be used to draw
conclusions about the movement. It may be possible to pick two points and
accurately calculate the difference in the total numbers but this does not provide
an authentic representation of the movement, nor meaningful understanding of
the content.
The other part of the problem with a claimed correlation between media and
territory, is that it implies (rather than calculates) a relationship between the two.
The problem-solving logic of correlation requires there to be a single
downward direction and that these would occur in a way that indicates a rela-
tionship between them, distinct from confounding by other factors.73
However, a different picture has long been evident to anyone embedded in an
69 Mehdi Semati & Piotr M. Szpunar, ISIS beyond the spectacle: communication media, net-
worked publics, terrorism, Critical Studies in Media Communication Vol. 35, Iss. 1,2018.
70 Frampton, Martyn, Ali Fisher, and Dr Nico Prucha. “The New Netwar : Countering Ex-
tremism Online” (London: Policy Exchange, 2017).
71 Frampton, Martyn, Ali Fisher, and Dr Nico Prucha. “The New Netwar : Countering Ex-
tremism Online” (London: Policy Exchange, 2017).
72 https://twitter.com/charliewinter/status/935082777040642050.
73 Without an actual calculation, claims of correlation have no weight. The following is the-
refore emblematic of the problem. We also won’t spend any time on whether they were
claiming a correlation based on the Spearman or Pearson method.
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Arabic context and “crystal clear to virtually anyone who has the linguistic
capacity to grasp and the opportunity to witness what jihadists are actually
saying, writing and doing, both online and offline”.74
The Global Coalition has reported on the reduction in ISIS territory as a
percentage area held at the territorial highpoint of August 2014.75 Yet, decliners
claim summer 2015 as the media highpoint, which occurs while ISIS was losing
ground, including parts of Sinjar and Kobane (14 % in total during 2015).76 Put
simply, the count of content was increasing toward the claimed ‘highpoint’ while
territory was decreasing, which casts doubt on the pseudo-correlation.
Furthermore, as content production has fluctuated, for there to be even a
pseudo-correlation, logic dictates that territory would have to fluctuate too. This
is problematic as claims of a relationship between territory and media pro-
duction after the 2015 media ‘highpoint’ rely on a ‘decline’ narrative. Yet, content
production went up 132 % between October 2016 and February 2017, while
territory held by ISIS went down. The Coalition territorial estimate for October
2016 shows that the territory ISIS had lost was 56 % Iraq 27 % Syria, by February
2017 this had become 63 % and 35 % respectively.77
As a result, not only do the claimed ‘highpoints’ occur a year apart, but the
claimed pseudo-correlation between the two evaporates when the change in
production and territory are compared with genuinely longitudinal data rather
than cherry-picking. Indeed, the study of the jihadist movement requires data
science capable of producing an authentic representation of the phenomena
rather than tweet-ready problem-solving which presents ISIS as unprecedented,
thus removing the need for detailed analysis of what came before. The im-
portance of focusing on an authentic representation was highlighted only days
after Jade Parker and Charlie Winter announced “a full-fledged collapse” in ISIS
media.78 During the month they pronounced the full-fledged collapse ISIS con-
tent production showed a month-on-month increase of 48 %.79






77 October 2016: http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/maps_and_stats/daesh-areas-of-influence-




79 Analysis: IS media show signs of recovery after sharp decline, BBC Monitoring, (23rd Fe-
bruary 2018) https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c1dov471#top.
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Summary
The Jihadist movement distributes their strategy in their own words, these words
should not be obscured by disciplinary siloes, a failure to collaborate, nor an
attempt to force the understanding of the movement into a Western, predom-
inantly English language, habitus.
Lacking a nuanced understanding of the movement, both “counter-narra-
tives” and takedowns have become trapped in a tactical paradigm, while research
has struggled to grasp the strategy of the movement. However, while once de-
rided as a ‘straw man argument’, the need to understand how ISIS networks of
influence operate at a strategic level is now evident to almost all.80
It requires data science based on the collaboration between data analysts and
subject matter experts to achieve it. Understanding the information ecosystem is
about more than peering down soda straws at handpicked examples; it is about
the way different parts of the ecosystem co-exist and intersect; it is about the way
the humans behind the screens interact and fundamentally about the content
they share. This includes the documents which outline the strategy and tactics
which the Jihadist movement currently intends to use. It is not about providing
the latest proxy metric to government but developing an authentic under-
standing of the movement on the (electronic) ribat.
What is Data Science
Many contemporary perspectives on data science highlight the importance of
computer data, programming languages, maths and statistics. For example, Mike
Loukides argues “data science requires skills ranging from traditional computer
science to mathematics to art”.81 This vision is shared by Jeff Hammerbacher
who described the reason for adopting the ‘data science’ label at Facebook:
… on any given day, a team member could author a multistage processing pipeline in
Python, design a hypothesis test, perform a regression analysis over data samples with
R, design and implement an algorithm for some data-intensive product or service in




81 Mike Loukides, What is data science? The future belongs to the companies and people that
turn data into products. June 2, 2010 http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/06/what-is-data-science.
html.
82 Jeff Hammerbacher, ‘Information Platforms and the Rise of the Data Scientist’, in Toby
Segaran, Jeff Hammerbacher, Beautiful Data (O’Reilly Media, Inc. July 2009) p. 84.
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These perspectives on Data Science place heavy emphasis on Computer Science.
In the study of the Media Mujahidin, this type of approach has lead to endless
presentations by computer scientists focusing on what is purported to be ‘core
content’ of the jihadist movement – magazines such as Dabiq, Inspire, or Ru-
miyah, or Twitter accounts with pictures of Lions and detection of tweets using
terms such as ‘Islamic State’. Such computer science driven big data approaches,
often focus on challenges characterised by three Vs: volume, velocity, and va-
riety – with the veracity of data being a common fourth ‘V’.83
However, the use of data science must maintain a focus on delivering mean-
ingful and authentic representations of the phenomena being studied, whether
or not these insights are immediately considered relevant by policy makers. The
focus must be on the challenges posed by the Jihadist movement, rather than the
data collection challenges. To this end, the use of data science will require
teamwork between computer or data specialists and subject matter experts.
Fortunately, this is not the only approach to Data Science. In his valuable An
Introduction to Data Science, Jeffrey Stanton writes:
Data Science refers to an emerging area of work concerned with the collection, prep-
aration, analysis, visualization, management, and preservation of large collections of
information. Although the name Data Science seems to connect most strongly with
areas such as databases and computer science, many different kinds of skills – including
non-mathematical skills – are needed.84
To ensure the data science returns an authentic representation of the phenomena
being studied, Jeffrey Stanton outlined the four A’s of data as useful categories
through which team members can identify the roles and responsibilities at each
stage of a research project:
– Architecture refers to the form and format of the data and the design of the
research.
– Acquisition includes the identification, collection, and storage of data, in-
cluding how that data will be presented for analysis. This consideration is
particularly important when the subject area specialist is not also technically
capable of accessing the data from the format in which it is being stored.
– Analysis combines data science elements such as the summarizing the data,
using samples to make inferences about the larger context, and data visual-
ization. It also includes the process through which data will be made available
83 3 Vs https://hbr.org/2012/10/big-data-the-management-revolution/ar ; for Veracity : http://
www.ibmbigdatahub.com/sites/default/files/styles/xlarge-scaled/public/infographic_image
/4-Vs-of-big-data.jpg?itok=4syrvSLX.
84 Stanton, Jeffrey M. “Introduction to data science.” (2013). https://ischool.syr.edu/media/
documents/2012/3/DataScienceBook1_1.pdf.
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to the subject matter expert, in this case diplomacy, to be analyzed within the
context of that field.
– Archiving refers to preservation, long-term storage and, where appropriate,
making the data reusable.
As team members are often significantly more familiar with one part of the
project than the other, defining clear roles can help ensure that important aspects
of research do not fall down the cracks between computer or data specialists and
subject matter experts. In addition, laying out the responsibility at each stage of
the project can help ensure that a data science approach can best contribute to
greater understanding of the activity of the Media Mujahidin. The table below is
intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. Understanding the role of the
‘other’ specialisms in the collaboration are fundamental to effective data science.
This is not only to ensure they receive what they require to do their part of the
project, it is to ensure the project is a genuine collaboration rather than a list of
individuals working in parallel with little understanding of the other elements of
the project.
As this chapter has shown, the problems in the current study of the electronic
ribat are seriously impacting the understanding of the Jihadist movement. As the
‘internet has become a great medium for spreading the call of Jihad and following
the news of the mujahideen’ so the methods used to study the phenomena must
follow suit to produce an authentic representation of the movement.
To study the electronic ribat, data science must be a genuine collaboration
made up of teams with a range of skills ; genuine Arabic language abilities (not
faux Arabic), in depth knowledge of the hundreds of thousands of pages of
Arabic documents, and the back catalogue of video, audio and nashid. Statistical
specialists capable of ensuring that data is appropriate, that graphical repre-
sentations are authentic representations of the data and that statistical techni-
ques such as time series and correlation are executed accurately and adequately
understood by subject matter specialists.
The time for fumbling in the dark, proxy metrics and poor data work is over –
dawn is coming.
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Ali Fisher / Nico Prucha
A Milestone for “Islamic State” Propaganda: “The Clanging of
the Swords, part 4”
Introducing the theological framework of “Clanging of the Swords”
– from Amsterdam to the “Islamic State”
This chapter is an in-depth analysis of a four-part video series named Salil al-
sawarim, or the “clanging of the swords”. This series is worthy of such detailed
attention as it provides an excellent example of a certain form of ISIS (=IS)
propaganda. More specifically, it is a key example of how IS uses theology to
justify the actions of its fighters and legitimise its occupation of territory in Syria
and Iraq.
Sunni extremists, referred to as jihadists or Salafi-jihadists, have a long and
rich tradition of written theological explanations of what it means to be a “true”
or “proper” Sunni Muslim. However, IS uses theology to justify its day-to-day
operations to a greater degree than other Sunni extremist groups, including Al
Qaeda (AQ).
The series Salil al-Sawarim is particularly illustrative of this emphasis on
theology. Readers sufficiently initiated into the mainly Arabic language corpus of
Sunni extremist theology will understand the title’s particular reference right
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-SA 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen 
ISBN Print: 9783847109389 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737009386
away ;1 it refers to the book al-Sarim al-maslul ‘ala shatim al-rasul, “the Sharp
Sword on whoever Insults the Prophet.” Its author is 13th century Islamic scholar
Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328 AD), who is often referred to as shaykh al-Islam (“the
scholar of Islam”) in the conservative Arabic-Islamic framework.
1 Rüdiger Lohlker, Why Theology Matters – the Case of Jihadi Islam, in: Strategic Review (July-
September 2016) (http://sr-indonesia.com/in-the-journal/view/europe-s-misunderstanding-
of-islam-and-isis) (accessed May 05, 2018).
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Ibn Taymiyya is renowned for his “characteristically juridical thinking”2 and
viewed as a highly competent legal scholar. His writings are based – at least in
part – on Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).
Ibn Taymiyya has featured prominently in Sunni extremist thought since the
1980s, when AQ established this theology. The “Islamic State” has based all of its
audio-visual output on the theology penned by AQ. The crucial difference is that
IS has (had) the territory to implement and enforce this corpus of theology on the
population of the self-designated “caliphate”.
Ibn Taymiyya provides a legal framework based on jurisprudential findings
for killing “an insulter of the prophet, regardless whether he is a Muslim or a
disbeliever”.3 Whoever insults the Prophet, according to Ibn Taymiyya, “must be
killed, no matter if he is a Muslim or disbeliever, and has no right to repent.”
Within the Sunni extremist mind-set, the sword must be drawn upon anyone
who opposes their worldview and specific interpretation of Qur’anic sources or
the hadith (sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad). In various AQ and IS
videos, a specific sound effect subtly underscores references to Ibn Taymiyya’s
writings. This sound effect, popular within jihadist online subculture, is that of a
sword drawn from its shaft, clanging in the process.
Jihadists have also used the writings of Ibn Taymiyya to justify specific at-
tacks. For example, Muhammed Bouyeri cited Ibn Taymiyya’s book before
killing Dutch filmmaker and Islam critic Theo van Gogh in November 2004 in
Amsterdam:
“Shortly before he [Bouyeri] killed van Gogh, he circulated the theological tractate on
the “heroic deed” of Ibn Maslama4 per e-mail to his friends. It is one of the 56 texts
Bouyeri wrote or distributed. The fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya was among them also in a short
leaflet-form downloadable from tawhed.ws titled “The drawn sword against the insulter
of the Prophet” (al-sarim al-maslul didda shatim al-rasul). It is likely that the text not
only influenced Bouyeri’s decision to assassinate van Gogh, but also his method.
The text details how and why to kill targets, first of all because of insult (shatm, sabb,
adhan) of Islam. Bouyeri tried to sever van Gogh’s head with a big knife after he had
2 Wael b. Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians. Translated with an introduction by
Wael Hallaq, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. xxxiii.
3 The book is available online on various websites and outlets, for example Durar al-Sunniyya,
www.dorar.net. A print version is available in most religious book shops in Arab countries.
The image is a book cover illustration of a commented version published as: Ibn Taymiyya, al-
Sarim al-maslul ‘ala shatim al-rasul li-shaykh al-Islam Taqiyy al-Din Ahmad bin ‘Abd al-
Halim Ibn Taymiyya al-Harrani, Shubra al-Khayma: Alexandria/Medina, 2008.
4 As the author of the citation Philipp Holtmann explains, “terrorists are called upon to identify
with the Muslim Ibn Maslama who volunteered to kill Muhammad’s critic Ka’b bin al-Ashraf.”
Philipp Holtmann, Virtual Leadership in Radical Islamist Movements: Mechanisms, Ju-
stifications and Discussion. Working Paper, The Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya
Conference February 6–9, 2011 (http://www.herzliyaconference.org/eng/_Uploads/dbsAtta
chedFiles/PhilippHoltmann.pdf) (accessed May 05, 2018).
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shot him several times. In the text, we find the passage: “the cutting of the head without
mercy is legal if the Prophet does not disapprove it.” Moreover, the text advises multiple
times to use assassination as an act of deterrence. The slaughter of van Gogh in open
daylight seems like a one-to-one translation into reality of the directives we find in the
text.”5
User-created content on Twitter praising the killing of Theo van Gogh, outlining the theological
obligation to hunt anyone who insults Prophet Muhammad or God.6
5 Ibid.
6 The text praises Muhammad Bouyeri as a jihadist role model. Not only has he acted to avenge
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In addition, AQ alluded to the writings of Ibn Taymiyya in a video claiming
responsibility for a suicide bombing targeting the Embassy of Denmark in
Pakistan in 20087 after a Danish newspaper published cartoon depictions of
Muhammad.
Ibn Taymiyya is among several traditionalists and historical scholars who
have explored the subject of avenging the Prophet Muhammad. The work by
Jordanian-Palestinian jihadist scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi stands out in
its attempt to clearly outline who can be killed legitimately for insulting Prophet
Muhammad. Al-Maqdisi extends this beyond individuals, and says any gov-
ernment deemed to have insulted either the Prophet, God or religion in general is
a legitimate target for reprisal.8
In January 2015 two brothers, apparently trained in Yemen by Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, opened fire in the offices of the French satirical magazine
Charlie Hebdo. After the attack, a bystander filmed the Kouachi brothers
shouting, “We have avenged the Prophet” (li-intiqamna al-rasul), before fatally
shooting wounded French police officer Ahmad Merabet.9 A video published on
January 11, 2015 by the IS-affiliated media outlet, Asawirtimedia, praised the
attacks. The video is entitled “The French have insulted the Prophet of God – thus
a merciless reaction.”
There is a coherent message across jihadist writings, videos, and theological
decrees that say vengeance restores the dignity of Prophet Muhammad. They
command individuals worldwide to demonstrate their faith by responding vi-
olently to those who insult the Prophet.
This report focuses on IS’ fourth Salil al-Sawarim movie, in which retribution
for insulting Prophet Muhammad is the underlying principle of a brutal and
rapidly emerging sectarian war (harb ta’ifi). The film shows IS fighters seeking to
exterminate the Shiites, portrayed as a group that has insulted the prophet, his
companions, God, and in sum, Islam, since the early days of the religion.
the violation of van Gogh against religion in general, but rather he, according to the text,
denounced the worldly law in the Dutch court, claiming to only acknowledge shari’a law.
7 A video entitled al-qawla qawla al-sawarim, “the words [are now about action and hence]
words of the sword”, shows the testimony of the suicide operative identified as a Saudi by the
nom de guerre Abu Gharib al-Makki [the Meccan]. The one-hour video justifies the attack;
“the time to talk is over, the time for actions (i.e the swords must be drawn) has come to avenge
the insults of Prophet Muhammad”.
8 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, al-Sarim al-maslul ‘ala sabb al-rabb aw al-din aw a-rasul sala l-
llahu ‘alayhi wa-salam, via Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l Jihad.
9 A detailed overview is provided by the BBC, also outlining in depth the attack by IS member
Amedy Coulibaly who executed several hostages in a Jewish supermarket in Paris: http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237 (accessed May 05, 2018). Amedy Coulibaly
uploaded a video where he pledges allegiance to al-Baghdadi. Part of his video is used in one of
the ‘official’ IS videos to applaud the January 2015 Paris attack, Risala ila Fransa, Wilayat Salah
al-Din, February 14, 2015.
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For example, SAS4 shows several sequences in which murdered Iraqi soldiers are
described as Shiites, or rejectionists (rafida), a degrading term in Sunni ex-
tremist literature. The film brands Shiites as inferior humans who constitute the
“interior enemy” because they are Arabs. It follows that they are Islam’s most
important foe and must be fought first and foremost.
Text and videos are not the only means of spreading the theoretical principle of
avenging the Prophet; two of the most popular jihadist songs, or nashid, on
YouTube reference Ibn Taymiyya and the notion of killing all those who insult
Islam. A nashid by Abu Yaseer has over 1.5 million views and can easily be
retrieved online by searching for “Salil al-Sawarim”.10 A related nashid with the
title “the words [are now about action and hence] words of the sword” by Abu
“The French have insulted the Prophet of God”
IS cites historical scholars such as Imam al-Sam’ani or Ibn Hazm to justify the execution of Iraqi
soldiers
10 Hosted by the YouTube Channel “The Great Breakfast War”, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ZQoJvI8XUa0 (accessed May 05, 2018).
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‘Ali has over 3.5 million views.11 The reference of the “sword” is part of both
nashid.
The four-part Salil al-sawarim series conveys two main themes:
1. Punishment: It is legitimate to kill anyone considered a non-Sunni Muslim, in
particular the Shiites of Iraq.
2. Shiism by Sunni extremist standards is portrayed as a sect that has deviated
from Islam and seeks to destroy Sunni Islam from within.
3. Inclusion and representation: IS is shown operating carefully within Sunni
territories in Iraq and Syria, assassinating key government figures and of-
fering the Sunni majority a chance to reintegrate into the true Sunni com-
munity – represented solely by the “Islamic State” – by repenting (tawba)
their sin of having worked for non-Sunni Muslims.
The chance to repent has become an integral part of IS strategy to consolidate
newly-conquered territory. Key IS ideologues such as Abu Muhammad al-‘Ad-
nani have supported this strategy ; it consists of annihilating key figures of the
Iraqi government; punishing Sunnis who collaborated with the Americans or
Shiites; and offering Sunni police and soldiers a chance to be cleansed of their
sins and restored as true members of the Sunni community by renouncing their
past actions and swearing allegiance to al-Baghdadi.
Salil al-sawarim has turned into a popular and active meme online. It fosters
IS identity and creates role models in a fandom-styled environment where users
can create and upload their own images to praise videos like SAS and the
worldview they depict.
IS has become more than an idea or a physical movement. It has managed to
spread its “values” and theological reference points across a wide range of online
platforms in a number of languages, primarily Arabic.
11 This singer was featured in Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula videos as far back as 2003/4.
Popular jihadist songs on YouTube. 1.5 million views (left), 3.5 million views (right)
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For example, the two screen-grabs below highlight how IS establishes role
models and turns its audio-visual propaganda into memes that are readable and
comprehensible to a wide group of consumers – ranging from hard-core sym-
pathizers to lesser initiated followers and even those who simply seek to make
fun of IS. The screen-grabs feature the same sequence of SAS4, where a young
foreign fighter from Bahrain (Salman Turki) addresses the audience in Arabic.
The first image is a cat meme showing several IS sympathizers watching SAS4
on a smart phone. The second image identifies a role model; it praises the Saudi
man standing next to the young Bahraini for making the ultimate sacrifice by
committing a suicide bombing to help IS gain control of an area in Raqqa.
Salil al-Sawarim, part 1
The first part of Salil al-sawarim (SAS1) was released by “Islamic State in Iraq”
(ISI) in 2012. After Al Qaeda in Iraq consolidated control over the Sunni province
of Anbar, it declared the establishment of ISI, al-dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyya.
Anbar province has an extensive border with Syria that includes the Syrian town
of Minbaj, which became one of the main hubs for cross-border activity.
SAS1 features a rich blend of narratives that have formed an integral part of
Sunni extremist identity since the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003/4. SAS1 fea-
tures several prominent jihadist figures, including IS godfather Abu Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi and IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani. The video portrays the
Cat memes and role models – IS projects influence online and has a fandom base
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Shiites as mere agents and henchmen of the Americans and shows a number of
attacks on police posts and individuals accused of apostasy and collaboration.
The first movie features two sequences that would later become “Islamic State”
modus operandi, and appear prominently in SAS4. The first type of sequence
depicts well-planned, well-organized and well-executed rapid attacks on police
and army checkpoints in urban and remote areas of the country. For example, the
film shows fighters killing uniformed officers in Baghdad in hit-and-run and
execution-style shootings. The film uses audio recordings of Abu Muhammad al-
‘Adnani or Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi to justify these killings. The second type of
sequence shows fighters raiding army outposts in remote areas. The aftermath of
these attacks is also shown, including close-ups of dead Iraqi soldiers as proof of
the success of the Sunni extremists.
In other parts of SAS1, suicide bombers give their testimony (wasiyya) while
crude bombs and handgun silencers are proudly shown as “industrial produce of
the State for the oppressed,” whom IS claims to be fighting for. Sniper scenes are
an integral part of the first SAS movie, as in SAS4.
SAS1 features a coherent blend of elements of Iraqi-based Sunni extremist
theology, notably the offer to fellow Sunni Muslims, including those in the ranks
and service of the Iraqi army, police and government, to repent (tawba) and
become “true” Muslims again. This form of repentance and inclusion is im-
portant throughout the series, but reaches a climax in the fourth SAS video,
which shows the mass repentance of Sunnis in areas that IS conquered in Iraq in
early 2014.
This is a form of applied theology, an idea that originated with AQ, though it
lacked the territory to fulfil its implementation. By contrast, SAS1 features for-
mer Sahwa (“Awakening Council”) soldiers repenting and joining IS while its
Salil al-Sawarim 1 fostering sectarian tensions and praising the ”Islamic State” Godfather Abu
Mus’ab al-Zarqawi
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spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, calls on all Sunnis to renounce their
loyalty to the then Iraqi Shiite-led government of president al-Maliki.
A targeted assassination in SAS1 set the precursor for what was about to hit
Iraq, in particular the region of Anbar and the cities of Fallujah, Ramadi, Mosul
and smaller towns such as Hit. The screen-grabs below show Muhammad al-
Sab’awwi, allegedly a Sahwa leader and head of security for the city of Mosul. He
was marked as an enemy in SAS1 and allegedly subsequently killed.
SAS1 also features a speech by Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani entitled “we renew
our invitation (da’wa) to every apostate, traitor and deviant to repent and to
return [to the state of being a Sunni Muslim.” This offer is especially directed at
“policemen and Sahwa members” and ceases to be valid when IS overpowers or
captures them. According to jihadist reasoning, repentance can only be con-
sidered sincere and potentially accepted if the individual does so without co-
ercion – so as not to violate the jihadist interpretation of Qur’an, verse 5:34:
“unless they repent before you overpower them – in that case bear in mind that God is
forgiving and merciful.”12
The first Salil al-sawarim video ends with a slogan that has since become
commonplace in IS propaganda: “the Islamic State will remain” (baqiyya). The
conclusion of SAS1 also makes clear the ambition of the “Islamic State in Iraq” to
expand into Sham (Syria) and liberate Sunni Muslims from the regime of al-
Assad.
Screengrab of SAS1 showing the Mosul security chief (left) and a popular YouTube video (right,
860,000 views) claiming he was killed after SAS1 was released
12 For a detailed discussion of this principle in jihadist videos: Nico Prucha. Online Territories
of Terror – How Jihadi Movements Project Strategic Influence on the Internet and the Battle-
field and Why it Matters, Dissertation, University of Vienna, June 2014.
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Salil al-Sawarim, parts 2 and 3 – making a state
SAS2 shows fighters conducting hit-and-run missions, infiltrating Iraqi cities,
such as Hit, Ramadi, or Haditha to capture and execute Iraqi counter-terrorist or
government officials, and then withdrawing to the remote desert.
The second video also introduces footage that would become a common
theme in “Islamic State” propaganda: a professionally-laid out shooting range
where many masked men are training. The weapons shown include the classic
Kalashnikov assault rifle, as well as the much glorified – and often seen in jihadist
videos – Pulemyot Kalashnikova (P.K.) heavy machine gun. SAS2 is more so-
phisticated than its prequel; the attacks by the Mujahidin appear more precise,
professional and deadly.
SAS2 emphasizes the importance of media work, featuring an IS media op-
erative preparing crates of DVDs to give out to Sunnis in the towns and cities that
will be attacked but not immediately occupied. A Mujahid is interviewed and
introduced as a “soldier of the Islamic State”. Iraqi cars, gear and elite police
SWAT equipment are handed out to the graduates of the training course.
A speech by IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani and the direct application in the video.
A Mujahid in full SWAT gear gives an interview; apparently looted SWAT boots and uniforms
being handed out.
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The video also features action footage in various towns and cities at night.
Iraqi soldiers and policemen approach IS fighters disguised in special police
uniforms to greet them, believing they are comrades, only to be executed.
Those who IS considers high-value targets, predominantly collaborators and
Sahwa officers, are at the centre of the movie which showcases IS laying the
groundwork to eventually take over the territory cleansed of functionaries loyal
to the central Iraqi government.
A blog named “Islamic News Agency – da’wa al-haqq” described the second SAS
movie as a documentary in Full HD, with 49 minutes of IS fighters in special
counter-terrorism vehicles conducting assaults in various cities and killing
dozens of Iraqi soldiers.
The third video of the Salil al-sawarim series was released on January 17, 2013.
By this time, the “Islamic State” was seeking to consolidate control of territory in
Iraq and the purpose of SAS3 was to document its proclaimed campaign Hadim
al-aswar (“take down the walls!”).
The video opens with a band of Mujahidin singing and the movie sequence is
introduced as:
“a new phase in the conduct of jihadi operations, starting in the beginning of Ramadan,
a.H. 1433. The Mujahidin have arisen anew and returned to areas from which they had
previously withdrawn. This film is a documentary of some of the military operations in
this important and historical phase for jihadist work in Iraq.”
The campaign “take down the walls” consisted of systematic attacks on prisons
and had two strategic objectives:
1. Exacting revenge for Sunnis, perceived as excluded, marginalized and per-
secuted by the ruling Shiite majority of Iraq;
2. Replenishing fighter ranks with freed inmates who have little choice but to
support and join IS.
SAS3 features freed inmates of the Tasfirat prison in Tikrit who have assumed or
resumed leadership roles within IS. These men inform the audience of the
Iraqi SWAT pick-up trucks, uniforms and equipment – in the hand of IS operatives.
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hardship and torture endured in prison while relaying theological inter-
pretations framed in terms of the need to act.
The Sunni community is repeatedly portrayed as driven to extinction by
Iranian-backed Shiites and Western enmity. In addition, every IS armed oper-
ation is framed as an altruistic act for the Sunnis in Iraq and Syria.
The specific Sunni extremist interpretation of the Qur’an and the Hadith are
put in practice; for example, a Mujahid issues a call to prayer while standing next
to slain enemies. Such footage is intended to portray IS as the only Sunni group
willing to resist the Shiite takeover of Iraq and Syria.
The 80-minute long SAS3 concludes with a massive suicide bombing attack on
an Iraqi army barracks near or in Mosul, undertaken by a Tunisian foreign
fighter. He is identified as Abu Ziyyad al-Bahhar “from Tunis, the Muslim city
where real men are made.” He describes his emigration (hijra) into Syria and
then Iraq in 2013 and claims he did not face any problems while traveling. Using
classical Sunni extremist rhetoric, he urges others to follow his example:
“This is not the end of the path – no (…) Many of our brothers have spent many years in
prison (…). Hijra, jihad, hardships and combat; being imprisoned, blood, flesh [and
sacrifice], this is the path. This is the path of Muhammad.”
The “Islamic State” is the first Islamist movement to make highly professional
use of the Internet for “missionary purposes” (da’wa) related to territory seized
from a sovereign state. The control of strategic towns and even huge cities such as
Mosul, parts of Ramadi (2014–2015), Fallujah, and Raqqa, the capital of the
“Caliphate”, allows IS media workers to continuously produce new video
propaganda from both the ‘hinterland’ as well as from the frontlines.
This enables jihadist media strategists to convey several messages; firstly, they
The official banner of the al-Furqan release in the light of the campaign “take down the walls!”
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showcase IS members building and maintaining critical infrastructure for ci-
vilians, while fighting, bleeding and dying for this pseudo-altruistic project on
the frontlines. They also show IS fighting a rich blend of enemies, including air
force raids by the “crusader alliance” and various Shiite, Kurdish and Christian
militias on the ground. These sequences are intended to convey a sizeable Islamic
state populated by people who have adopted a real Muslim identity.
Salil al-Sawarim, part 4
Individuals who gained fame with the release of SAS4, such as Salman Turki or
Lavdrim Muhaxheri, rose within IS ranks and quickly became the ‘real face’ of IS
– offering the group’s theology in their own words. As a result, IS media has a
wider appeal than that of predecessor groups, like AQ or the first generation of
“Islamic State in Iraq”.
The release of the video Salil al-Sawarim, part 4 by ISIS’s media department
al-Furqan demonstrated sophisticated use of social media to disseminate video
content. Al-Furqan’s sister department, al-I’tasimu announced the release of the
fourth instalment of the film on Twitter on Saturday, 17 March 2014. A few hours
later, it was published via al-I’tasimu’s high-profile Twitter account and the tier-
one jihadist forums.
In the first twenty-four hours after the fourth instalment was posted on
YouTube, it was viewed 56,998 times with an average user watching a little over 17
minutes of the hour-long film. This means that collectively YouTube users spent
the equivalent of 686 days watching this one video. It has subsequently been
reposted a number of times on YouTube, and was published on other file sharing
sites such as archive.org and links for download were broadcast via justpaste.it. It
was published in different sizes and formats. A high-definition format, about one
gigabyte in size, carries death and mayhem to homes and portable devices
worldwide.
Approximately one month later, this major video production was available for
download and on YouTube with English, Dutch, German, French, Russian and
Bahasa Indonesia subtitles.
Ensuring a high number of views on the first day after publication takes
coordination across a range of social media channels. Analysis of the dissem-
ination of SAS4 allows us to determine:
– The volume of tweets related to the video release.
– An estimate of the size of the network-of-interest surrounding the video
release.
– The prominent languages used to spread word of the video release.
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– The frequently shared URLs that led to content access across a range of
platforms.
– The users most frequently mentioned in connection to the video.
– The key actors in the Twitter network-of-interest that spread word of the video
release.
– The platforms that users utilised to tweet.
– The likely location (proximity) of Twitter users sharing the video.
The Framework and Context of Sunni Extremist Media
Sunni extremist groups such as AQ and the “Islamic State” use the Internet as a
communication hub to broadcast their messages. Online jihad is a phenomenon
that has spread on a massive scale and pace in the past fifteen years. “Islamic
State”, in particular, invests a great deal of effort in its online operations in-
cluding maintaining/re-establishing accounts and networks on Twitter, Face-
book, YouTube, telegram and elsewhere. Large amounts of jihadist audio, video
and written content can be found on these networks, mostly in Arabic.
For most of the past 15 years, jihadist material was concentrated within
classical websites, blogs, and online forums. It has recently expanded to the full
range of social media. This content conveys a coherent jihadist worldview, based
on theological texts penned by AQ ideologues as far back as the 1980s.
Following the terrorist attack on September 1, 2001, the Internet became the
general platform for AQ to spread its Sunni extremist theology. This theology,
established by AQ in the 1980s, entered a new evolutionary phase in mid-2014
when ISIS declared a “Caliphate”.13 This AQ offshoot then became its primary
13 Statement regarding the Relationship of the Qa’idat al-Jihad group to ISIS (in Arabic) Markaz
al-Fajr li-l I’lam, https://alfidaa.info/vb/showthread.php?t=92927 (accessed February 02,
2014). Al-Qaeda Central issued this statement distancing themselves from the Islamic State of
Iraq and al-Sham with the refusal of ISIS’ leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to pledge allegiance
(bay’a) to AQ-amir Ayman al-Zawahiri. As a consequence, the Syrian revolution against al-
Assad was further divided with various ‘rebel’ factions turning on each other – including
Jabhat al-Nusra, the official branch of AQ turning on ISIS and vice versa. The clash – or fitna
(tribulation) – between ISIS and JN as well as other factions is the manifestation of two
torrents: the claim of seniority posed by AQ and its Syrian franchise Jabhat al-Nusra versus
the practicality of the “Islamic State” which advanced what AQ pledged to fight for : the
establishment of a Caliphate. Joas Wagemakers refers to ISIS as the Zarqawiyyun, practical
military orientated individuals who seek to implement their principles of faith by brute force
versus the Maqdisiyyun, adherents of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi who criticized the “Is-
lamic State” for its apparent rapid move in declaring a Caliphate. For further reading: Joas
Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Theology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 2012. Cole Bunzel referred to
this rift as “two tendencies predominate among jihadis insofar as the Syrian war is con-
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rival, developing a massive foothold on social media sites, mainly Twitter14, while
AQ lost significant support online and offline.15
Under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, IS16 adopted al-Qaeda’s iconography and
doctrine without being subject to its formal leadership.17 The Internet served as a
powerful tool that allowed the jihadist network to morph and spread in many
directions.
IS’ professional and coherent decentralized use of the Internet involves the
continuous and tireless deployment of media-workers and media-dedicated
brigades embedded with fighting jihadi units in the real-life battlefields. The
media departments – or the designated individual media mujahid (sg.) – facil-
itate all means possible to transport, broadcast and thus project strategic in-
fluence by enabling individuals worldwide to tune into the jihadist monopoly of
truth. This monopoly is a dominant form of projecting only one truth, or haqq, in
jihadist parlance, while remaining that every Muslim outside this tight definition
is either treading on the “path of falsehood (batil)”, is an apostate (murtadd), or
simply earmarked to be excommunicated (takfir) as a disbeliever (kafir). The
jihadi monopoly of “truth” only allows onea specific interpretation and im-
plementation of the corpus of Qur’an and Sunna, claiming absolute authority
over common Islamic habits and traditions to widen their potential impact.
Symbols, icons, gestures, and key words from religious texts are hijacked and
used to legitimise extremist reasoning and acting. The jihadist strives by all
means, foremost by violent actions, to implement an orthodox and selective
cerned: one favoring the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and cooperation with all
rebel groups, and another favoring ISIS and its exclusionary political designs as the reborn
Islamic state, or proto-caliphate.” Cole Bunzel, The Islamic State of Disunity : Jihadism
Divided, in: Jihadica, (2014) (http://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-disunity-jiha
dism-divided/) (accessed May 05, 2018). See also: Khalil Ezzeldeen/Nico Prucha, Rela-
tionship between ISIL and local Syrian rebels break down, in IHS Jane’s Islamic Affairs
Analyst, Islamic World Web Watch, April 2014.
14 Ali Fisher, How Jihadist Networks Maintain a Persistent Presence Online, in Perspectives on
Terrorism (2015) (http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/426)
(accesed August 01, 2015).
15 Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), the Syrian AQ affiliate was first to use Twitter on a noticeable scale and
facilitated the social media platform to disseminate propaganda videos and writings. The JN-
IS divide caused JN to lose members, fighters, and media activists to the “Islamic State”.
Further reading: Nico Prucha and Ali Fisher, Tweeting for the Caliphate, Twitter as the New
Frontier for Jihadist Propaganda, in CTC Sentinel (Westpoint), (2013) (http://www.ctc.usma.
edu/posts/tweeting-for-the-caliphate-twitter-as-the-new-frontier-for-jihadist-propaganda)
(accessed May 05, 2018).
16 At the time the “Islamic State” referred to itself as dawlat al-Islamiyya fi l-‘Iraq wa-l Sham
(ISIS), then shortened its name after the declaration of the Caliphate to IS or dawlat al-
khilafa.
17 See Cole Bunzel, The Islamic State of Disobedience: al-Baghdadi Triumphant, Jihadica,
October 5, 2013, http://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-disobedience-al-baghdadis-
defiance/ (accessed by May 05, 2018).
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interpretation of Islamic divine texts. This propaganda is disseminated online on
a variety of channels and platforms, in an increasing number of languages with
differently calibrated appeals to global and local audiences.18 The most modern
means of communication are deployed coolly and skilfully to propagate an
antiquated, ancient-medieval yet coherent worldview. This propaganda is meant
to address contemporary geopolitical circumstances, as well as local grievances.
Resisting and acting against unfair and inhumane realities, including by the use
of force, is declared ‘missionary work’ (da’wa). Conducting da’wa online, on all
channels and layers of the Internet, has proven effective in several past conflicts
and is a key operational concern for militant groups, as well as related non-
militant movements, often referred to as Salafist groups in the West.
Given the innovative capacity of online forums, social media and in general
‘new media’ platforms, the jihadist theology is effectively competing with
mainstream worldviews for the ‘hearts and minds’ of young Muslims.
Fighting for Hegemony: Claiming Sunni-Muslim identity and
“Prophetic Methodology”
This is a fight for hegemony and identity : what does it mean to be a Sunni Muslim
in times of war and sectarianism? To answer this question, the “Islamic State” has
taken the lead in producing mainly Arabic language videos to incite a global Arab
audience by popularizing their fighters, ideologues and preachers as ultimate
role models, modern-day Islamic warriors, or simply as defenders of Sunni
communities in a time of suffering.
“Islamic State” is an Arab movement fighting for independence, yet wel-
coming non-Arab Muslim foreign fighters into its ranks and using them stra-
tegically and on a tactical level in jihadist media, on the battlefield and in the
hinterland, where they can support state-building efforts.
Foreign fighters tend to address their target audience in their respective
language, and are often featured in videos with Arabic and non-Arabic subtitles.
This includes British citizens,19 Germans, Austrians,20 French,21 Russians,22 al-
18 Nico Prucha, ’Online Territories of Terror’: How Jihadi Movements Project Strategic Influence
on the Internet and the Battlefied and Why it Matters, Dissertation, University of Vienna,
(June 2014).
19 IS’ magazine Dabiq is published in English to ensure maximum readership worldwide,
including through mainstream media outlets. British and American foreign fighters appear
from time to time (e. g. a video released by Markaz al-Hayyat li-l i’lam, featuring a British,
French and German foreign fighter entitled “Wait. We are also waiting.” October 16, 2014).
20 For example, a video uploaded from the IS province Wilayat Hims featuring Austrian-
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though the overwhelming majority of IS and AQ videos are in Arabic, featuring
native Arabs.
The influx of foreign fighters to IS from Europe and the United States has
increased the use of social media by the group, and both Arab and non-Arab
foreign fighters post a large amount of content on social media sites in various
languages. Foreign fighters have the potential to have particular resonance for
Islamic communities in their respective countries of origin, as grievances and the
framing of “injustice” can vary depending on the local context, while the the-
ology is tied into the Arabic religious reasoning, as expressed by writings and
most importantly, as conveyed by audio-visual means.
The Qur’an – understood as the speech of God (kalimat allah) – was revealed
in Arabic, and therefore is the most important language for Islam. The lingua
jihadica is, likewise, Arabic; the overwhelming majority of AQ penned texts from
the 1980s and the dominant majority of IS videos are in Arabic. As a result, key
words in Arabic have become a mainstream substrate in many non-Arabic
languages where Islam has found a home, providing non-Arabic speaking
sympathizers of jihad terms to identify with and use for their religious rituals
and codes of identification. This is important when studying Arabic jihadist
materials, especially when it comes to the social media jihad.23
Sympathizers and media operatives use key words strategically to widen the
appeal of jihadist theology, while ascribing extremist definitions to the mainly
Qur’anic terminology. Deriving from the original Arabic, the key words are
transcribed in Latin letters (for example allahu akbar) and are the most integral
part of any non-Arabic language production. The use of these key words is
significant to understand and assess the impact of the Arabic-dominated the-
ology on non-Arab majority societies, expressed both online and offline. For
Egyptian Muhammad Mahmud and a German by the nom de guerre Abu ‘Umar al-Almani,
“Siyahat al-Umma – Der Tourismus dieser Umma”, Wilayat Hims, August 5, 2015.
21 For example, the French language nashid “Tend ta main pour l’all8geance”, with English
subtitles. Markaz al-Hayyat li-l ‘ilam. May 24, 2015. French is also an important language for
IS, which seeks to reach Francophone Muslims. In a video published on July 24, 2015, a
French speaking Mujahid addresses France and threatens future attacks. “Wa ma zalamna-
hum wa-lakin kanu anfusahum yuzlamun”. Wilayat Hama, July 24, 2015.
22 With a large number of foreign fighters coming from the Caucasus region, IS has a dedicated
Russian-language media department, “al-Furat”, that promotes Russian, mainly Chechen,
fighters and ideologues.
23 This is most evident in non-Arabic language nashid where Arabic key words are built-in
references to complex theological concepts. For more details, see Nico Prucha, Die Ver-
mittlung arabischer Jihadisten-Ideologie: Zur Rolle deutscher Aktivisten, in: Guido Stein-
berg (Ed.), Jihadismus und Internet: Eine deutsche Perspektive, in: Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik, (October 2012), pp. 45–56 (http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/swp-
studien-de/swp-studien-detail/article/jihadismus_und_internet.html) (accessed May 05,
2018).
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example, non-Arab foreign fighters introduce these key words to their target
audiences and employ them to define what it means to be a ‘true’ Sunni Muslim.
Social media platforms encourage sympathizers to engage with such videos and
role models, hence popularizing specific key words among non-Arab com-
munities within non-majority Islamic societies, for instance in Europe.
Jihadist media strategies were further developed and improved after the rise
of IS in 2013/14 as a major player in the Syrian revolution and its subsequent re-
emergence in Iraq. IS successfully competes with its rival AQ for hearts and
minds – using the media strategies and theology/theology invented by AQ – to
broadcast and project influence on an unprecedented level. The deliberate and
proficient use of social media outlets, particularly Twitter and since late 2015,
Telegram, has furthermore enabled the flow of images and videos from real-life
battlefields, sometimes in almost real-time.
As such, IS has adopted the theology of AQ and outrun its mentor in terms of
the scale and pace of uploading content while maintaining a persistent presence
in the physical world. This content consists mainly of videos meant to depict the
application of its theology in territory in Syria and Iraq (and elsewhere such as
Libya) that AQ was never able to conquer. Content is shared through a broad
support network of media Mujahidin in one of the clearest manifestations of
Netwar since it was first envisaged.24
Context of IS Conquest in Iraq: The ‘Arab Spring’ as a Renaissance
for AQ Affiliates in Perspective
Within the framework of the turmoil in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’, and
especially with the conflict in Syria growing in intensity and scope, AQ has been
able to re-emerge with two linked groups, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and The Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). While JN has pledged allegiance (bay’a) to
Ayman al-Zawahiri, ISIS under the rule of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has morphed
into a major manifestions of al-Qa’ida iconography and doctrine by adhering to
the theology without being subjected to AQ’s formal leadership.25 The renais-
sance of al-Qaeda doctrine is largely based on its most powerful tool that allows
24 For details on the concept of Netwar: John Arquilla/David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar
(Revisited)”, RAND (http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/
MR1382/MR1382.ch1.pdf) (accessed July 8, 2014). John Arquilla/David Ronfeldt. Networks,
Netwars, and the Fight for the Future, in First Monday, Volume 6, Number 10, October 1,
2001. http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/889/798 (accessed July 8, 2014).
25 See Cole Bunzel, The Islamic State of Disobedience: al-Baghdadi Triumphant, in Jihadica,
(2013) (http://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-disobedience-al-baghdadis-defiance/)
(accessed May 05, 2018).
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the network to morph and spread in many directions: the professional and
coherent decentralised use of the Internet and the continuous and tireless de-
ployment of media-workers and media-dedicated brigades embedded with
fighting jihadi units in the real-life battle arenas.
The Islamic State, referring to itself also as the Islamic Caliphate State, con-
siders itself as an avant-garde, an icon (ramz) and in parts in its rhetoric even as
awliya’ (friends/saints)26 of God who are fighting against injustice, suppression,
occupation, imprisonment, or the distortion of “Islam”. In the words of Ayman
al-Zawahiri, contemporary Mujahidin are convicted of their re-enactment of
Muslims under the command of Prophet Muhammad. He refers to the early
Muslims as “the most noble servants in close proximity to God”, a sentiment that
furthers the contemporary Mujahid’s self-understanding and perception as
having a likewise relationship to God. This role model is outlined in al-Zawahiri’s
writing “note on the noblest servants in close proximity to God – campaigns of
death and martyrdom”, published in a second electronic edition by as-Sahab on
the Shumukh al-Islam forum in mid-March 2014.27 As based on jihadists in their
own words, the sentiment is more than merely being “soldiers of God”, but rather
consider themselves as the “men of [Prophet] Muhammad”, calling out by their
filmed testimonials for men to join them in their endeavour. These videos,
needless to add, are produced, edited, curated and ultimately disseminated
digitally – and handed out via USB drives and DVD’s to the local audience within
the territory held by the Islamic State.
Anyone is invited to tap into this freely available culture on the Internet and be
a part, either as passive or active consumer – by various means within the shared
space of the inclusive online territories that nevertheless promise the same
paradise for the online activist as for offline members. This has led to the con-
struction of a virtual sense of a real (global) community, where individuals may
feel compelled to commit acts of terror by themselves out of a presumed personal
responsibility for the “Islamic” collective in the West or by seeking to join the
Mujahidin within Islamic territories deemed as occupied by Western nations or
at war with non-Sunni armies in general, as is the case in Syria as of writing.
On this virtual realm, the principles of the al-Qa’ida dominated theology
remain active and resilient whereas in real-life, offline-fighting groups, either
with direct or indirect connections to the remnants of the AQ network prop-
agates the implementation of these principles framed as “shari’a law” by force.
26 The awliya’ allah, “the friends of God” as stated in Qur’an 10:62 is an expression used by
jihadists for describing themselves and elevating their deeds for God by approximating
themselves to God as representatives exercising His will in this world.
27 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Risala ‘an ashraf qurubat al-‘ubbad hamlat al-mawt wa-l-istishhad,
second edition, Markaz al-fajr li-l i’lam, broadcast by al-Sahab, https://shamikh1.info/vb/
showthread.php?t=220308 (accessed March 13, 2014).
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Groups adhering to the jihadist theology and mind-set in general learned their
lessons from past conflicts in Iraq and Algeria where the indiscriminate killing of
Muslims contributed to the demise of jihadi outlets and emphasize positive
elements in their audio-visual incitement material published frequently online.
Content Analysis of Salil al-Sawarim, part 4
As is typical of jihadist videos, Salil al-sawarim, part 4 begins with the basmala
formula:28 “in the name of God, the most beneficent, the most merciful.” The
opening sequences of the film are set within the overarching notion of the 37th
sura of the Qur’an (sura al-saffat)29, Verses 172–173:
“Our word has already been given to Our servants the messengers: it is they who will be
helped, and the ones who support (jund) Our cause will be the winners.”30
As M.A.S. Abdel Haleem notes, “in classical Arabic jund means ‘supporters’, not
just ‘armies’.” IS, however, implies the meaning of jund is “soldiers”, hence
defining every true legitimate supporter of the “Islamic State” as a soldier. In this
manner, IS redefines Sunni Muslim identity and any physical member of the
group is presented as a soldier of God (jund allah), or soldier of the caliphate
(jund al-khilafa) with a reference to the above cited passage of the Qur’an.
The video shows a satellite map of the greater Middle East, the territory IS
considers the heartland of Islam and hence the most important countries to
”liberate”. Clearly visible are the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, which according to
jihadist doctrine, are the God-given boundaries of what should be referred to as
the “Arab Peninsula.”31 Syria and Iraq are part of the Arab Peninsula in jihadist
understanding, and defined as the cradle of Islam, including by Ayman al-Za-
28 Bi-smi l-llahi l-rahmani l-rahim is a common saying for Muslims worldwide; during prayer;
when entering a house, when thanking God for their food, etc. Every Sura of the Qur’an with
two exceptions (surat al-anfal, “spoils of war” and surat al-tawba, “repentance”), start with
the basmala.
29 “Those who set the ranks”. The term saff (row) is reference to the rows of believers during
prayer and is used in jihadist slang likewise to project unity in their war against non-Muslims
worldwide.
30 Unless otherwise noted, the English translation of the verses of the Qur’an throughout this
study is that of M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, The Qur ˘an, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004.
31 In Jihadist definition, the Arab Peninsula (al-jazirat al-‘Arab) comprises an area that in-
cludes Iraq. According to the first generation of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, the Arab Peninsula
must be cleansed of all polytheists (mushrikin) as detailed in AQAP’s electronic magazine
“the voice of jihad”, Vol. 6 & 7. Discussed in: Nico Prucha, Die Stimme des Dschihad “Sawt al-
gihad”, al-Qaedas erstes Online-Magazin, Hamburg: Verlag Dr.Kovač 2010.
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wahiri in a 2012 speech commemorating and acknowledging martyred al-Qaeda
ideologues and leaders.32
This drive to liberate the Arab Peninsula is focused on Mecca and Medina as
much as Jerusalem. The Sunni extremists portray themselves as the only Muslim
Arabs – in contrast to all Arab regimes – willing to take Jerusalem back and
enforce the “true” Islam in the birthplace of Islam in contemporary Saudi Arabia.
The camera zooms into Iraq and takes the audience into the full HD per-
spective of a drone, hovering over the Iraqi city of Fallujah, where the most severe
attacks against U.S. occupation forces occurred. As a result, Fallujah has been at
the centre of jihadist narratives in writing and on video since 2003. The U.S.
Army suffered many losses in the Iraqi province of Anbar, and was only able to
retake the city of Fallujah after two intensive campaigns consisting of house-to-
house fighting.
Drones, operated by handheld tablets such as iPads or Android-powered
devices, are in to some extent revolutionizing the landscape of jihadist videos. On
December 17, 2015, the IS “province” of Anbar, Iraq, published a video message
for the Saudi government titled “expel the polytheists from the Arab Peninsula”,
a phrase popularized by the first generation of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). At the end of the video, a suicide bomber’s farewell ceremony is
documented and his advance towards a remote Iraqi Army outpost is filmed by a
drone, showing the long drive through the desert plains and the massive ex-
plosion at the Army site.
The drone, possibly an iPad-controlled AR Parrot drone, provides an overview of
the city of Fallujah, suggesting calmness and peace after the IS takeover in
January 2014. The drone perspective projects the “Islamic State” as functioning
and operational in Fallujah, presenting itself as the only force able and willing to
protect the Sunni population – a strategic message in light of the bloody sectarian
war in Iraq and the recent history of grievances due to war and conflict since 2003
related to the city itself.
The images of the drone are termed “Fallujah bi-‘adsa al-furqan”, “by the lens
32 Ayman al-Zawahiri, li-ahlina fi manzal al-wahi wa-mahad al-Islam, al-Sahab, May 16, 2012.
Death on the ground – filmed from above by an IS operated full HD camera drone
Ali Fisher / Nico Prucha92
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-SA 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen 
ISBN Print: 9783847109389 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737009386
of al-Furqan [media]”, the main official media outlet of IS, founded in the days of
al-Zarqawi and now one of the group’s main media stations, resembling a Ca-
liphate-wide broadcasting company.
The sequence shifts to convoys of mainly Toyota pick-up trucks with armed
fighters and .50 caliber guns from various IS controlled cities. This footage
underlines the fight for territory within the Sunni Arab heartlands of Syria and
Iraq. When the video was published in May 2014, it was meant to show that the
“Islamic State” was indeed in the phase of consolidation. The audience is taken
from the city of Fallujah to cities across Syria and Iraq, showing columns of IS-
cars and fighters parading in various cities.
The cities shown include Homs, Raqqa, and Ramadi, which fell to IS in May 2015
and was liberated by Iraqi forces in February 201633. The sequence ends with
footage of Fallujah and the black flag of the Islamic State, while the narrator sets
the tone of divine guidance for IS:
“by the voice of truth (haqq) and the conquest of the millat Ibrahim prying open the
true conflict between the opposing military camps and those who fight for al-haqq and
[against] falsehood (al-batil).34 For jihad is set to establish the din (bond to God, etc),
this is a shari’a obligation, a duty that can only be achieved by holding fast (i’tisam) on
to God and by adhering to the jama’a.35 This endeavor entails sacrifice and humbleness
The “al-Furqan drone” documenting the IS convoy from above and cameramen on the ground in
Fallujah
33 Iraq liberates city of Ramadi from Islamic State, in Chicago Tribune, February 9, 2016, http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-iraq-ramadi-islamic-state-20160209-story.
html (accessed May 05, 2018).
34 For a description of the terms haqq / batil : Nico Prucha, Notes on the Jihadists’ Motivation for
Suicide-Operations, in Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (JIPSS) 4i
(2010), pp. 57–68.
35 A religious reference to the ahl al-Sunna wa-l jama’a, meaning the Sunni Muslims who are
acting on behalf of the prophetic tradition (Sunna), exemplified by prophet Muhammad and
his companions. Sunni extremists claim to be in the closest proximity to God by re-enacting
the example and guidance, as set by the Sunna of prophet Muhammad and his companions
(sahaba). The “Islamic State” has taken this AQ crafted concept to a new level by popularizing
their slogan “upon the prophetic methodology” (‘ala minhaj al-nubuwwa), framing every
action, ranging from the destruction of Shiite mosques to the execution of non-Sunni
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until the judicial rulings prescribed by shari’a36 are retained and safeguarded, the divine
physical punishment (hadd) are implemented and carried out without any fear of
God.37”
The focus of the video is Syria and Iraq, where at the time of the video release,
“vast territories” had recently been conquered and absorbed into the “Islamic
State”. The target audience consists of Arabic native speakers who understand
the dynamic in Iraq, where IS was able to establish itself as the main lobby for the
marginalized Sunni population, particularly in Anbar.38 The conquest and
subsequent consolidation of territory, as allegedly shown in the video, is framed
within the grand dream of liberating Jerusalem, a repetition echoed by jihadist
groups since the 1980s,39 stating that “the Mosque of al-Aqsa is just a stone hurl
away” from the newly (re-) established Islamic State that seeks to liberate and
integrate all parts of the once blossoming caliphate.
The introduction is concluded by a lengthy talk given by a foreign fighter from
Kosovo who is fluent in Arabic and holds his passport into the camera like most
of his comrades. The group of men waiving black flags and flashing their
weapons and passports are framed as sincere believers who ”fulfil their covenant
to God”40 and are presented to the audience as ultimate role models.
Muslims, as the only valid model of pieces of divine scripture as well as the alleged prophetic
conduct.
36 In Arabic: ahkam al-shari’a. The term ahkam, singular : hukm, refers to the judicial findings
based on the interpretations of religious scripture and is often equated to a specific “ruling”
or “jurisprudential decree” issued by a religious authoritative scholar (shaykh).
37 A core theme in jihadist literature; in particular, the first generation of Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) published a great deal of writings online referring to the fifth
chapter (al-Ma’ida) of the Qur’an in defining themselves as the only proper Muslims favored
by God. “[God] loves and who love Him, people who are humble towards the believers, hard
on the disbelievers, and who strive in God’s way without fearing anyone’s reproach. Such is
God’s favour.” A true believer adhering to the jihadist corpus of writings and videos only
fears God and accepts or gives guidance channeled through the formalization of religion and
thus enforced as “shari’a law”, ahkam, or defined as part of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).
38 Emma Sky, The Unravelling. High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq, Atlantic Books:
London 2015. Also: Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of the Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni
Revolution, Verso: London, New York 2014.
39 The importance of fighting within Arab countries to liberate Jerusalem is discussed in: Nico
Prucha, ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam’s Outlook for Jihad in 1988 – “al-Jihad between Kabul and Jeru-
salem”, in RIEAS, (December 2010) (http://rieas.gr/images/nicos2.pdf) (accessed May 05,
2018).
40 The contract, or ‘ahd, is a central theme throughout the theology of Sunni extremist groups.
In jihadist mindset, the only ‘true’ Muslim is the one who understands and acts on behalf of
the “contract [or : covenant] with God”, affirming that God in return will recompense the
bloodshed and deeds invested by the believer in the afterlife, as based on the extremist
reading of verses such as 3:169 or 8:60, to briefly reference two samples.
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From Kosovo to the Caliphate – Lavdrim Muhaxheri a Rising Jihadi
Video Star
The man featured giving a lengthy talk to the audience in fluent and elaborate
Arabic is a recognizable figure for fans of IS videos. In Salil al-Sawarim 4, he is
neither identified nor otherwise named by a nom de guerre or kunya, which is
quite unusual. Only his Kosovar passport in his hand portrays him as a non-Arab
who otherwise has a high-ranking dual-position of fighter and preacher or
ideologue. In a series entitled “Windows into the Epic Battlefield” comprising 50
videos, released by – at the time – the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (or al-
Sham)” in 2013–2014, he was featured as Abu ‘Abdallah al-Kosovi. He starred in
the 15th instalment of this series, published via Twitter on October 12, 2013 and
broadcast via jihadist forums as well.
Abu ‘Abdallah from Kosovo speaks in Albanian and Arabic subtitles appear.
He defines his address to the audience as an advice (nasiha), a recurring element
in jihadist videos and writings. In addition to senior ideologues and leading
figures, ‘regular’ fighters issue nasiha to share their personal experiences with a
wider audience. Their goal is to explain what jihad is about and encouraging
their targeted consumers to join the cause.
In explaining his move to Syria he highlights the motivation to help and
support the weak, oppressed Sunnites, using the Arabic word mustada’ifin to
express his religious motivation. This is a direct reference to “the oppressed” in
Qur’an 4:97.41 He then praises the “assembled lions from all over the world” who
have come to aid the mustada’ifin.
He portrays himself more as a humanitarian than a fighter – a humanist who has
emigrated to help people in need, people that the audience can identify and
sympathize with. Furthermore, as most jihadists state, the final motivation is
41 Nico Prucha, Die Stimme des Dschihad “Sawt al-gihad”: al-Qaedas erstes Online-Magazin,
Hamburg: Verlag Dr.Kovač 2010, p. 151.
A screengrab of Kosovar foreign fighter Muhaxeri from SAS4 (left) and of the 50 video series
(2013) speaking from an IS checkpoint in ‘Azaz, North Syria in Albanian (right).
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instilled by the notion made popular by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq and the
first generation of AQ in Saudi Arabia, “to fight for the sake of the word of God,
that is the highest and met with disbelief by the imbecile [non-Muslims].”42 This
underlines the idea that the identity of the Mujahid is based on loyalty to God, as
based on the theological concept of al-wala’ wa-l bara’43, and he states:
“my Muslim brothers, this is an advice from Syria (ard al-Sham), the land of jihad and
epic battles (malahim), and as you have seen here, God has bestowed upon us victory.
No authority or [worldly] rule remains for the apostates and disbelievers, all praise be
God’s.”44
For one, he declares the area a safe-zone where the proper conduct of prayer and
shari’a law is exercised without interference by any apostate or negative influ-
ence. This liberated territory under IS control and its interpretation of Islamic
Jurisprudence (fiqh) is:
“so we can live in the shades of shari’a law and for the sake of it. People here [in North
Syria] love the Islamic shari’a, coming in flocks to be under the judicial rule of the
shari’a.”45
In the six months in between the release of the 15th video of the Nawafidh ‘ala ard
al-malahim series and Salil al-sawarim, Abu ‘Abdallah al-Kosovi has made a
career within the ranks of “the state” (al-dawla), as it is often referred to on social
media. IS made and released the SaS4 video during a period of accelerated
territorial conquest in Syria and Iraq, with the objective of uniting and con-
solidating territory.
With this mind-set, he gives a furious speech in Arabic to the main Arab target
audience, expressing his Muslim identity as an adherent of IS theology in his own
words for the viewers. This is a powerful rhetorical tool that is used throughout
jihadi videos. A ‘common’ man or fighter speaking about his personal motiva-
tion and in his own words appeals to a far broader audience than elaborate
addresses by clerics or renowned preachers.
As in most cases, this speech is interesting because it features an individual
explaining in his own words why he joined IS and what he is fighting for. His
individual motivation expressed in Arabic is particularly important because he
calls on the Arab community – as a non-Arab Muslim – to join the fight. Fighters
are portrayed as role models “who fulfil their covenant to God”. They are shown
holding their passports into the camera46 renewing their bay’a to Abu Bakr al-
42 Nawafidh ‘ala ard al-malahem, 15 (http://justpaste.it/drd5) (accessed December 17, 2014).
The justpaste.it link is a collection of the first 32 video installments of the series.
43 “Loyalty and dissociation”, as discussed in this report later.
44 Nawafidh ‘ala ard al-malahem, 15 (http://justpaste.it/drd5) (accessed December 17, 2014).
45 Ibid.
46 See for example: Huwa samakum al-Muslimin, Mu’assassat al-Furqan, April 14, 2014. The
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Baghdadi and pledging their allegiance to death as the ultimate fulfilment of the
“covenant to God.”47
Foreign fighters burning their passports has become a regular theme in IS
videos and is one of the most dramatic expressions that loyalty (wala’) is only for
God, manifest by the bay’a to al-Baghdadi, while the destruction of the passports
is the ultimate dissociation (bara’) to governments that are branded “un-Is-
lamic” for various reasons.
As part of the millatu Ibrahim, the “community of [prophet] Abraham,”48 the
speaker sends a clear message to the tyrants (tawaghit) and disbelievers (kuffar)
worldwide, assuming the ultimate representation of the millatu Ibrahim:
“we tell you as Ibrahim [Abraham] told his father:
“We disown you49 and what you worship beside God! We renounce you! Until you
believe in God alone, the enmity and hatred that has arisen between us will endure!”
[Qur’an 60:4] And we say to you what the prophet – peace and blessings upon him –
said: “we have come to you with nothing other than slaughter.50””
This is the exact same reference that Bouyari used before murdering Theo van
Gogh in the streets of Amsterdam. Ten years after this murder, a physical “Islamic
title of the video refers to Qur’an 22:78, translating as “God has called you Muslims.” Thus,
the bearing of any man-given identity, such as a nationality, is considered invalid and sinful.
47 This is a frequent narrative in IS videos; it strengthens the individual’s commitment to the
doctrine of jihad and invites viewers to participate by pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi – an act that does not necessarily need to be made face to face but can also take
place on the Internet. As stated above, the pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi is a pledge of
allegiance to God. In some IS videos the bay’a is termed as a “pledge of allegiance to death”
(bay’a ‘ala l-mawt), for example: bay’a ‘ala l-mawt, wilayat al-Raqqa, April 13, 2015.
48 Guido Steinberg, Die Globale Islamische Medienfront (GIMF) und ihre Nachfolger, in Guido
Steinberg (Ed.), Jihadismus und Internet: Eine deutsche Perspektive,in: SWP, October 2012,
pp. 23–32; Nico Prucha, Die Vermittlung arabischer Jihadisten-Ideologie: Zur Rolle deut-
scher Aktivisten, in Guido Steinberg (Ed.), Jihadismus und Internet: Eine deutsche Per-
spektive, in: SWP, October 2012, pp. 45–56 (http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/
swp-studien-de/swp-studien-detail/article/jihadismus_und_internet.html) (accessed May
05, 2018).
49 The verb in Arabic is based on the above reference “dissociation” (bara’), lit. : “we are
dissociating ourselves from you” (innana bura’a minkum).
50 In Arabic the term dhabh is used to refer to “slaughter”. This term is mainly applied to the
ritual halal butchering of animals. Slaughter in the sense of combat underlines the notion of
cleansing territory from anything or anyone deemed non-Sunni or non-Muslim. Jihadists
base this slogan on a statement by prophet Muhammad in the historical circumstance of
fighting the Quraysh and has been documented in various hadith collections. For a discus-
sion of this statement as well as an oversight of the hadith collectors referencing it: http://
www.ahlalhdeeth.com/vb/showthread.php?t=123429 (accessed May 05, 2018), posted Ja-
nuary 8, 2017. This is a slogan used throughout the history of jihadist movements and is a
typical repetition used by IS as a nashid and as a title for videos, for example: Patience sahwat
of Derna [Libya], we have come to you with nothing other than slaughter, wilayat Barqa, July
12, 2015.
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State” is in the making, based on the same theology that had driven Bouyeri to
execute Theo van Gogh in broad daylight in Amsterdam.51
The title Salil al-sawarim is meant to invoke the overall preparedness for
battle. Referring to the “clash”, the speaker draws a machete from his tactical
ammunition vest, augmented by a popular sound effect indicating the readiness
to kill by the drawing of a sword or long knife from its shaft, swearing:
“by God almighty, we will cleanse the [Arab] Peninsula of you, you filth!
We will liberate Bayt al-Maqdis [Jerusalem] of you, you Jews!
We are going to conquer Rome,52 we are like the tribe of Ishaq [Isaac], we will take Rome
and al-Andalus,53 by the will of God, exalted is He.”
The crowd responds with allahu akbar shouts that collectively approve his fu-
rious speech. The foreign fighter from Kosovo holds his passport into the camera
and states:
“this is your passport you tyrants everywhere in the world. By God, we are Muslims, we
are Muslims. We are Muslims.”
While shouting allahu akbar, a number of foreign fighters tear their passports
apart and toss them on the ground. The destruction of passports consolidates the
pledge of allegiance to the caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and – most importantly –
to God and the full disavowal of any possible loyalty to a non-Islamic state or
authority. The underlying concept that is expressed by this action is living out of
al-wala’ wa-l bara’.
The Kosovar Abu ‘Abdallah al-Kosovi, who in a later IS video speaks fluent
English, has been identified as Lavdrim Muhaxheri by the media.54 In a non-
official IS video published in 2012 or 2013, Lavdrim Muhaxeheri is seen killing a
prisoner tied to a pole by firing a rocket-propelled-grenade-7 (RPG) at him.55 He
51 Bouyeri who holds joint Moroccan-Dutch citizenship pledged in court to repeat this act if
given the chance (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4716909.stm) (accessed May 05, 2018),
BBC News, July 26, 2007.
52 The first major threat by IS to conquer Rome was made in a video released by al-Hayyat
Media center, showing the execution of several hostages on the shores of the coast of Libya.
Risala mawqi’a bi l-dima’ ila ahl al-salib (Message signed in blood for the people of the
cross), Markaz al-hayyat li-l i’lam, February 15, 2015.
53 Andalusia, the southern part of Spain that once belonged to the Umayyad Caliphate, is vowed
to be liberated and re-integrated into the caliphate IS claims to have established. On January
30, 2016, a video released by the province of Nineveh (Iraq) features a French speaking
foreign fighter executing several alleged spies speaking in French about the importance of re-
claiming Andalusia. Tasfiyyat al-murtaddin (exterminating the apostates), wilaya Nineveh,
January 30, 2016.
54 http://www.warbreaking.com/2015/07/kosovo-cuts-water-supplies-after-isil.html sourcing
Aljazeera and Reuters (accessed May 05, 2018).
55 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Ky-j0cENW8, accessed September 27, 2015 (accessed
May 05, 2018).
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is wanted by Interpol56 and was named a relevant figure in a possible IS plot to
poison water supplies in Kosovo.57 This echoes a call for waiters serving non-
Muslims in Bosnia and Serbia to poison their food and thus participate in the war
to restore Islam, as seen in a IS video entitled “Honor in Jihad.”58
According to sources on Twitter he was last seen in July 2015 in the town of
Rutba, in the Iraqi province of Anbar.59 In addition to native Albanian, he speaks
fluent Arabic and English, as he demonstrated in the English-language al-Hayyat
production “Rise of the Caliphate and Return of the Gold Dinar.”60
The Clashes of the Swords – Nashid as Pop-Culture
Nashid (pl. anashid) are jihad-hymns. These religious songs are exclusively a
capella-styled and oftentimes enhanced by sound effects such as the “clash” or
“clang” of a sword, a machine-gun, an explosion or the neigh of a horse –
suggesting the Mujahid embarked on a horse following the historical role models
steering into combat.
Since the 1980s, the nashid has been a genre of its own, enriching sermons and
the videos of jihad in general, conveying elemental and key themes of Sunni
extremist theology in a playful style to a wider audience. The use of the Internet
was key in popularizing the nashid, some of which have entered mainstream
pop-culture, such as the song salil al-sawarim. Generally, nashid acoustically
convey rhythmic and easy to comprehend texts featuring religious key words in
56 http://www.interpol.int/notice/search/wanted/2014-43350 (accessed May 05, 2018).
57 More than 200 FF http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/11/kosovo-cuts-pristina-
water-supply-over-alleged-isis-plot-to-poison-reservoir (accessed July 11, 2015). http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/tens-of-thousands-without-water-in-kosovo-
after-fears-of-isis-plot-to-poison-reservoir-10383229.html (accessed May 05, 2018).
58 Honor is in Jihad, Markaz al-hayyat li-l i’lam, July 4, 2015.
59 https://twitter.com/iraqisuryani1/status/621733495472152576 (accessed May 05, 2018).
60 https://twitter.com/realigazz/status/638374505673531392 (accessed May 05, 2018).
Speaking first in Arabic then in English, Muhaxeheri praises the gold dinar and promotes the
English video nashid “for the sake of allah”.
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Arabic. This holds true for both Arabic and non-Arabic nashid, where likewise
Arabic key words full of Sunni extremist meaning are broadcast outlining
theological concepts and a general Muslim identity. Such ideological key con-
cepts are enhanced by visual means, either pictures or short video sequences – or
the nashid serves as the theme for segments within jihadist videos.
The nashid salil al-sawarim has become one of the main IS theme songs, often
used to enhance videos, including non-jihadist content, such as a video showing
a belly dancer with over 1 million views,61 a “Shiite version” with drums and
about 875 000 views,62 Egyptians mocking IS63 or a heavily modified “Skrillex”
version thereof with over 430 000 views.64 When searching for this nashid in Latin
transliteration salil al-sawarim, the ‘original’, unmodified version appears by
Abu Yasir with over 640, 000 views and about 4 500 likes.65 Most of the comments
are in English with the seeming majority in favour. Of the nearly 2,000 comments,
statements such as “this song rocked so hard the twin tower collapsed” (25 likes)
appear as often as references to first-person-shooter games where two teams
fight each other to death:
“Played this over mic in a csgo [Counter Strike Global Offensive, a first-person-shooter]
match while yelling Allahu Akbar. Everyone else started yelling with me. The bomb got
detonated and we all went totally crazy. 10/10 would jihad again,” (742 likes)
or a top comment:
“My speakers just exploded for like no reason.” (957 likes)
Other commentators criticize the popularity of the IS nashid, claiming that:
“Thanks to 4chan & Reddit, metadata won’t be able to tell the difference between legit
radicalized Westerners and teenagers with really weird senses of humor.” (47 likes)
The nashid tends to accompany action-related content released by IS, such as in-
combat footage or sniper videos, including a video released January 13, 2016 by
the wilaya Halab (“province of Aleppo”). The 7-minute video entitled “Deadly
Arrows” (sahm al-qatil) highlights the professional training of IS snipers, with
one sniper speaking to the audience about the necessity to fight. Footage
showing the shooting of Syrian soldiers through the sniper scope is enhanced by
the nashid Salil al-sawarim.
As stated, the nashid in general is a genre of jihadist media productions that is
61 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=exMS5HkfCFA (accessed May 05, 2018).
62 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GZCT6013Skg (accessed May 05, 2018).
63 A news report on mock executions and Egyptians dancing in a funny manner to offend IS,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zFR1AUA_RPo (accessed May 05, 2018). About a quarter
million views with some strong language in favor of IS in the comments.
64 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jg_mZv_SdZw (accessed May 05, 2018).
65 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZQoJvI8XUa0 (accessed May 05, 2018).
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meticulously and professionally produced and serves the strategy of conveying
ideological parameters and popularizing key words with in-depth meaning to a
wide target audience.
A Translation of the nashid Salil al-sawarim
Clashing of the swords,66 hymn67 of the reluctant
while the passageway of fighting is the way of life
so amidst an assault, tyranny68 perishes
the most beautiful echo is silence69
concealment of the voice70 results in the beauty of the echo
By it my religion is exalted71 and tyranny is laid low
Therefore, my people, awake on the path of the brave
For either being alive delights leaders
Or being dead vexes the enemy
So arise brother get up on the path of salvation
So we may march together, resist the aggressors
Raise our glory and raise the foreheads
That have refused to bow before any besides God
Come on to righteousness
The banner has called us
To brighten the path of destiny
To wage war on the enemy
Whosoever among us dies






68 This refers to local tyrants (local Arab regimes) and the ‘far enemy’ (Western nations,
supporting regimes in the Arab countries to suppress Islamist and jihadist movements).
69 Lit. : the silencing of the voice is a beautiful echo.
70 Lit. : the silencer is a means of a beautiful resistance [to assassinate enemies in secret].
71 In the meaning of “my religion is honored” (‘izza), a term frequently used to re-instate lost
pride and respect to incite the consumers of jihadist media to get active and participate in an
empowering movement. La ‘izza ila bi-l-jihad, “there is no honor except by jihad” was a
popular slogan for the first generation of AQAP and often used within the electronic ma-
gazine The Voice of Jihad.
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Hunt the Rafida – the Killings of Shiites as a Music Video
The nashid complements the video sequences of IS fighters undertaking drive by
shootings on the Iraqi highway. The targets are unmarked cars that, according to
the video, transport Shiite Iraqi soldiers not wearing their uniforms to their
bases to report for duty. This part of the movie is entitled as “hunt the rafida”, a
reference made to Shiites who are thus termed as “deviates” or “rejectionists.”
Any Shiite, in particular those working for the central government in Baghdad
are framed as safavid, a reference to the Iranian Safavid Empire (1501–1722),
whereas IS perceives a war against Sunni Islam because of the interest and de
facto presence of contemporary Iran inside of Iraq. In a video released in April
2015 entitled “Hunt the Safavids”, IS made it clear that Shi’a Islam is the main
threat for the Sunnis in Iraq and that the U.S. occupation served the intent to
disempower Sunni Muslims in an attempt to destroy the ‘pure Islam’. Thus, in IS
perception backed by a wide array of Sunni extremist literature, the Shiites are
nothing but rafida (pl. rawafid), secretly or openly working for Iranian interests
and in particular cruel on Sunni civilians.
The SUV’s are strain with bullet holes and corpses are seen lying on the
motorway – documented by the jihadi camera lens to undermine the effective-
ness of such operations and to highlight payback for Sunnis who have been
discriminated since the ousting of Sunni ruler Saddam Hussein. Sequences of
killing and drive-by shootings in open urban warfare are a frequent element of
Sunni extremist videos, however, in this sequence IS shoots to kill, not wasting
much ammunition while claiming to thoroughly hunt Shiite Iraqi soldiers, in
some cases stopping at cars that crashed as a result of the attack to ensure all the
passengers are killed by close up head shots. A caption clarifies “rafida hunters –
eliminating elements of the safavid army on route to their military units.”
In one sequence a man walking on the street next to another pedestrian is shot
with a Kalashnikov rifle and hit multiple times. A caption in the video explains
“eliminating an element of the Safavid SWAT forces.” The other man who walked
next to the victim runs away in horror, apparently unharmed with the camera
man making sure to send this message. Taking out members of the Iraqi SWAT
team, an elite unit loyal to Iraqi Prime Minister at the time Nuri al-Maliki is part
of exercising revenge for the violent breakdown of peaceful Sunni protestors in
Hawija, Anbar province, in April 2013, as is later detailed in the film. In one
sequence a driver who had managed to escape on foot was caught and executed at
close range. The camera pulls the audience into the front seat of the car where the
front passenger shoots at the man on foot by leaning out of the window. Below the
inside rearview mirror a dreamcatcher dangles while the man runs for his life.
The sequence is captioned as “the hungry lions run their prey down.” With two
shooters aiming at the man, he is hit in the leg and falls into a fence in the Iraqi
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country side off the motorway. The man shouts in English and apparent disbelief
“I am the driver ; driver!”
The video halts, the image of the injured man on the ground freezes and turns
black and white. Another picture blends in showing the same man in color
wearing an Iraqi Army uniform. Invented by IS’ Godfather Abu Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi to partly justify the execution of Western construction workers con-
tracted by the U.S. Military and thus relying on a decade long history of media
work and successful resistance, the injured driver by the photograph is sen-
tenced to death and framed as guilty by association. He is shot in the back at point
blank by a Mujahid emptying his full clip into the victim. Any allegiance or
loyalty, even when an individual is merely the driver for employees of the Iraqi
government, is an ultimate death sentence. This loyalty – or proximity – to the
defined enemies of the “Islamic State” result in the consequent execution of this
individual based on the guilt by association principle and/or a violation of al-
wala’ wa-l bara’ if the victim is a Sunni.
Repenting and Recruitment: Inclusion of Sunnis in Conquered
Territories
The nashid that bears the title of the video series concludes the sequences of the
“hunt of the rafida” and takes the viewer into the most positive aspect of the
“Islamic State”, where Sunnis are invited to repent (tawba) and coerced to pledge
IS projects the message of targeted not indiscriminate killings.
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allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This IS tactic of consolidating power within
Sunni majority pockets is part of an overall strategy to project influence and
convey that IS seeks to include those who are marginalized and discriminated
against by the non-Sunni government of al-Maliki and the Iraqi army.
By sparing the Sunnis in Anbar province who served as policemen or soldiers,
IS seeks to include them in its own ranks. The offering of repentance allows the
Sunni men to revert to the true ahl al-Sunna wa-l jama’a. By denouncing their
loyalty to the Shiite-majority government, they renew their loyalty to God in the
care of the “Islamic State” that claims to fight for the altruistic cause of all Sunnis.
Mosques in Anbar province are used to gather scores of men of various ages who
are then offered to repent. This enforces a collective identity of being a Sunni
Muslim, with IS-fighters portrayed as avant-gardists and the sole defenders of
Sunni Islam. Tribal leaders and subsequently the young and middle-aged men
who belong to those families, clans or tribes are summoned to the mosque for
collective and public repentance.
The men, exclusively members of Sunni tribes of Iraq, are offered to revert
from their state of apostasy (ridda) to Sunni Islam through tawba and bay’a –
replacing their loyalty, voluntarily or under coercion, to the Iraqi government for
loyalty to God and respectively Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This underlines and
elevates the core IS tactic of re-integrating Sunni Muslims who repent, relinquish
loyalty (wala’) to the Iraqi government, and hence dissociate (bara’) themselves
from the influence thereof.
In tactical terms, this tawba and re-integration of young men of Sunni tribes
aims to destroy the influence of the Iraqi government for years to come. In
particular, young men who had been members of the army and police forces in
the province of Anbar are shown in the video and called to repent. While their
service for the Iraqi government has turned these men into apostates (murtadd),
IS seeks to reintegrate these men into Sunni Islam and recruit them – without any
choice[?] – into the ranks of its army, administration, force, policing units (al-
hisba) and so on. The sequence of tawba by these young men is thus defined as:
“the apostates of the army, police and sahwa councils are summoned publicly to declare
their repentance and to dissociate (bara’) themselves from kufr.”
Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, “the official spokesman of the Islamic State” and a
key ideologue narrated the sequence of the repentance in a January 2014 speech:
“We call on every remaining individual of the sahwat without exception, on all the
politicians considered to be from the ahl al-Sunna, we call on you to repent and declare
the end of your war against the Mujahidin. Dissociate yourself of supporting and aiding
the malicious rafida. Whoever repents before we overpower72 will be granted [according
72 Emphasis added.
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to extremist interpretation of divine scripture] security. We shall not request anything
of him regardless of what he has done in the past; we call on every policeman and all the
soldiers, on all agents of the safavid security apparatus, clandestine and overt, to the
tawba and to surrender their weapons and military gear to the Islamic State.”73
The sequence is concluded by a sermon held by a soldier of the “caliphate” to
further instruct the apostates prior to their repentance and subsequent re-
version:
“you have carried your weapons, you stood shoulder on shoulder with these rejectionist
Shiites to kill your very own sons [of ahl Sunna wa-l jama’a]. We are your sons. We are
your very brothers. We have come to protect and preserve your religion and your
honour. Today is the day to forgive [and repent] while you are aware that our shaykh and
amir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has said: “even if they killed thousands of us; if they killed
thousands of you, forgive and pardon them.” And we forgive and pardon,74 isn’t that
what you ask for? For we are part of the ahl al-Sunna wa-l jama’a.”
The administered inclusion and re-instatement of Sunni Muslims now under the
formalistic rule of the Caliphate is immediately followed by combat footage of IS
advancing on enemy positions in urban and rural environments, with scenes of
Iraqi soldiers executed on the spot. The audience is therefore encouraged to
believe that all those who had been liberated and included are now partaking in
the state project of Sunni Islam.
The coherence of IS messaging matters most in this context. Abu Muhammad
al-‘Adnani said in his statement that “whoever repents before we overpower” will
be offered peace and security. This very notion is deeply rooted within jihadist
theology since 2010 when Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) re-estab-
lished itself in Yemen and started fighting for territory.75 The words of al-‘Adnani
The apostates register and issue their repentance speaking into a microphone with their right
hand on the Qur’an. Through their repentance, the apostates are re-integrated and greeted as
Sunni Muslims by “their brothers, the Mujahidin.”
73 Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, wa-l-Ra’id la yukadhib ahlahu, al-Furqan Media, January 2014.
74 Meaning acceptance of voluntary repentance (tawba), thus not violating the commandment
“unless they repent before you overpower them”.
75 As discussed in: Nico Prucha, Online Territories of Terror – How Jihadi Movements Project
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are a direct reference to the Qur’an 5:34 ruling that tawba can only be accepted by
individuals coming forth on their terms and do not repent in captivity or under
duress.
Oftentimes, jihadist videos show captives who are indicted in a kangaroo trial,
in which they confess their crimes and violations. Granting these captives mercy
would be in violation of the Qur’an 5:34 (“unless they repent before you over-
power them – in that case bear in mind that God is forgiving and merciful”).76
Only if one comes forward voluntarily and repents in public can he be forgiven.
The tawba in captivity before execution is thus only between the individual and
God.
By contrast, what IS claims to document in SaS4 in early 2014 is the voluntary
and public repentance of scores of Sunni men who served the Iraqi government;
IS claims to be ‘re-instating’ them as ‘proper’ Sunnis into the “Islamic State”.
These men had been given a ‘general amnesty’ despite their work for, and af-
filiation with, the army and police or other Iraqi government bodies, which made
them “henchmen”, “agents” or simply “dogs” of the Shiites.
After the conquest of territory in the Iraqi province of Anbar, IS moved to
consolidate control of those areas and destroy Iraqi government infrastructure.
The men who worked for the central government are part of this infrastructure,
and IS deals with them as follows: most Sunnis are offered repentance and
reintegration. This is not offered to Shiites and high-ranking Sunni officers, in
particular those who collaborated with the Americans during the occupation. As
a result, these individuals are executed or driven to flee.
After registering at the IS-controlled mosque, the gathered men issue a col-
lective repentance on this day of forgiveness:
“I dissociate (bara’) myself before God of these deeds of disbelief, of which I had been
part. And I testify there is no God but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God.”
By publicly stating the shahada, the Islamic creed, the apostates renounce their
mischief and loyalty to anything related to disbelief (kufr) and restore their
identity as Sunni Muslims professing the oneness of God (tawhid).77
Strategic Influence on the Internet and the Battlefield and Why it Matters, Dissertation,
University of Vienna, June 2014.
76 Ibid.
77 The oneness of God; the fundamental monotheistic principle to not only establish a rule by
God’s divine commandment, but rather set an identity as a muwahhid, who professes the
worship and proper rituals for the one God as outlined in the Islamic shahada and set by the
flag of the ‘Islamic State’.
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Closed Circuit Communication – the Coded Reference of “unless
they repent before you overpower them”
The need for rules of engagement in the action radius of jihadist groups extends
to answering questions related to their conduct and handling of prisoners,
hostages, captured spies, or captives in general. In particular the conflicts in Iraq
and subsequently Syria demand the need for more such operational guidelines,
in particular within a confessional framework where the jihadist acclaims
himself as the only legitimate Sunni representatives in fighting infidels, heretics,
hypocrites, rejectionists, and apostates.
This includes, in times of conflict where one must choose an identity for
belonging, traitors and spies who must be eradicated and within a punitive legal
framework receive a sentence or othr form of punishment. With sectarianism
thriving it has become an identity marker for most without many alternatives
and is a driving force for the hardliners on all sides. As all of the terms above can
be used to describe those who deviate from the jihadist methodology (manhaj),
jihadist groups may be keen and quick to impose the death sentence. However,
operational questions remain uncertain on, for example how to deal with Sunni
clerics who gave their services to the enemies? And for whom the alleged spies
work, furthermore, when no credible or sufficient proof is found. Is that in-
dividual cleric and his closest associates legitimate to execute, despite the
scholar’s claim to have repented and thus be spared, or shall he be executed just
as any alleged spy of lower rank and file or individual of higher social standing
within Sunni societies?
This is the essence of a question posted on the interactive Q& A fatwa forum on
al-Maqdisi’s website by the member Nusrat al-Sham, “the Victory for al-
Sunni tribal leaders and elders (‘asha’ir) are woven into the power fabric of IS (left) with
“common men”, former Iraqi non-commissioned policemen and soldiers pledging their alle-
giance to IS in mosques
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Sham.”78 His question is entitled whether it is “sufficient for the spy to claim
having repented before being overpowered?” The last part of the question, taba
qabla ‘l-qidra ‘alayhi, is a direct reference to Qur’an 5:34:
“unless they repent before you overpower them – in that case bear in mind that God is
forgiving and merciful.”
The issue is complex, as this spy in particular is a cleric, a shaykh, who, in the
opinion of the questioner, is an impostor who worked in his religious author-
itative role “to tirelessly promote lies.” This cleric and his companion have been
arrested for their ‘swindle’. The shaykh was
“searched and a list of names of Syrian and Lebanese senior officers and high digni-
taries was found on him. He confessed spying for the [Syrian] regime but claimed to
have repented!”79
The core issue at hand is clear : is a Sunni Muslim who claims to have repented in
silence before God prior to his arrest to be pardoned? Or is this a violation of
Qur’an 5:34, whereas any repentance (tawba) under duress or after one’s arrest is
invalid? How can the tawba be sincere then?
With both individuals arrested or by whatever means detained, the allegations
against the two are further denoted:
“the shaykh had been collecting donations for the poor and spent the money on alcohol
and to commit adultery (zina), as he confessed. Regarding the companion, there is no
proof (dalil) for him spying, however, he did confess his desires to be part of the
adultery and alcohol consummation with the false shaykh.”80
The question is focused on the practical implementation of shari’a-law for both
individuals. As he is asking
“the brothers for a legal decision (hukm) on the swindler? And the ruling on his
companion?”81
On behalf of the “shari’a law council on al-Minbar”, Abu ‘l-Mundhar al-Shanqiti
answers online by emphasizing four elements based on the question:
“He [the cleric] confessed being a spy.
In his possession was a list of names of senior officers and high-ranking dignitaries [of
the Syrian regime].
78 Muntada al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, Hal yanfa’ al-jasus za’amahu anahu tab qabla l-qidra
‘alayhi?, Question number 6528, http://tawhed.ws/FAQ/display_question?qid=6528 (ac-
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His relentless self-destructive drive (inghimas)82 into breaking inviolabilities, straying
away from the shari’a as mentioned in the question regarding the legitimacy of not-
recognizing his tawba.
Not having rid himself of those names and not having the pertaining numbers cleared
from his mobile phone despite the likelihood of his arrest [after confessing].”83
Al-Shinqithi sets a general finding as the premises by decreeing the cleric the
status of a muharrib, who wages war against Muslims. Therefore, he initiates his
ruling, and as based
“on the common understanding for dealing with those who engage in war against
Muslims, do not grant them their repentance after you overpower them, this is affirmed
and backed by taking His speech – exalted is He – into account: “unless they repent
before you overpower them,” al-Ma’ida: 34. This applies to everyone who is a crude
apostate [of Islam], summarizing everything between the warfare [against Muslims] on
the one hand while committing apostasy (ridda).
This man had not shown his repentance before his scandalous matter was revealed,
therefore claiming to have repented shall not save him then.”
In a classical style to back his argument to sentence the cleric determined by al-
Shinqithi as an active combatant to death, Ibn Taymiyya’s work al-Sarim al-
Maslul is cited. This citation is out of context, for Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328 AD),
the Shaykh al-Islam, had dealt in his – in modern jihadist circles popular – book
with those who insulted the prophet and should therefore be sentenced to death.
Thus, al-Shinqithi moves further ahead to not only define this particular cleric of
being a combatant, but by his deeds on behalf of anti-Islamic forces he is equated
to anyone insulting prophet Muhammad. This bears the death sentence as the
defined combatant against Islam is, because of his Sunni background, further
degraded as a murtadd, an apostate.
According to Ibn Taymiyya, in the reading of al-Shinqithi,
“if the insulter [of the prophet] was also an armed opponent of God and His messenger
with the aim to soil the earth with corruption, then he must be punished by one of the
mentioned conditions in the verse [5:34]; unless he is to repent before being over-
powered (…).”84
82 In the meaning of plunging carelessly into the rows of his enemies – a reference usually made
in a highly positive connotation for Mujahidin and in particular suicide-bombers; as there is
no return. The wording inghimas in this context by al-Shinqithi, however, is quite contrary.
Ibn Taymiyya, Qa’ida fi l-inghimas al-‘adu wa-hal yubah? Riyadh: Adwa’ al-salaf 2002.
83 Muntada al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, Hal yanfa’ al-jasus za’amahu annahu taba qabla l-qidra
‘alayhi?, Question number 6528, http://tawhed.ws/FAQ/display_question?qid=6528 (ac-
cessed July 15, 2012).
84 Ibid., citing Ibn Taymiyya’s work al-Sarim al-maslul ‘ala man yushatim al-rusul.
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“Shaykh al-Islam says: If this insulter is a combatant against God and His messenger,
causing mischief (fasad) to appear in the land85, then he must be punished by one of the
sanctions mentioned in the verse [of the Qur’an]; unless he repented before being
overpowered.”86
The alleged actions, the confession and the names found on the cleric are suf-
ficient for al-Shinqithi to approve the execution. He furthermore refers to two
more sources, by al-Nasa’i and Ibn al-Qayyim to back his argument and con-
cludes by responding to the status of the companion of the incriminated cleric,
saying:
“he is in the status of doubt, however, his mere presence next to the cleric does not
necessarily mean that he is indeed a partner in his espionage against the Muslims. For
the matter concerning him, more interrogations must be conducted with the aim of
receiving a confession, allowing all tricks and methods of deceit, such as offering him to
work as a spy against the regime to assess his relationship status with them.”87
Reformatting Territory – Consolidating Power and Projecting
Influence
The “Islamic State” is driven by a coherent and tightly defined theology, claiming
absolute hegemony as the only legitimate representatives of Sunni Islam. The
current fight in the Middle East escalated the conflict along sectarian lines as
never before in the history of Islam; Syria and Iraq are dominated by a war
between Sunni and Shi’a Islam with their respective allies and proxies. IS, like al-
Qaeda, considers itself a protection force for Sunni Muslims while denying any
space for Shiites, Alawites, Christians, Jews, Druze, Yezidis, homosexuals, sec-
ulars or any other group in the region.88 Two main IS tactics contribute to this
denial of space:
1. Military conquest and the immediate destruction or takeover of army out-
posts, police stations and checkpoints. IS keenly documents the bulldozing of
army checkpoints in urban settings as much as storm assaults on remote
outposts. These sequences often end with scores of corpses wearing Iraqi
85 This can be interpreted as a subtle reference to Qur’an 40:26.
86 Muntada al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, Hal yanfa’ al-jasus za’amahu annahu taba qabla l-qidra
‘alayhi?, Question number 6528, http://tawhed.ws/FAQ/display_question?qid=6528 (ac-
cessed July 15, 2012).
87 Mantada al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, Hal yanfa’ al-jasus za’amahu annahu taba qabla l-qidra
‘alayhi?, Question number 6528, http://tawhed.ws/FAQ/display_question?qid=6528, (ac-
cessed July 15, 2012).
88 A vast number of IS videos shows the enforcement of this theology by destroying Yazidi sites
of worship or the execution of homosexuals by plunging them to death off high buildings.
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army uniforms. IS also documents that the personal items of slain soldiers
include Shiite patches, flags, and personal veneration items, all of which is
‘proof ’ of open Shiite warfare against Sunni Islam.89
2. As part of consolidating conquered territory after removing government
structures, non-Sunni places of worship are systematically destroyed. The
annihilation or enslavement of those who attend these sites is part of the
consequent implementation of jihadist theology. This constitutes a genocide,
in which IS wipes out the cultural heritage sites, mosques, churches, and sites
of veneration, including graveyards, tombs of holy men (awliya’), and even
trees (“tree of Moses”)90 that hold spiritual meaning for local communities. IS
systematically cleanses conquered territory of non-Sunni holy sites, de-
stroying not only non-Muslim communities, but anything deemed non-
Sunni. Subsequently, Shiite mosques and tombs of holy men or saints (aw-
liya’) are demolished and literally blown to obliteration. According to the
worldview of IS, the Caliphate can only manifest in its true form when the
conquered territory is purged of anyone and anything that violates the
“oneness of God,” or tawhid in Arabic, which is supreme in jihadist theology.
The May 2014 release of Salil al-Sawarim 4 is the first major media production to
‘document’ the twofold strategy of winning on the ground while reformatting the
landscape to consolidate territory for the “Islamic State.” Cleansing (the term
tadhir is used almost exclusively to describe this) is applied to project this brutal,
yet effective, method of building a state. This reformatting of territory in Syria
and Iraq, Libya, Yemen, parts of Africa and elsewhere, may be an irreversible
destruction of heterogeneous religious communities and the end of pluralism
and tolerance in certain areas, particularly within the greater Middle East.
The narrative of waging a without mercy against Shia Islam is important
because it incorporates several jihadist ideological core themes. Sunni jihadists
regard Shiites as “rejectionists” or rafida, but IS includes Shiites when it refers to
polytheists, or mushrikin. This is intended to convey that Shiites violate the
monotheist principle of orthodox Islam – and are therefore legitimate targets.
In Salil al-Sawarim 4, footage of scores of men collectively issuing their
repentance at a mosque in Anbar province is followed by a fierce armed en-
gagement. The fighting is concluded by the takeover of Iraqi Army barracks in an
undisclosed urban environment and the point-blank execution of several cap-
89 One of the first major IS videos ‘documenting’ Iranian involvement in Syria and the presence
of Lebanese Hizbullah Mujahidin is the 25th instalment of the 50 video series Nawafidh ‘ala
ard al-malahim, “Protecting the Access Points of Aleppo”, Mu’assassat al-I’tisam, November
2013.
90 See for example the video released by the IS-declared province of al-Khayr, August 13, 2015,
entitled: izala shajra al-Musa (“uprooting the tree of Moses”).
A Milestone for “Islamic State” Propaganda: “The Clanging of the Swords, part 4” 111
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-SA 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen 
ISBN Print: 9783847109389 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737009386
tured soldiers. The soldiers are labelled Shiites and displayed to the audience as
henchmen responsible for the misery of Sunnis.
The video shifts to IS fighters looting the conquered outpost and pauses on a
Mujahid holding a Shiite flag showing Ali and Iraqi Shiite dignitary al-Sistani.
One of the Saudi Islamic scholars of the 20th century is cited with the Shiite
banner fading into the background to fortify the ‘natural’ enmity against Shiites:
“Shaykh Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Latif Al Shaykh91 – may God have mercy with him –
described the rafida of his time: “As for now their situation is even more hideous and
atrocious having added to their beliefs an absolute exaggeration regarding sainthood
(awliya’) and the family of prophet Muhammad (al-salihin min ahl al-bayt) and oth-
ers.92 They believed that this brings about benefit and harm in times of difficulty and
ease. They consider this as a means of gaining proximity to God (qirba), that brings
them closer to God (taqarrabhum ila l-llah). This is a central element enforced in their
religion.””93
Speeches of ideologues such as Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani form the audio track
of footage of fighters consolidating territory in the Iraqi province of Anbar. This
frames the actions of IS as a direct application of theory and implementation of
theological decrees. The “Islamic State” is therefore portrayed as a viable way to
bring peace and security to the Sunni Muslims of the Arab World. After all, IS
claims to exist only to protect and avenge94 the Sunni community, the ahl al-
Sunna wa-l jama’a.
For example, the video plays an audio track of Abu Muammad al-‘Adnani
alongside footage of bulldozers destroying Iraqi military watchtowers and IS
fighters looting American-provided weaponry :
“We only exist for your defiance and to protect your rights; to halt your enemies by
facing them. This is the Islamic State: your only hope and we are sincere by God to
91 He is the brother of the former Saudi Great Mufti Muhammad bin Ibrahim (1953–1969) and
passed away in 1947. For a relationship of the Saudi scholars with modern al-Qaeda members
in the Kingdom: Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia – Violence and Pan-Islamism
since 1979, Cambridge University Press 2010.
92 Some of the companions (sahaba) of prophet Muhammad.
93 Part of a collection of writings of Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Latif Al Shaykh and essential source
for the “ruling on Shiites”, chapter 15 of the al-Gharq Encyclopedia, http://www.dorar.net/
enc/firq/1892 (accessed May 05, 2018). His writings are also reflected in a forum posting
“academic articles regarding the strive against the rafida Huthis [in Yemen]”, where the exact
same passage is cited. Shabaka Sahab al-Salafiyya, October 13, 2015, http://www.sahab.net/
forums/index.php?showtopic=154946 (accessed May 05, 2018).
94 This notion was broadcast in a video released in November 2014 by the al-Furqan Media
Institute entitled wa-lau kariha l-kafirin (“although the disbelievers dislike it”). In this video,
the Sunni jihadist ‘intervention’ coming from Iraq in Syria is contextualized in the overall
state of the Middle East since the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the history of Sunni extremist
resistance.
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escape the unjust heresy in which your [current] leaders have cast you into obliging to
those who have aligned themselves with the rafida.”95
The symbolism of the footage is worth noting: after a decade of occupation by
the U.S. military and continuous counter-terrorism operations (that at times had
been guided by a Shiite confessional agenda against the Sunnis of Fallujah), IS
filmed its destruction of the main administration building of the local counter-
terrorism unit. Such headquarters or government buildings are used to coop-
erate with U.S. forces leading the war on terror, including drone warfare and joint
military operations.96 IS exploits such grievances, and together with the reality of
‘Shiite boots on the ground’ in Syria and Iraq, positions itself as the only reliable
protector of Sunnis.
After the building collapses in a detonation, the site is bulldozed. This is
portrayed as an attempt to wipe out any memory of the injustices brought upon
the Sunni population of Fallujah. One of the Mujahidin, claiming to be a local
resident, explains:
“the armoured vehicles are cleansing the earth of the filth of the [Iraqi] government
administrators of counter-terrorism in Fallujah. The removal is a salvation for all
Muslims, who praise and rise, who have had to endure injustice and tyranny ; who have
waged war upon the muwahhidin and Muslims for so long. These sites that for all this
time have [inflicted pain] on our brothers of the Mujahidin and Muslims. All these years
of injustice and hostility [are over, citing the Qur’an97]: “Their only grievance against
them was their faith in God, the Mighty, and the Praiseworthy.” All of this is happening
with the permission of God and heals the believers chests98 of the muwahhidin and
discourage the people of disbelief and hypocrisy.”
95 Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, al-Iraq al-Iraq ya ahl al-Sunna, Mu’assassat al-Furqan, March
2012.
96 Andrew Cockburn, Kill Chain, The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins, New York: Henry Holt and
Company 2015. Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield, New York: Nation
Books 2013, e-book edition.
97 Qur’an 85:8.
98 Shifa’ al-sudur, healing the believers’ chests within the framing of a revenge action-reaction
scheme, with a subtle reference to the Qur’an. Shifa’al-sudur is the title of the video showing
the killing of the captured Jordanian combat pilot Mu’adh al-Kasasiba, alledgedly an act of
revenge for the indiscriminate bombing of Raqqa, Syria. For an analysis of the video and the
ideological implications: Nico Prucha/Ali Fisher, Turning up the Volume to 11 is not Enough
(part 2), in Jihadica, (2015) (http://www.jihadica.com/turning-the-volume-up-to-11-is-not-
enough-why-counter-strategies-have-to-target-extremist-clusters/ – art 1) (accessed May
05, 2018); Why counter narratives have to target extremist networks, in Jihadica, (2015)
(accessed May 05, 2018).
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A Foreign Fighter from Bahrain – Citizens of the Islamic State
The scene shifts from sequences of IED attacks to a band of armed Mujahidin
who hold their passports in their hands. Similar to the opening of the video
promoting Abu ‘Abdallah al-Kosovi, the foreign fighter from Kosovo, the focus is
now set on a foreign fighter from Bahrain. Sympathizers on Twitter identified
him two days prior to the video release by his nom de guerre Abu Dharr al-
Bahrayni99 using the Twitter handle @mojahed_bh. He speaks in native Arabic,
using a non-colloquial version to boost his standing as an individual with a high
degree of religious education.
IS sympathizers and members utilized Twitter before and after the release of
SAS4 to popularize the “story of responding to the call of arms by Abu Dhar al-
Bahraini in his own words via his Twitter account.”100 In his story, Abu Dharr al-
Bahraini claimed his mother had initially begged him to return to Bahrain, but
later joined him in Syria. His tweets were then used by media sympathizers to
create and disseminate fan content. Abu Dharr al-Bahraini later used the dif-
ferent alias Abu Bara’ al-Bahraini and was reportedly killed in Fallujah in July
2015. His real name had been Salman Turki from Riffa, Bahrain, born in 1995.101
A screenshot from this sequence is shown above. It contains four elements that
exemplify the culture of online fandom for IS:
1. The title of the film in Arabic is shown below the green passport, as well as the
then-official Twitter handle of the al-I’tasimu Media Foundation. This helps
viewers find new official IS content even after accounts are shut down. Al-
though the Twitter account is long gone, non-Arabic speakers are empowered
to uncover troves of IS videos and materials online just by using key search
terms in Arabic and Latin transcription such as wa3tasimu102.
2. A screenshot of Salman Turki’s original tweet emphasizes in Turki’s words the
initial criticism of his mother who then later joined him in the “Islamic State”
project. Under the hashtag “the story of [my] nafir” (# ) he tweeted:
“As I arrived in Istanbul my mother called me and threatened to kill herself
should I not return. She will never allow me to leave. A little while later she
came to me in Syria where she adopted the methodology [of IS] and joined the
state.”
3. Turki’s concluding remarks of the movie are shown in the bottom of the
frame:
“O you tyrants! Do not think that we tear up your citizenship; we are burning
99 Via *jazrawiyya* (@hnun321): https://twitter.com/hnun321/status/467130346765443073
(accessed March 15, 2014).
100 https://justpaste.it/fitu, published on March 19, 2014.
101 Mir’at al-Bahrain, muqatil al-bahrayni Salman Turki fi sufuf “da’ish”, July 13, 2015.
102 The number “3” is often used to transliterate the Arabic letter “’ayn” / “3ayn”.
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it right here, right now. We shall not return to our home countries, no, by God,
we are to return, God willing! But not with these [passports], rather by this
[petting his Kalashnikov rifle]. By God, we will shred you to pieces, limb by
limb, and in doing so we attain the closest proximity to God.103 By God, we
won’t rest until we have hammered the last nail into your coffin. You tyrants
and worshippers of idols!104 This is your citizenship [holding his passport
into the camera]. For I am Muslim! I do not recognize this!”
4. A stamp makes the fan-created picture ‘official’. The stamp is a graphic
modification of the IS flag that imitates the alleged seal of the prophet. Written
below is the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,” the official name at the time the
video was published and before the declaration of the caliphate.
The narrator of Salil al-Sawarim 4 introduces the men as individuals who heeded
to the call to arms (nafir) and unity and thus “have the benefit of gathering united
in one row (saff)105.”
The men shown are apparently neither Syrian nor Iraqi, but rather Chechens
and Arabs from the Gulf States. Continuing the narration, the men are elevated as
those who made up
“these convoys (muwakib)106 of migrants (muhajirun) to the Islamic State. From every
last corner of the earth, unpacking their luggage, to nourish this sacred plant [of the
“state”] by their blood.”
One of the Mujahidin outlines in his own words why he joined IS and what he is
fighting for and against – clearly defining his identity as a fighter for Islamic
State. This foreign fighter, who claims to be from Bahrain, holds his red passport
in his left hand and a microphone in his right hand. Symmetrically aligned, he is
flanked by two Mujahidin of exact height who are both holding green Saudi
Arabian passports in their hands. The symmetry is further enhanced by two
erected flagpoles in the background, each with a black banner of the “State”
framing the men.
First, he praises Prophet Muhammad, using a violent image:
“peace and blessing upon who has come slaughtering with laughter (al-duhuk al-
qital)107 Muhammad, son of ‘Abdallah.”
103 In Arabic: taqarrub.
104 Hence the branding as ‘polytheists’ or mushrikin in Arabic.
105 The Arabic term saff for row, refers to the rows obligatorily kept in order during prayer.
106 Often the reference for “caravans” is the Arabic term qafila, used in the meaning of a popular
theme penned by the Godfather of Jihad ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, Ilhaq bi-l qafila (“Join the
Caravan”), Peshawar 1987.
107 The statement duhuk al-qital is based on a transmission by Ibn Faris and Ibn ‘Abbas, both
companions of Muhammad, which is not conveyed in the hadith collections but rather
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He repeatedly uses this imagery while neglecting any description of the prophet
not related to time of war.
This image of prophet Muhammad enjoying combat and laughing into his
enemy’s faces gives jihadists ‘license’ to express joy when applying hard power
(beheadings, general combat) for their cause. In their view, this justifies the
content of the IS video “And Kill them Wherever you Find them”, which shows
perpetrators of the November 13, 2015 Paris attack beheading hostages in Syria
and Iraq, holding the severed heads into the camera, and smiling.
This is the kind of role model some Sunni extremists seek to popularize, while
neglecting the intellectual and philosophical sources that have been the back-
bone of over 1,400 years of Islamic history.
The foreign fighter from Bahrain then issues
“a warning to the tyrants Al Khalifa, the rulers of Bahrain, the henchmen of the Al
Salul108 and obedient dogs for the Americans.”
conveyed by historical writer and scholar Ibn Taymiyya. This is according to a question
posed by Abu Yusuf al-Sabi’i, asking for the source of Muhammad’s statement, “I slaughter
laughing,” which he read in Ibn Taymiyya’s book “The Whip of Shari’a”, Multaqa Ahl al-
Hadith Forum (http://www.ahlalhdeeth.com/vb/showthread.php?t=12210) (accessed May
05, 2018), September 11, 2003.
108 In jihadist slang, a reference for the Al Sa’ud, the ruling Saudi family. Salul is a repeated
insult for the Saudi government as well as the Saudi mainstream media. The historical figure
IS video justifying the November 13, 2015 Paris attacks in the words of nine alleged assailants.
Multilingual propaganda for a diverse target audience; German (left), Arabic original (right).
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Given that Bahrain has threatened to revoke the citizenship of those who have left
the country and joined IS, Salman Turki continues:
“The Bahraini government has issued an ultimatum to the Mujahidin, who profess the
oneness of God (muwahhiddin), who have responded to the call (nafir) to join the
battlefields of jihad.109 If they do not return to Bahrain within two weeks, they will have
their citizenship revoked.”
“Citizenship” is paired with extremist identity in jihadist media, for a “true”
Sunni Muslim should never hold state-issued citizenship from an un-Islamic
government and thus belong to a society that is not governed by the full set of
“rules of God” (hukm allah), which are – ironically – interpreted and applied by
humans. However, IS claims to consist of the “soldiers of God” (jund allah) who
are hence in God’s closest proximity, decreeing who is a Muslim and who is not.
As Indonesian Kyai Haji Hodri Ariev puts it :
“In reality, the extremists are nothing but petty dictators, who seek to deceive Muslims
by wearing masks that conceal their human fallibility, while presenting themselves as
God’s chosen spokesmen.”110
The Bahraini government’s threat to revoke an IS Mujahid’s citizenship is the
final phase in consolidating individual commitment to a new identity : being a
citizen of the “Islamic State” and pledging full loyalty and allegiance to this
project. There is also hardly a way out of the group from this point on.111
of ‘Abdallah b. Ubay b. Salul was used in the speech “A Muslim Bomb” by Osama bin Laden
in December 1998 after the East Africa embassy bombings. The ruling family of Sa’ud are
considered as traitors as much as ‘Abdallah b. Ubay b. Salul. He became a Muslim in Medina
at the time of prophet Muhammad and later lost a great deal of influence when the majority
of the population of Medina accepted Islam. Apparently he was never a passionate Muslim
and betrayed Muhammad twice, leading to allegations against him of lacking belief and
commitment to God. The term salul today is used in Arabic for traitors and hypocrites, even
more so in reference to the Saudis.
109 In the understanding of IS and AQ, the “battlefields of jihad” (sahat al-jihad) are online as
much as offline. Media guidelines and strategies, advice for active fighting jihadi groups
was, for example, set in late 2013 by Mu’assasat al-Ma’sada al-I’lamiyya / Fursan al-Balagh
al-I’lam, Bayan nusrat al-ansar li-ikhwanihim al-Mujahidin al-abrar (https://shamikh1.
info/vb/showthread.php?t=21520) (accessed May 05, 2018), October 10, 2013. This state-
ment is signed by the most influential contemporary jihadi media key figures. For an
analysis: Nico Prucha, Online Territories of Terror : How Jihadi Movements Project Strategic
Influence on the Internet and the Battlefied and Why it Matters Offline, manuscript of
forthcoming book, 2016.
110 Kyai Haji Hodri Ariev, The Theology and Agenda of Extremist Movements in Indonesia, in
Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid (ed.), The Illusion of an Islamic State, LibForAll Foundation
Press, 2009. E-book version.
111 Former German gangster rapper Denis Cuspert a.k.a. Abu Talha al-Almani gave a similar
sentiment in a video message to his followers and fans in Germany : “why I gave my
citizenship to the Islamic State; meaning why I gave up my German citizenship, giving the
bay’a deliberately to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham? Because for me as a Muslim [it is
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The conviction is further elevated by the individuals’ firm posture to fight,
bleed, kill, and die for this identity and frame of reference, as the Bahraini foreign
fighter Salman Turki declares:
“Let me tell the government of Bahrain from this blessed place; o you intellectually
depraved ones, aren’t you fully aware that we are the soldiers of IS in Iraq and in al-
Sham? We do not give a damn for your citizenship! Don’t you get it? We renounced our
loyalty to you. Don’t you realize that you and your citizenship, worldly laws (qawanin),
constitutions, and your threats are all under our feet [with us tramping on your values
and structures of power]?
Haven’t you coped with the fact that our amir is the amir al-mu’minin [“the leader of all
believers”]? He is the scholar Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who tears down walls and erodes
the borders [between Muslims], who crushes the disbelievers. Aren’t you aware that our
commander ordered us to not recognize the borders of the despicable Sykes-Pikot
[agreement]; for the lands of the Muslims are one!”
When Turki Salman rejects the borders created by the Sykes-Picot-Agreement,
he is echoing AQ-inspired literature. For over three decades, these writings
aspired to spark a ‘jihadist renaissance’ in the Islamic world, in particular in the
Middle East and North Africa.
IS is therefore acting on the writings of famed scholars of jihad and attempting
to implement their ideas, notably eroding the border between Syria and Iraq.
Similarly, it claims to be a movement leading the Islamic world into a golden age.
The jihadist writings, furthermore, act as proclaimed theological and ideological
authoritative sources, purporting that the historic Caliphate ceased to exist
because of a conspiracy against Muslims – hence the Islamic world is divided by
the Sykes-Picot-Agreement and in parts occupied. The “Islamic State” not only
projects the image of being an avant-garde in understanding and therefore re-
storing “Islam”, but also an actor actively succeeding in the fight for statehood.
The root-cause for the misery of division and occupation is perceived to be an
unholy alliance. ‘Abd al-Majiid ‘Abd al-Maajid, an Afghanistan-based AQ
ideologue and prolific writer, outlined this line of thought in the Arabic-language
Tala’i al-Khurasan electronic magazine. He writes that the misery :
“is repeating the catastrophes for the Muslims over and over again. It is but the hand of
the Jews and Christians, which is clearly involved [in the fate of the Islamic world]. And
the final confirmation is the dismemberment or the assault of the great Islamic State
[the Caliphate and its subsequent division] into tiny state-entities.112 These states are so
tiny that they hardly can be found on a map. Consequently, the tyrannical Crusader
obligatory] to join an Islamic State, ruled by the Qur’an and Sunna; in which the shari’a is
implemented.” Mein Treueid an den islamischen Staat (http://alplatformmedia.com/vb/
showthread.php?p=201868#post201868) (accessed May 05, 2018), April 12, 2014.
112 Usually this is a reference to the Sykes-Picot arrangement, which led to the creation of the
modern-day Arabic states.
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hostilities began against the Muslim countries of Afghanistan and Iraq after Bosnia, the
Philippines, Somalia, Sudan and the occupation of the land of the al-Aqsa Mosque
[Palestine] by the Jews in accordance with the pledge to their Crusader-brothers [to
wage war on Islam].113 They have risen by killing women and children there. And when
the Islamic Sahwa114 began to become more widely known in the 20th century, they
turned against it by any means possible.”115
The foreign fighter from Bahrain concludes:
“Don’t you understand that al-Baghdadi ordered us if we are to return to our home
countries, we are not to arrive with your filthy citizenship. Rather, will spread and grow
(tamaddud)116 by the will of God and by Him granting us victory (bi-nasr minhu); then,
we will come for you!
We are the soldiers of IS in Iraq and al-Sham and our state will expand, expand, and
expand (tamaddud) until you are forced to get out of your thrones for which you have
sold your religion for.”
The gathered men start tearing up their passports and throw them to the ground.
This is the final step of renouncing all ties and loyalty to their countries of origin
and pledging allegiance to the project “Islamic State”, of which they now claim to
be citizens.
113 A footnote states that “it is well known that the first phase in establishing a Crusader-Zionist
state in Palestine was the Balfour agreement.” Since this historical agreement, al-Maajid
argues, further phases have come into effect to secure the creation of such a state that would
manifest the final stage of the assumed war against Islam and Muslims alike. Furthermore,
the pledge contains “active help and support by the British to the Jews to [first of all]
proclaim the state of Israel on Palestinian territory and assist to seek recognition of this state
on an international level.”
114 A term describing awakening or recovery of consciousness – al-Maajid refers to it as the
beginning and the rise of a militant-jihadist struggle against perceived enemies and vassal
regimes that developed into a global network. Parallel to active insurgencies and attacks,
ideological parameters and rulings have been established and disseminated by the Internet.
115 ‘Abd al-Majiid ‘Abd al-Maajid, Manhaj al-ghuraba’ fi muwajihat al-jahiliyya, Tala’i al-
Khurasan, 7th edition, August 2006, p. 45.
116 Dawlatu l-Islam baqiyya wa-tammadud, “the “Islamic State” will remain and expand” is one
of the earliest slogans.
Consolidating one’s conviction by renouncing any belonging to the nation state of origin.
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Guilt by association: IS reasoning for executions at checkpoints
As stated, the documentary-style movie is intended to project a state-building
process. Following the furious speech by the Bahraini foreign fighter, the film
takes viewers to the plains of Anbar province, where IS is building a checkpoint
on a remote desert highway. Jihadist videos often show soldiers on patrols, search
and destroy missions or maintaining checkpoints to single out individuals such
as government workers, plain-clothes army members, foreigners, etc.
As these groups often operate within their home territory, they know whom to
look for. The video intends to convey that IS has mastered this tactic, as the
checkpoint seems professionally established, with several cars, including several
Toyota pick-ups mounted with .50 caliber heavy machine guns. The “in-
telligence” branch of IS is part of the checkpoint. A Mujahid fully dressed in
black has a laptop with an apparent database on it where he compares the names
of the identity cards given to IS-soldiers at the checkpoint.
The theme of this part of the film is defined as “singling out the apostates for
extermination, based on inquiry and cross checking with a digital database of
men wanted by the Mujahidin.”
Some of those stopped are rightfully confused; the IS checkpoint resembles an
Iraqi army checkpoint and IS fighters are wearing army-issued uniforms; no IS-
symbols, icons and no black flag are seen at the checkpoint. Rather, IS fighters
wear the insignia of the Iraqi army, badges with the Iraqi flag on their arm, and in
some cases the “Anti-Terror-Unit, Special Forces” badge. The film describes
these sequences as fighters “singling out one of the local [Iraqi] government
criminals in [the province of] Salah al-Din.”117
The use of checkpoints such as these and the targeted execution of govern-
ment employees, Iraqi army soldiers/policemen, and non-Sunnis, especially
Shiites (often identified by their names), has enabled IS to drastically root out
key figures of the Iraqi government. The film is documenting a phase of terri-
Checkpoints and background checking.
117 The official English name is “Saladin Governorate.”
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torial consolidation prior to IS’ conquest of large Iraqi cities, especially Mosul in
June 2014.
Two men are taken out of their SUV. One is identified as a student, as he had
claimed, and released, while the other is a high ranking Iraqi government official
and taken aside. He is seen in the following scene sitting on the ground in front of
an open grave and shot in the back of his head. Like previously, the film justifies
these actions by citing a historical scholar, in this case Imam al-Bukhari, the most
important collector of the sayings and doings (hadith) of the prophet Mu-
hammad as described by his companions:
“Imam al-Bukhari – may God have mercy with him – said about the rafida:
“I do not differentiate between praying behind a Jew, a Christian, or a rafidi. Do not eat
the meat they slaughter. Do not observe their funeral processions and do not tend to
their sick.””118
The victim is guilty by association. First and foremost, he is executed for being a
Shiite. Second, as he is Shiite and a member of the Iraqi government, the rea-
soning for IS to execute him is clear : (i) as a Shiite member of the Iraqi gov-
ernment, he is directly responsible for the marginalization of Iraqi Sunnites,
(ii) he bears the guilt of having collaborated with American forces during the
occupation of the country, (iii) he must pay a personal price for the massacre of
Sunnis in April 2013 in Hawija, Anbar province. Immediately after the citation of
Imam al-Bukhari, both a civilian Iraqi government employee and a plain-clothes
Iraqi soldier captured at the checkpoint are executed.
The men, one of them identified by his ID card as Mash’al Khalif Shaghir, are
forced to sit on the desert ground before a dug out grave with their hands tied
Identifying a high ranking Iraqi governmental official and justifying his subsequent execution.
The IS-fighter on the left wears official Iraqi Army Special Forces badges.
118 The quote by Imam al-Bukhari, a renowned hadith collector, is the essence of many anti-
Shiite writings and sentiments, as discussed on the al-Burhan website (“The Ruling of the
Scholars of Islam and their Fatwas in regard of Shiism”), http://alburhan.com/main/ar
ticles.aspx?article_no=3992#.VsTk6VLLecQ (accessed May 05, 2018). Likewise, Islam-
port.com offers a collection of citations on why it should be forbidden to pray with or behind
Shiites: http://islamport.com/w/aqd/Web/3689/211.htm (accessed May 05, 2018).
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behind their back. They fall into their graves when shot in the back of the head.
Next to the executioner a stands a Mujahid holding the IS-flag.
“Entering a New Stage”
The video switches to a new subchapter, visualizing the greater context of the
“Islamic State”, showing sequences of earlier published jihad videos. The se-
quences show IS during the phase of military conquest of key zones in the Iraqi
province al-Anbar, most notably the city of Fallujah.119 The execution of sixteen
Iraqi army soldiers captured by IS in an abandoned house after being forced to
videotape their statements for the central government, is among the blend of
jihad video meshes, with a clear visualized reference to the time of U.S occu-
pation and the “Godfather” Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.120
This scene is special as it shows how dedicated IS deploys camera-men to the
frontlines, producing and using images consistently for their media productions.
The short sequence of the execution of several Iraqi soldiers follows after IS
proudly parades captured tanks in the city of Fallujah, Humvees, heavy artillery
and anti-aircraft weaponry mounted on trucks and Toyota pick-ups project IS as
an army in the making, having evolved from the guerilla war.
The sequence on the right that appears in Salil al-sawarim was released in
February 2014 in a major video production with the title Malahim al-Anbar al-
The execution of Mash’al Khalif Shaghir – an Iraqi soldier and hence an “enemy of Islam.”
119 Al-)Qaeda force captures Fallujah amid rise of violence in Iraq, in The Washington Post,
January 3, 2014 (https ://www.washingtonpost.com/world/al-qaeda-force-captures-fall
ujah-amid-rise-in-violence-in-iraq/2014/01/03/8abaeb2a-74aa-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_
story.html (accessed October 9, 2015).
120 This modus operandi is very much a repetition of the “days of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi”, the
founder of the predecessor of IS who is held in honors by his nickname amir al-dhubbah, the
“leader of slaughter.” Al-Zarqawi videotaped the beheading of American radio entrepreneur
Nick Berg in 2003 and used the online media as his main tool of communication throughout
his operations. Throughout the years, al-Furqan media, the same media institute used today
by IS, published a variety of online videos showing the execution of captured Iraqi soldiers,
police men, and ministry employees in a similar to identical style as of today’s videos.
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kubra, part 2 (“Epic Battle of greater al-Anbar [province], part 2”). The men had
been captured in a rural area of al-Anbar province, not far from Fallujah, when
their unit succumbed to IS after a fierce firefight. Some are covered in blood and
wounded. Much like the later videos, especially the ‘Ala minhaj al-nubuwwa
(“Upon the Prophetic Methodology”), released end of July 2014, the soldiers are
lined up, beaten, and rushed off. A speech by Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani
praising the “days of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi” is played while the viewer sees the
captures soldiers leaning against a wall bearing two IS flags. The soldiers are
coerced to confirm that they have been sent “to kill Sunnites” and are reporting at
the time to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. In the following scene, the 16
men are kneeling on the ground with their hands tied behind their backs and
executed (“implementation of the rule of God on the Safavid soldiers”). The
scene is filmed from two angles whereas in the February 2014 video the killing is
only shown from one angle, while in the May 2014 Salil al-sawarim, part 4 video
the second angle is used.
The February video is concluded by IS driving a U.S. provided Humvee
through the streets of Fallujah showing off their flag – a precursor for IS videos of
later 2014 and throughout 2015.
In an hour-long video released on October 9, 2015, entitled Ramadi Malham
al-Jihad (“Ramadi, the slaughterhouse of jihad”), the martyred IS-commander
Abu Muhannad al-Swaydawi is eulogized at length. New footage of the February
2015 video is shown here, depicting the executions of the 16 captured Iraqi
soldiers and others from yet another camera angle. Al-Swaydawi addresses the
viewers as a military commander and as a deeply pious individual. He is seen
unmasked and his role as a lead executioner of the above described site is
elaborated. He is projected posthumous as a true leader of men, “who knew his
soldiers before him under his command.”121
This sequence of Salil al-sawarim is narrated by Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani,
Victory parades and executions – part of the consolidation of territory strategy
121 Lit. : in the rows (sufuf) before him, referencing the order and conduct of orthodox prayer
rites. Al-Ramadi malhamat al-Jihad, wilayat al-Anbar, October 9, 2015.
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strengthening the theme of entering a new phase of consolidating power in the
Iraqi heartlands of Sunni tribal areas:
“Soldiers of the state, know that today you have entered a new phase in the stages of
conflict. For you have returned to the cities and taken hold of the territory. Anyone of
you is ready to be killed one thousand times before of even thinking of taking one step
back. The cities and areas are under your control. First and foremost, Fallujah, which
will not be ruled by anything other than the rule of God (shari’a allah) – with the
permission of God. There is no space for secularists, for Fallujah belongs to the Mu-
jahidin.[The province of] al-Anbar belongs to the Mujahidin ; [the provinces of]
Nineveh, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din belong to the muwahhidin. Diyala, the north and south of
Baghdad, belong to the people of the Sunna.”
Al-‘Adnani’s audio speech is concluded by a short order implemented imme-
diately in the video: “kill, use silencers and sniper rifles.” The audience assumes
the viewpoint of a sniper, watching unaware Iraqi soldiers manning checkpoints
in an urban environment. As al-‘Adnani stated, the jihad has been taken back into
the hearts of Iraqi cities with snipers and assassins conducting surgical strikes
against the remnants of the Iraqi central government to open and then effectively
claim territory. The anthem Salil al-Sawarim is played to the footage of unaware
soldiers being shot by snipers from the viewpoint of the audience of the video.
Uniting the Sunni tribes of al-Anbar
The ‘cleansing’ of Iraq’s al-Anbar province is enhanced by the IS claim to be the
sons of the very people they are fighting for. Like in the era of Saddam, IS is
obliged to work with the Sunni Arab tribal elders to maintain and consolidate
their power. As IS is fighting for the inclusion and the restoration of honor of all
Sunnis and because many of the IS fighters in Iraq are fighting at home, in their
home turf, the role of tribal elders pledging allegiance to al-Baghdadi is a central
theme for IS videos in Syria122 but in particular in Iraq.123 The tribal elders, the
leaders of the respective Sunni tribes in Fallujah, are summoned in a mosque
where a IS fighter gives a speech on the motifs of IS to fight for the Sunnis and
122 Halab November 2013 pledge.
123 Example / killing of Shiite soldier to consolidate bay’a ‘asha’ir In a video published by the IS
provincial media department of Fallujah, June 7, 2015, entitled “the Tribes of Fallujah are the
Thorne in the Eyes of the Enemies”, the tribal elders are assembled. The elders read out a
statement acknowledging the “Islamic State”, the reestablishment of the Caliphate and the
leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the “leader of the faithful” (amir al-mu’minin). The
alliance of the tribesmen of Fallujah and of the al-Anbar province with IS is consolidated by
the execution of an Iraqi soldier who had exhibited during the speech of the tribal leader.
Wilayat al-Fallujah, al-Mu’tamar al-‘asha’iri al-awwal bi-‘anwan ‘asha’ir al-Fallujah
shawka fi ‘uyun al-‘a’da’, June 7, 2015.
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calls on the loyalty of the Arab Sunni tribes: “the sons of the “Islamic State of Iraq
and Sham” are in the midst of their tribes in the province of al-Anbar.”
In his speech, grievances and the Iraqi reality since 2003 is reflected and
summarized. The statements given by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and his successors
are clearly reflected in this speech. The main fear phrased by this IS fighter was
coined by al-Zarqawi in the video of the beheading of American Jack Armstrong,
who was abducted and killed in 2004 as a conspiracy of disbelieving outside
forces wishing to (re-) colonize Iraq. This implies a direct attack on Sunni Islam
and a tearing apart of Islamic territories, as internalized in the trauma of having
lost Palestine.124 The loss of any Islamic territory is a direct assault on the Islamic
identity.
The fighter having morphed into a preacher, thus bearing weight by his ac-
tions to his words, calls out to continue the tradition of fighting the U.S. since
2003 in Iraq and to target the remaining henchmen. These are considered as
agents of an attack on the core identity of Islam from within, with the greatest
threat being secular forces.
“The past colonization, my beloved brothers, has led to the creation of secular parties.
These [political] parties stand between a [united] Islamic nation and the return to
religion. The new occupation is more complex and harmful. In order to dissolve Islam
[as a political force] the religion is disfigured by the creation of so-called Islamic
parties. This allows the slaughtering of our youth in the name of acting against ter-
rorism and extremism. This is a major catastrophe and we need to be aware of this. We
have to assume responsibilities [with the tribal Sunni elders present]. My brothers, by
God, what is termed as an election is nothing other than a new conspiracy dressed in
filthy clothes to re-subject our [Sunni] Islamic community under the [Shiite] rule of al-
Maliki and his soldiers. What have we received of whom we elected? Anything other
than war and slaughter with the rivers of blood our precious youth (…). By God, our
honor! Who has surrendered us to the crusaders and safavids? Those we voted for.”
Legitimate sorrow and grievances existing in the Iraqi context since 2003 and
before, having endured decades of the Saddam regime, are effectively exploited
in religious disguise for political gains – building and capitalizing on a real
sectarian war within that framework.
Referring to the sectarian agenda and doings of Shiite militias, the preacher
equates these Shiite militias to the Iraq army as a whole:
“Militias are what we refer to as “the army” (al-jaysh), the police, the sahwat – the
traitors and apostates125 – are eating away the best of our youth and hand them over to
the al-Maliki regime.
124 As outlined in: Hazim al-Amin, Al-Salafiyyat al-yatim – Al-Wajha al-filastiniyya li-“l-jihad
al-alami” wa-“l-Qa’ida”, Beirut: Dar al-Saqi 2011.
125 Apostasy (al-ridda) carries the death sentence and hence any Sunni Muslim who has joined
forces with the Sahwat forces is a legal target for IS to capture and kill.
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That is not all. They [the safavids, the Shiites and others siding with the Maliki regime]
are disrupting and rewriting the everyday lives of Muslims. Don’t allow the handing
over of the honor (‘ird126) of Muslims over to our enemies, who are the ones that have
called for these elections and political operations [to consolidate their power and
continue the politics of exclusion of Sunnis].
My beloved [brothers], do we return to the phase of this betrayal? Will we once again
turn in our beards and turbans, our intellects, our honor and dignity and hand it all over
on a golden plate to al-Maliki?”
The sequence concludes with an important socializing element: sharing food
together insider the mosque after the sermon of the IS-representative. During the
speech in the mosque the mainly elder men, Sunni tribal leaders and men of
influence from segments of local society, had been served tea and water. The
meeting room of the mosque where the speech is held with the technical support
of what appears to be a state of the art sound system is furthermore well equipped
with 0.5 liter water bottles for the audience. Eating together at the end of the talk
in a mosque, a sermon comprising mainly political elements and the notion of
shared Sunni identity, the breaking of the bread also serves to nourish the ties
and the alliance crafted that became integral for the steep rise and success of the
“Islamic State”; co-opting the tribal leaders (‘asha’ir) as brothers into the local
Sunni “statehood” in the making.
The Mujahidin on a Mission
Throughout the video, IS presents itself as a highly pragmatic and militarily
capable organization. The words of an IS preacher are put into action as the
camera films four battle-ready Mujahidin wearing Kevlar vests, cartridge belts,
and desert camouflage uniforms, most likely looted from the Iraqi Army.
The IS fighters resemble professional soldiers in their U.S.-provided uniforms
complete with combat gear and helmets with attached flashlights. All four enter a
Kia Sorento SUV that will be part of a larger operation, and a cameraman ap-
proaches the passengers for some final words of encouragement:
“Let’s go my brothers! I ask mighty God, Lord of the Mighty Throne127, that God may
enable you to overcome your enemies.”
126 On the term “honor” in Islamic context: Frank Stewart, Honor, Chicago: The University of
Chicago, 1994. For a description of “honor” in the context of Sunni extremism and in general
for women: Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State – Islamic Voices from a New
Generation, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2007, pp. 166–168.
127 Rabb al-‘arsh implies mighty power, as referenced in the Qur’an, for example Sura al-Tawba,
Verse 129: “If they turn away, [Prophet], say, ‘God is enough for me: there is no God but
Him; I put my trust in Him; He is the Lord of the Mighty Throne.’”
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The video shifts to night-time in a rural part of Iraq, where isolated bungalow-
styled houses are standing far apart from one another. The sequence is titled
“Hunting the Sahwa, storming the house of a filthy Sahwa commander.”
The IS soldiers are dressed as Iraqi Army Special Forces, wearing no IS-
insignia or other identifying elements. They detain a man in his twenties and an
older man, presumably his father. As the older man is pushed outside his house,
he shouts “take it easy, let me call the Army so I can verify [who I am]”, believing
he is dealing with an Iraqi Army unit out on a search-and-destroy mission. This
is intended to evoke memories of the height of the counter-insurgency campaign,
when the homes of Sunnis were targeted in storm and search raids.
The idea that Shiites sought power to crush the Sunnis appeared frequently in
the videos of Al Qaeda in Iraq and its successor, the “Islamic State in Iraq”. The
Sahwat, or awakening councils, later became an integral part of American
strategy to quell the Sunni jihadist insurgency. Following the withdrawal of U.S.
combat troops in December 2011, the Sunni jihadi forces immediately resumed
their operations. Three years later, Salil al-Sawarim 4 showed the capture, in-
terrogation and subsequent execution of Sahwa members and leaders. By then,
IS had become emboldened by recent victories and well-equipped by looting
modern weapons from the Iraqi Army.
This sequence was filmed during the stages of IS conquest and consolidation.
As such, the motto “hunt the Sahwa” is about rooting out potential resistance
and (counter-) insurgency within the nascent “Islamic State”.
Two Mujahidin take the captured Sahwa leader away and ask him, “Sir, sir,
where are the terrorists, where?” Realizing his fate and that of his son and family
he replies: “I fear you are da’ish!”
The next sequence is in daylight: the captured Sahwa leader and two of his sons
are digging their own graves. The Sahwa leader is presented as a broken and
disillusioned man, collapsing in his own grave. One IS fighter asks one of his
sons, referred to as “sahuji”, a mock term for Sahwa members:
Mujahid: “where do you work, you are a member of which division?”
The captive replies: “12th Division.”
Mujahid: “Where is al-Maliki’s army and why haven’t you been freed?”
The young man replies: “al-Maliki’s army is a failure”
A subtitle says, “they are digging their graves by their very own hands”.
Mujahid: “What got into you to join this failure of an army?”
Prisoner: “I got involved by my own choice and because of my father” [pointing to his
collapsed father].
Mujahid: “Who is your father [in the Iraqi Army]?”
Prisoner: “My dad is a Sahwa commander.”
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Mujahid: “A Sahwa commander. Set up to fight the Mujahidin, the defenders of your
honor (‘ird).”
Prisoner: “Yes. Against the Mujahidin.”
The next sequence shows the father barely able to continue digging his grave.
One of the Mujahidin lectures him: “Getting tired? Dig! Are you out of energy?
Unlike when you became a Sahwa elder clinging on power.”
In shock and exhausted, the father utters his final words, advising and de-
terring his Sahwa comrades:
“I advise everyone in the Sahwa forces to exercise repentance (tawba) and to stop their
work. That is what has brought me [and my sons] here, digging our own grave.”
An older photo of the Sahwa commander flashes on the screen, with the word
‘yesterday’. He is dressed in traditional white Arabian cloth, sitting at a desk with
the Iraqi flag in the background, as an apparently high-ranking Iraqi gov-
ernmental official. A photo of ‘today’ then appears; he is worn out, digging his
own grave. “They came to my house to snatch me. From my house!128 They
cannot be stopped.” The picture freezes, turns to black and white and the Arabic
word “slaughter” (dhabh) appears, sealing their fate.
Nashid: Fight for Ramadi
As part of the “operation shield for the Sunnis” in Ramadi the video continues by
taking the audience into the heat of battle.
Nashid
“Oh soldiers of truth let’s go, let the tunes of resistance ring out/
Indeed Sham is illuminated, for assemble every soldier/
The Islamic State has been established, so wipe out every existing border/
Wherever we roam, the Rabbis of the Jews are humiliated/
Digging their graves. An interrogated son and a disillusioned father.
128 Private and sacred space; payback after a decade of non-Sunnis violating the same sacro-
sanct space.
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We break the crosses and wipe out the grandchildren of the apes/
The state of tawhid will remain, despite the trembling of those who are full of hate/”
The visual layer is filled with advancing IS-fighters in what appears to be an
urban area. The viewer is taken into the battle siding with gunmen pointing and
firing their M-16 assault rifles into houses, while others run to the front line to
toss grenades into the last manned strongholds of the Iraqi Army. Abandoned
tanks are set on fire, blue colored Iraqi police Humvees are taken as loot and the
highlight of shooting down an Iraqi Army helicopter by a shoulder-launched
anti-aircraft missile concludes the action of the battle for Ramadi.
Killed Iraqi soldiers are shown up close. The dead soldiers are framed as
Safavids and as such as Shiites. The “operation shield for the Sunnis” is un-
derlined by a citation of the historical scholar Imam al-Sam’ani:
“The Islamic community reached a consensus on the excommunication (takfir) of the
Shiites due to their opinion that the sahaba129 are misguided. [Furthermore,] they
neglect the consensus of the Islamic community and accredit the sahaba in in-
appropriate130 terms.”
From the slain Iraqi soldiers the camera moves to the loot of the Mujahidin, the
ghanima, focusing on one fighter :
“we have taken cars, equipment and the heads of apostates. And: our meeting place is
Jerusalem, God willing.”
“Today is the day of retribution”
The viewer is taken into the desert at night. Illuminated by night vision, the
Mujahidin, “the sahwa hunters”, march to their next target, “to terrorize the
heads of the disbelievers in their own homes.” The scenario resembles prior
sequences: platoons of IS Mujahidin conduct raids and execute officers of the
Iraqi Army, particularly those belonging to the Sahwa Councils, who are mostly
Sunni, and therefore accused of apostasy.
Sunni Sahwa Council members are an integral part of the insider threat de-
scribed in SAS4. In this case, the Sunni Sahwa Council member is accused of
having converted from Sunni to Shia Islam – strengthening the IS narrative that
the attack from within is the most dangerous threat, and that IS is the only
defender of Sunni Islam. According to this narrative, any Sunni tribal leader
working for the Shiite dominated government of Nuri al-Maliki is per definition
129 The companions of prophet Muhammad.
130 Yansibuna, lit. : offend, insult.
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an apostate. Any Sunni, however, perceived as moving to Shiism is considered
the ultimate apostate, a traitor to his tribe, lineage, and heritage.
The Mujahidin are again wearing regular Iraqi Army uniforms with no in-
signia of the “Islamic State”. One of the Mujahidin defines this as “today, today is
the day of retribution!” Retribution, in Arabic qisas, engulfs the theological
concept often expressed as “an eye for an eye”. The shari’a council of IS uses it to
apply a clear ruling against its enemies, justifying subsequent executions as
retribution, the deserved payback after a decade of humiliation. The foundation
of qisas, or retribution, is set on the Qur’anic reading of Surat al-baqara (The
Cow), verse 179:
“Fair retribution saves life for you, people of understanding, so that you may guard
yourselves against what is wrong.”
Furthermore, the notion is supported by Qur’an 5:45, stating in the words of God
(kalimat allah):
“In the Torah We prescribed for them a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose,
an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, an equal wound for a wound.”
This basic interpretation is in line with what al-Qaeda’s main ideologue Abu
Mus’ab al-Suri prescribed:
“aggression against Muslims necessitates retaliation in the same manner (’amaliyat bi-
l-mithl) or operations that deter aggression (rad’ al-’adwan).”131
Jihadists frequently refer to the principle of “an eye for an eye”. The ‘classical’ Al
Qaeda school of thought uses this sentiment to primarily justify attacks in the
West132 that avenge interference with, and occupation of, Islamic territory.
However, “Islamic State” uses this logic to justify its actions toward local enemies
in Syria and Iraq.
Another Qur’anic concept introduced is that of “giving full measure” (qistas)
to enemies or transgressors to repay them in full for their offenses against Sunni
communities.
131 Citing Philipp Holtmann, The Concept of Deterrence in Arab and Muslim Thought, Ma-
nuscript 2012.For further reading: Philipp Holtmannn, Abu Musab al-Suri’s Jihad Concept,
Tel Aviv, Dayan Center, 2009, chapters 8–9; Also: Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, Da’wat al-Muqawama
al-Islamiyya al-Alamiyya, published on the Internet, 2004: http://archive.org/details/Da
waaah (accessed June 24, 2012).
132 For example, the German language video by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, featuring
Mounir Chouka, who asks the audience: “what would you do, if somebody where to ignite
explosives on German soil following the example of the Bundeswehr airstrike on September
4, 2009 in Kunduz, killing scores of people?” Böses Vaterland, Islamic Movement of Uz-
bekistan, Jund allah Media, February 2012.
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“Give full measure when you measure, and weigh with accurate scales: that is better and
fairer in the end.” 17:35
IS uses the concept of “giving full measure” to justify its preoccupation with old
grievances and guilt by association in times of war within Arab countries. Their
extremist interpretation of religious sources133 and the corresponding audio-
visual output offers theological validation for IS and its behaviour as a “state”. In
their view, the same theological guidelines apply to anyone acting on behalf of
jihadist theology worldwide, including self-motivated individuals.134 As recent
jihadist videos from Egypt show, other jihadist groups and movements have
emulated this ideological current.135
Banging on the door, the Mujahidin behave similarly to the Iraqi Army,
claiming that this is a random search and ordering the inhabitants “to move, we
are the army!” The film then shows a man in the custody of the Mujahidin, a
caption in the video clarifies: “a filthy Sahwa leader arrested by the Sahwat
hunters.”
The detainee is brought into a neighbouring house in a complex that is most
likely the home of the greater family of this Sahwa leader. He demands, “where is
the arrest warrant? I am a tribal leader.136” Believing to be in the custody of the
Iraq Army, he seeks to clarify by saying “I have fought terrorism.”
A split screen appears, with a series of videos showing the captive in tradi-
tional tribal dress receiving members of the Iraqi central government. The video
is overlaid with the original footage of the interrogation. One picture shown in
the overlay depicts the IS prisoner with three American soldiers in full combat
gear, suggesting he had fought with the U.S. Army.
133 For example the extremist analysis of selected hadith, statements by Prophet Muhammad,
by Abu ‘l-Hasan al-Azdi, al-Qistas al-‘adl fi jawwaz qatl atfal wa-nisa’ al-kuffar mu’aqiba bi
l-mithl, Ansar al-Mujahideen forum, 1432 a.H.
134 The discourse following the killing and attempted beheading of a British soldier in Wool-
wich, London, was set in the words of the two assailants by the logic of an eye for an eye. This
attack in early 2013 was credited in the English-language Inspire magazine, 11th Edition
(2013), 24–25. For a practical[?] discourse of al-mithl bi l-mithl, justifying operations
against Western targets for the sake of “defending Muslim countries”: Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,
Da’wa al-muqawama al-Islamiyya al-‘alamiyya, 933. Al-Suri references al-mu’amala bi l-
mithl, to imitate the acts of the enemies, thus exercising the principle of retribution in full.
135 Al-Qisas al-hayyat, Ajnad Masr, https://twitter.com/ajnad_misr_am/status/45677784659
8283264, published May 18, 2014. This twenty-minute long video equates police brutality
and military state repression against the Muslim Brotherhood members protesting to
support ousted MB Muhammad Mursi to the targeted killing and attacks on individuals and
high-ranking officers of the “security organs.” The film follows two media strategies:
(i) showcasing targeted assassinations of key players of the Egyptian security establishment
while (ii) avoiding any civilian, any Sunni, casualties, a lesson learned from past mistakes of
Egyptian jihadist movements.
136 Ana shaykh ‘ashira.
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The videos and the pictures were most likely taken from the mobile device or
desktop computer of the detained Sahwa leader.137 As more pictures and short
video sequences are shown, the IS media operatives highlight a sequence taken
from a local Iraqi news station years ago, where the captive received a high
ranking Iraqi Army delegation, stating:
“we are honoured by your visit138, even when the [Iraqi] state has not given us every-
thing. Nevertheless, we are very happy to receive the governor of [the Iraqi province of]
Diyala – may God protect him.”
The main video resumes in colour, and the detainee repeats his statement, “I have
fought terrorists.” One of the Mujahidin replies: “You have supported armed
insurgents, isn’t that the case?”
Another Mujahid smashes four pieces of clay on the sahwa leader’s head, who by
now is blindfolded and facing the wall while remaining squatting on the ground.
The Shia use palm-sized clay coins or tablets for their prayer rituals, placing
them on prayer rugs and touching them with their foreheads during ritual
prayers (sujud). For orthodox Sunnis, this is an evident and clear practice of
shirk (polytheism). The prayer stones are the ultimate reason for passing a death
sentence. As one Mujahid shouts, calling the target not only a sahwa leader, but a
key driver in the propagated sectarian war against the Sunnis of Iraq, as a result of
Shiite support for the U.S. occupation:
“he chose to be a Shiite. He puts down his head on the stone and prays on it, because he
has become Shiite.”
137 In the video a desktop personal computer is seen next to the detained Sahwa leader forced to
squat on the ground.
138 Since he is a Sunni tribal leader, this implies Sunnis in his region have accepted and
submitted to the Shiite central government rule of al-Maliki.
A collaborator and convert to Shiism as proven by the “stone” of clay used by Shiites for prayer
rituals.
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Praying on the stone underlines a deviation of the practice of tawhid, claiming
the prayer on the stone is directed to figures such as ‘Ali, diminishing the role of
God who should be worshipped alone without distraction.
The IS-fighters then head to the neighbouring building, where the son of the
sahwa leader lives. The fighters, dressed in Iraqi Army uniforms with no in-
dication of their true identity, knock on the door and call for Nuri. He is led
outside. A caption in the video clarifies:
“The son of the sahwa leader who is a despicable source of information for the Safavid
army intelligence.”
The viewer is taken back inside the house where the father is restrained. One of
the Mujahidin readied his sidearm with a huge silencer mounted. Before
shooting him in the back of the head he asks ”do you know who we are? We are
the Islamic State.” The tribal leader falls on his back and lies on a carpet where he
is shot multiple times at close proximity in the head. The movie takes the viewers
to his son, neither blindfolded nor shackled, lying on the floor on a carpet. He,
too, is shot multiple times at close range with a [silencer-]suppressed side arm,
soaking the carpet and the wall with his blood and brain tissue. One of the
combatants steps over his body and says:
“May God curse you, traitor! This revenge is for our brothers!”
Both men were shot in the head point blank in the father’s house, spilling their
blood over the carpets. This is part of the payback, as carpets are sacred objects;
out of respect, visitors take off their shoes before stepping on them, and stepping
on prayer rugs is to be avoided by all means.
The payback on behalf of Sunnis consists (i) of storming private houses in a
similar fashion as Sunnis endured during and after the occupation by American
and Shiite-majority forces; (ii) and the point-blank execution on carpets, which
is perhaps comparable to the Mafia practice of shooting victims in the face, thus
denying their families an open-casket farewell ceremony.
Reverting to the ahl al-Sunna wa-l jama’a – collective repentance
After the assassination of the senior sahwa leader and his son, the viewer is taken
to witness the mass repentance of former Iraqi army, police and sahwa units in
the Sunni majority province of Anbar. IS presents itself as a liberator, returning
to serve the Sunni community united against the Shia.
The inclusion of the common Sunni population is key in the attempt to
consolidate power and territory. The systematic hunt for and execution of im-
portant officials who worked for the central government (“sahwa” and “rafida
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hunters”) in Baghdad is a strategy that seemed to work well for IS in the early
months of 2014.
As we have seen, IS maintained Iraqi army-style checkpoints following an
intelligence operational procedure to single out and execute government officials
and off-duty army and police personnel, while also humiliating and shooting
them inside their homes. In this manner, IS rooted out and exterminated the
network and framework of the Iraqi central government, destroying key infra-
structure, liberating imprisoned jihadists, and systematically executing gov-
ernment workers throughout the hierarchy.
By contrast, the offer of “repentance” or tawba serves as a framework of
Islamic jurisprudence for former Sunni soldiers and other Sunnis not deemed
guilty of any inexcusable crimes. The public tawba is part of the state-appeal of
IS, fighting for territory on behalf of the local Sunni population. The inclusion of
the “ahl al-Sunna in Iraq” is the backbone of this project of statehood, and a
recurring narrative in IS videos after Salil al-Sawarim 4.
After showing IS’ outreach and communication work with tribal elders, the
film shows how IS engages with “common” Sunnis, first and foremost, the Sunni
soldiers and policemen who lost their network and hierarchy when the central
government lost control of the area.
The men are called to a local neighbourhood mosque where a fighter fulfils the
role of a preacher. As the unarmed men, some in traditional garb others in
Western-style clothes, enter the mosque, a caption clarifies, “members of the
army, police and sahwa come in scores to the repentance centers (marakiz al-
istitaba) in Anbar.”
These centres serve as nodes in the IS network to fulfil the deeper meaning of
istitab: “to call on someone to repent.” As IS made gains and consolidated
territory throughout 2014 and 2015, it published videos showing the repentance
of former soldiers and government employees, showcasing the application of
tawba as institutionalized within “offices to call on people to repent.”139
Throughout the footage in Salil al-Sawarim 4, an audio track of IS spokesman
Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani guides the audience:
“Sunnis of Iraq, we cannot bear seeing your sons as slaves of the rejectionist Shiites
(rafida), as servants and henchmen for them; we cannot remain silent on their behalf.
We cannot stand witnessing your sons continue on the path to hell; therefore, we must
call and reach out to them. We want nothing but [restore] power and dignity in this
world, salvation and happiness in the afterlife. You will not see anything other but
mercy and compassion for your sons coming from us. Don’t you see that we offer and
accept repentance (tawba) of your sons, even if they have killed thousands of us? Don’t
139 Ta’ibun a’ibun, wilayat al-Furat, July 28, 2015.
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you perceive that all we ask your son to lower his weapon from our faces and cease
supporting the rafida, the tyrants, and return to his religion?”140
The speech underlines the sequence of men gathering at the mosque, guarded by
multiple fully-equipped masked IS fighters, some with handcuffs on their am-
munition vests. The viewer is taken inside the mosque, where an IS preacher talks
into a microphone to a large crowd of men, sitting on the ground, as is custom for
Sunni Muslims during the Friday prayers when listening to the khutba. Similar to
Islamic clerics and authoritative figures, the preacher, uses modern day, non-
dialectic Arabic:
“May God preserve your life, I swear by God, your presence here is blessed and fills our
hearts with the outmost joy. Our lord, exalted is He, says: “unless they repent, make
amends, and declare the truth. I will certainly accept their repentance: I am the Ever
Relenting, the Most Merciful.””141
“We do not wish of you to come to this place to repent in fear of us. There is no good in
this, we want of you to return to yourself, repent fearing God. Return, repent and return
to your lord, fearing God, exalted and mighty is he. Do not fear the swords of the
Mujahidin, for we are your brothers and your sons.”
The crowd of men repent following the guidance of the IS preacher, collectively
issuing the tawba by his lead:
“I dissociate myself before God142 before God from the deeds of the disbelievers of
which I took part in. And I bear witness there is no God but God and Muhammad is the
messenger of God.”
140 Speech by Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, “the official spokesman for the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria”: wa-layumakinanna lahum dinahumu l-ladha artada, released by al-Furqan
Media.
141 This summarizes the above cited IS video ta’ibun a’ibun: those who repent (ta’ibun) and in
doing so declare their repentance by speaking the truth, detailing their actions and alle-
giance before IS and in some cases issue their repentance after being arrested by IS, in others
claiming voluntary repentance.
142 The collective repentance is enforced by personally vowing: “I dissociate myself” and thus,
following the return to the concept of ahl al-sunna wa-l jama’a, giving the individuals no
way out but to subject themselves as loyal worshippers under the command of IS. This is an
instrument in practice on the foundation of the concept of al-wala’ wa-l bara’, as outlined in
the report. “Loyalty and dissociation” which often is used in the framing of muwalat,
“loyalty” for God and Muslims and dissociation or renunciation to the disbelievers in
general. The concept of al-wala’ equates “loyalty” with love for a group of Muslims who are
perceived as proper believers in their rites, conduct of life and actions for God. The ultimate
distance, or dissociation, al-bara’ to those defined as disbelievers, including nominal
Muslims who are considered as not sincere in their faith. Madawi Al Rasheed, in citing Saudi
head cleric bin Baz in his Majmu’a fatawa (vol. V, 149), outlining the concept of al-wala’ wa-
l bara’ as: “Hatred and enmity mean to hate them in your heart, never to take them as
friends. Muslims should not hurt them. If they greet you, you should return the greeting. You
should also preach to them and guide them to the Good. Jews and Christians are people of
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According to the IS preacher this concludes the repentance:
“I ask God to protect you, God willing, and that he may accept your repentance which is
God willing a sincere one, your repentance is only before God.
However, ya shabab143, recently a group repented and afterwards joined the new sahwa.
And by God, there is no other but him, we have their names.144 They have been apos-
tates, they came to us declaring their repentance here to only recommit apostasy and
sign up for the new sahwa. Now there is not another chance to repent. I swear by God,
there is not another chance to repent. Anyone we get a hold of, by the permission of God,
exalted and mighty he is, we will bring before the elders and folks of his tribe and we will
carry out the punishment (hadd) in public. Anyone who choses this path will meet the
same fate.”
The sequence ends, and the viewer is taken into the heat of battle, described in a
caption as, “wiping out a convoy of the Safavid army after assaulting their base.”
The shift from a scene of repentance to footage of a battle suggests the con-
solidation of the ‘liberated’ Sunni hinterland, as well as the inclusion of those
who repented into the fighting ranks – with the immediate military assault on the
“Safavids”, “Shiites”, and any non-Sunni in Iraq.
“My brother, if I die, join me, for a life of humiliation is no life at all”
The combat sequence from an immersive first-person perspective is enriched by
a nashid. The first thing the viewers see is an abandoned Humvee and a Toyota
jeep with visible bullet holes all over the windshield suggesting the driver was
killed leaving the vehicle otherwise operational. Through the constant gun fire a
Mujahid, perhaps the camera man, shouts, “allahu akbar, the apostates aban-
doned the vehicles and fled!” Concluded by perhaps the same man saying “oh
god, take our blood until you are satisfied my lord.” A nashid starts to play, while
several Humvees taking fire by heavy machineguns speed off. During one se-
quence, enriched by the nashid chanting “the smoke of my bomb is like the smell
the book. They should be given aman [peace], unless they do injustice, then they should be
punished. One can also give them charity.”
143 The term shabab, “youth”, needs to be understood within Arab-Islamic social framework. It
has a positive connotation whereas the “youth” is often addressed as the new generation
tasked to bring pride and honour to their predecessors and families, respecting Islamic
values and customs. The literature of jihad often refers to the shabab and also uses the
specific shabab al-Islam reference that was made popular by Osama bin Laden and others in
their call to arms and to get active for the Islamic community (umma). The “Islamic State” in
the Arab Sunni heartlands in Syria and Iraq implements bin Laden’s rhetorical expectation.
144 As demonstrated in this video, IS works effectively with military graded intelligence to hunt
dissenters and ‘high valuable targets’ to root out resistance and create facts on the ground
such as Sunni-only neighbourhoods, etc.
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of musk145 while the scent from my grenades is like ambergris”, a Mujahid throws
a Molotov cocktail on a disabled Humvee from a close distance. This nashid,
bearing different titles such “Akhi Abligh” or “brother inform my companions”
is found on YouTube. On one channel this nashid has been listened to over 46,000
times. Published by the user “ruhalamin” the nashid is visually enhanced by a
picture from the computer game “Tom Clancy’s Division”146 and has 226 “likes”
and 40 comments as of this writing.147 The comments are mainly in English and
Arabic and cover a rich blend of approving IS, calling for the final meeting at
Dabiq, or simply asking what game the picture is taken from. Comments from a
neo-Nazi spectrum are also present calling for a nuclear response in general.
145 See also Eli Alsheech who states that the texts of Hamas “commonly state that the martyrs’
corpses, gravesites, and personal belonging emit the scent of musk, a fragrance that the
Qur’ān associates with Paradise and that the Islamic tradition (hadith) considers a proof
that a martyr was accepted by God.” Egoistic Martyrdom and Hamas’ Success in the 2005
Municipal Elections: A Study of Hamas Martyrs’ Ethical Wills, Biographies and Eulogies, in
Die Welt des Islams 48 (2008), pp. 35–36. In reference the hadith was related: “No-one is
wounded in the Path of God, and God knows best who is wounded in His Path, except that he
will come on the Day of Resurrection with his wounds spurting blood. Its colour will be like
the color of blood and its smell will be that of musk” (al-Bukhari, Book 7, No. 441). ‘Azzam
narrates this very same story in a khutba (“The Sword is the Solution”) in Afghanistan. In
this sermon ‘Azzam provides more details on the death of al-Kurdi, who “asked to attain the
shahada as well that his brothers may seal their life with it.” ‘Azzam then relates that the
“pleasant smell of musk was spread, when he left” this world. Usood 2, published by the
Ansar al-Mujahidin in 2007 who include besides khutbas by ‘Azzam contemporary training
sequences and speeches by Osama bin Laden, Abu Yahya al-Libi and Abu ‘l-Layth al-Libi
(who was killed in a drone strike in early 2009). ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, al-Jihad bayna Kabul wa-
Bayt al-Maqdis, video, Seattle, USA., 1988. Another example is the opening of the grave of
Osama al-Shurbshi, a Palestinian shahid. His grave was opened to place his deceased father
(d. 2007) next to his son, who died for the cause of al-Fatah (1982). As his corpse is
uncovered, the smell of musk is predominant, such an unnatural state is claimed being
karamat al-shuhada’: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69Vgx4vIKuY (22. 10. 2010). The
video has more than 600,000 hits. For more information: http://moneer1976.maktoobblog.
com/578717/ م-الشوربجي-أسامھ-الشھید-جثت-حقیقیة-قصة / (next to musk, “something like
smoke exited the grave and a strong (perfume like) scent was smelled. One of the brothers
passed out due to this strong and beautiful aroma.” In this example (1.7 million hits) a
karama is accredited to a Palestinian boy before he died. Lying in a coma in a hospital bed,
only his left index finger is moving (and interpreted as confessing the shahada); http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=z9ZrPn3rDe8. Pictures of the shuhada’ appear regularly in various
jihadist videos and in some cases karamat, such as the sprawled right index finger of
deceased (confessing the unity of God (tawhid)) or – what is interpreted as – a smile on the
face of the dead are to ‘proof ’ that the shahid has confessed to the last and now has gained
entry to Paradise.
146 Announced for release by Ubisoft in 2016, https://tomclancy-thedivision.ubi.com/game/
en-us/home/ (accessed May 05,2018).
147 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yg604vLbaWg (January 11, 2016) (accessed May 05,
2018).
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Towards the end of the nashid in the Salil al-sawarim 4 video most of the vehicles
are at blaze in the dark of night.
“My brother, tell my companions here I am moving forward /
I will leave the glitter of the worldly life and won’t say where I’m going /
To the most benevolent and the most merciful148 in ease once I am buried /
I am blowing up the enemy’s barracks149 ; how perfidious and what deceiving traitors
they are /
Don’t you see what I see in the fruits of the palm trees150 in the gardens /
Do you hear the sounds of the enemies artillery beating the drums of the wedding
ceremony151 /
The smoke of my bomb is like the smell of musk while the scent from my grenades is like
ambergris /
My brother, if I die, join me, for a life of humiliation is no life at all.”
From Battle to Historical Scholar Ibn Kathir – the Rationale for the
Fight
As often is the case in IS videos showcasing firefights and attacks, the audience is
taken to a calm setting after the fighting has ended, with IS fighters sweeping the
‘liberated’ areas. A killed Iraqi soldier, illuminated by flashlights, introduces this
sequence. The video freezes and a body of text appears on the screen:
“Ibn Kathir, may God have mercy with him, said in regards of the rafida insulting the
companions of the prophet – peace and blessing upon him: “and whoever thinks about
the companions – may God be pleased with them – [in an offensive manner] has indeed
insulted them all by claiming they are immoral and opposed the prophet; opposing him
in his rule and in his opinions. Whoever takes this posture (…) is a disbeliever ac-
cording to the consensus of the noble Imams. Shedding his blood is most halal.””
The following sequence shows several IS fighters entering a house in search of a
high-ranking officer of the counter-terrorism unit. As usual throughout the film,
the fighters are wearing Iraqi army uniforms. The victim believes he is dealing
with a government unit and cooperates in hope of ending this “misunder-
standing”. Unlike the other victims, he seems to be alone at home and fights back
in despair when he realizes his mistake.
148 Al-Rahman, referring to God.
149 thakna: residence, compound.
150 This is a reference to the palm trees in the gardens of paradise, as described in several verses
of the Qur’an, i. e. 23:17–21.
151 For the Sunni martyr in the afterlife, where among his rewards he will be married to the Hur
al-Ayn, the paradise maidens, as outlined in an early “Islamic State in Iraq” document: ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz bin Muhammad (Abu Osama al-Iraqi), Mushawiq al-arwah ila nisa’ bilad al-afrah,
Global Islamic Media Front, Dhu l-Hujja 1427 (2007).
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Raiding the homes of counter-terrorism units
The IS fighters enter the man’s house at night who later identifies himself as
Makki Mahmud ‘Abid. He is sitting on the floor and is interrogated:
Mujahid: “Are you a [regular] soldier?”
‘Abid: “No. I am an officer.”
Muhajid: “Where do you work?”
‘Abid: “For the police, special counter-terrorism unit in the city of Samara’, Salah al-
Din [province].”
The picture freezes and splits in two parts a modus operandi used throughout the
movie. He is seen wearing his Iraqi Special Forces uniform on the right hand and
shackled sitting on the floor on the left hand. The interrogation continues:
‘Abid: “I work as the director of the counter-terrorism unit in Salah al-Din and am
commissioned for the branch in Samarra’.”
‘Abid is blindfolded and led into his bedroom where the IS-fighters begun
searching the room. Several of his Special Forces uniforms on the bed and one
mujahid pulls out a knife saying “we do not forget and we do not stay idle in the
light of your injustice.” However, the attempt to behead ‘Abid fails and the
camera stops when at least two mujahidin are trying to wrestle him to the
ground. ‘Abid is blindfolded and shackled. The next scene shows the severed
head resting on his back as often in jihadi videos with executions scenes. The
scene is narrated again by IS-spokesman Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani:
“I swear by God, our minds won’t be at ease, we won’t rest, life will not be pleasant for us,
as long as there remains a single Muslim in the prisons of the disbelievers. We pledge to
God and pledge to you we will do everything we can to free you; we will give all our
possessions and our lives to this cause. We won’t spare any efforts to cut off the heads of
those butchering you; the investigators and judges [of the regime of al-Maliki].”
Selective reading of Ibn Kathir to foster hatred against Shiites (left); handing out of IS pamphlets
explaining “the creed and methodology of the Islamic State” (right) in the streets of Fallujah.
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The Islamic State will Remain
The video ends with a lengthy sequence showing a series of IED attacks on
various Iraqi army and governmental vehicles. In some cases, the explosion is so
massive that the vehicles are shredded to pieces.
Distribution on Twitter – the Jihadist Dissemination Highway
In the first twenty-four hours after publication on YouTube, the video was viewed
56,998 times on the Mu’assassat al-I’tasimu YouTube channel. The average user
watched a little over 17 minutes of the hour-long film. Collectively, YouTube users
spent the equivalent of 686 days watching this one video. In other words, for each
hour that passed, users spent 28 days watching the video.
YouTube removed the most prominent video files, as they were deemed “to be
in violation of YouTube’s policy on shocking and disgusting content”. However,
duplicates of the video file have been posted on YouTube and are also available via
archive.org and justpaste.it.
Awareness of the video release spread on Twitter with two distinct peaks in
tweeting. These occurred on the day of release (17 May) and the following day (18
May).
Between 17 May and 8am on 19 May 2015, we observed a total of 32,313 tweets
carrying the name of the video. There were an average of 807.825 tweets per hour,
the median being 736.5. Tweets contained a range of #tags in addition to the title
of the video, the most common of which are shown below.
The #tags used most frequently were Arabic references to Salil_al-sawarim_
four, followed by The_Islamic_State_in_Iraq_and al-Sham, and the al-Furqan
Media department.
Although all the prominent tags were in Arabic, Twitter’s automatic coding
did not classify all tweets as being in Arabic. This demonstrates the reach of the
On March 19, 2014 (left) the video had been watched over 117,000 times; on March 19 (right)
close to 150,000 times.
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video and shows that some multilingual users were proactively translating
content and helping users access the information in a range of languages.
Analysis of user locations also suggests users who can bridge between lan-
guages or physical communities are important. The map and graph below reflect
the time zones users selected when setting up their profiles.
Although they lack the pinpoint accuracy of geocoding, time zones provide a
useful indication of the region where users are likely to be – and users are far
more likely to choose a time zone than enable geocoding. However, it does also
Volume of tweets containing the title of the video between 17th and 19th May
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mean groups of users are erroneously shown in Greenland and the middle of the
ocean given the time zone they selected – such as the International Date Line.
These limitations aside, analysis of the large sample size helped improve the
probable accuracy of most time zones selected, and demonstrates that they
provide a useful indication of users’ likely location.
Users used a range of different devices to tweet, but mobile technologies, and
particularly phones, were dominant. The most common ways users tweeted
about the video was an app on an Android mobile phone, (Twitter for Android)
followed by an iPhone app, (Twitter for iPhone). These were followed by the
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classical web interface – logging into Twitter via a browser on either a desktop or
laptop computer (”the web”). Tablets, including the iPad and Android-operated
devices, were also used, but to a lesser extent.
As the graph above shows, awareness of the video on YouTube and archive.org
was spread using a range of digital technologies. This last case emphasises the
importance of understanding the jihadist social media phenomenon as a cross-
platform trend, as users were using Facebook to promote tweets about a video
posted on YouTube.152
The video was also highlighted by sympathizers on tumblr, with one user
posting a picture of the title of the video on a big flat screen while holding a
Dutch-labelled popcorn bag in front of the camera. The act was intended to
confirm the validity of the user’s claim to be “just one of your beloved brothers
from The Netherlands.”153
The use of multiple means of distribution is highlighted by the range of links
embedded in tweets about 4 (Salil al-sawarim 4). The top 50 links are
included in an appendix.
Tweets often display an abbreviated version of the link or a t.co link, but the
metadata of each tweet also contains the ‘expanded URL’ – the original URL
entered by the user. While YouTube is the most frequently referenced platform,
152 Nico Prucha/Ali Fisher, Tweeting for the Caliphate: Twitter as the New Frontier for Jihadist
Propaganda, in CTC Sentinel, June 25, 2013: (http://bit.ly/17Aqej9) (accessed May 05, 2018).
153 The Clanging of the Swords, part 4 was made available with Dutch subtitles on YouTube, as
well (link defunct).
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the appearance of justpaste.it and archive.org near the top of the list emphasizes
the cross platform nature of the distribution.
In addition to Twitter, other services are used to construct the cross-platform
zeitgeist. For example, the most linked-to justpaste.it page contains links to
jihadist material on archive.org, gulfup.com, YouTube, and even Twitter accounts
to follow, such as @wa3tasimu.
The use of a cross-platform zeitgeist enables users to locate the video content
even when some Twitter accounts are suspended and the original video files
posted to YouTube have been removed.
Jihadist groups frequently advocate that supporters share their media content
with others. As a result, viewers who use all available means to spread videos like
SAS4 can feel like active participants and consider themselves media-Mujahidin.
When SAS4 was released, it immediately engaged a wide group of users.
However, accounts charged with countering jihadist social media content stayed
surprisingly quiet. For example, the Twitter account run by the U.S. State De-
partment intended to engage jihadist accounts in Arabic (@dsdotar) was silent
on Saturday, 17 May and Sunday, 18 May, 2015.
As the Twitter stream shows, @dsdotar did not produce a single tweet between
16 and 19 May. By the time @dsdotar burst into action again on Monday, 19 May,
SAS4 had been viewed over 100,000 times. The following section assesses the
roles played by key Twitter users in propagating a range of links to this video on
17 and 18 May.
“Just one of your beloved brothers from The Netherlands”- SAS4 on a big flat screen with Dutch
popcorn.
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Important Users on the SAS 4 Twitter Network
The information shared concerning the video release of SAS4 created a network
of 6,428 Twitter users and 19,601 edges, with some users mentioned frequently.
The graph below shows the frequency with which prominent users were men-
tioned.
To extend the analysis of prominent members of the network, we created a
representation of the network sharing the video via Twitter. It contains 6,428
Twitter users and 19,601 edges. The network had an average path length of 5.7
and a diameter of 15.
From the visual representation it is evident that a number of different users
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were prominent in different sections of the network. Rather than the majority of
the network orbiting one of a few influential accounts, in a series of hub and
spoke structures, this network has multiple interconnected hubs through which
information flows in multiple directions.
This provides the network a degree of resilience that allows information to
continue flowing in the event of Twitter account suspensions. The interconnected
hubs provide a level of redundancy so that there are a number of other pathways
through which information can flow. As Paul Baran’s calculations showed, dis-
tributed communications systems need a relatively low level of redundancy for
the majority of the network to maintain communication in the event of major
network disruption.154
Viewing the network map in greater detail can show which users communi-
cated with each other, which reached the same communities, and which were a
bridge to specific communities. For example, in the network representation,
nodes of the same colour are within the same interconnected community. This
means they are more likely to interact with other members of that community
than the rest of the network. These can be assessed in greater detail in a more
detailed version of the network map where connections between specific nodes
can be examined.
Through a refinement of the network image, a core group of users becomes
visible. The image below shows only those users who have at least one mutual
154 Paul Baran, On Distributed Communications: I. Introduction to Distributed Communica-
tions Networks, RAND August 1964 (http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM
3420.html) (accessed May 05, 2018).
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connection – meaning they have mentioned someone who has also mentioned
them.
This network of mutual connections contains 165 Twitter accounts (2.5 % of
the total network), including all of the top twenty-five most mentioned users. On
average, a node in this core group has slightly more than five connections to
other accounts in this group. This means the network has a density of 0.031–3 %
of all possible connections exist. This is sufficient to provide the network with a
level of resilience.
Resilience in this context is shown by the way a network limits the impact of
losing important nodes, in this case in the form of account suspensions. For
example, with the loss of the five most connected nodes (ranked by times men-
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tioned by others) every remaining node would still be connected to this network,
with only a slight reduction in graph density to 0.027.
Similarly, the removal of the five most important nodes (ranked by Pagerank)
leaves the graph density unchanged at 0.031 and again, every remaining node
would still be connected to the network. This means that the current occasional
account suspensions on Twitter are unlikely to have any practical impact on the
ability of users to share information and propagate content.
As of 2018, with the migration to Telegram since early 2016, the effects of
account-suspension on Twitter have become even more of a whack-a-mole game.
IS organizes “media raids” on Telegram, in channels and groups that are access-
only by invitation and end-to-end encrypted to then inspire supporters to ensure
their media is placed on the internet where a wider audience is reached – in-
cluding targeting those, who are Arabic illiterates.
The identification of key actors in the network can provide greater insight into
the way information travelled. For example, this analysis can differentiate be-
tween those users that are important for reaching specific communities, and
those users that are part of the core of the network. This type of analysis is
important, as not all users are influential in the same way. For example, some
users will be influential within the core of the network, while others are im-
portant as they form a bridge to wider communities.
Position on the scatter plot below is based on two network metrics: ‘pagerank’
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and ‘betweenness’. The size of the nodes reflects the number of times the account
was retweeted or mentioned. Nodes with the same colour are in the same stat-
istical community.
– Users in the bottom left of the graph tend to have no particular role and can be
thought of as general users, although they may have high value to an often
small and very specific group.
– Those in the top left of the graph tend to be in the core (or one of the cores) of
the network. This indicates they are often those most invested in the network
and have access to privileged information.
– Those in the bottom right of the graph fulfil the role of bridging between the
core content producers and a specific community. The value of this role often
comes from tailoring information to a specific ‘audience’ and as such these
users are more valuable to that group but less important to everyone else.
– Users in the top right are rare. They have a dual function, as they have the same
trusted status as those in the top left of the graph. They also fulfil the same
‘bridge’ role as users in the bottom right of the graph, reaching areas of the
network which others do not.
In the case of the network disseminating information about the release of SAS4,
the ‘pagerank’ scores are particularly low, which backs the earlier visual ob-
servation that the network is dispersed and has multiple interconnected hubs.
The graph shows that @Minbar_s, @Aahat9, and @kwatem0 were important
conduits for the spread of information to communities that other accounts could
not reach. Conversely, @furkan_om and @MoTweetry were most important
nodes in the networks to share the video. Most importantly, @ISIS_1111 was the
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single node that was able to fulfil both core and bridging functions simulta-
neously, with other accounts such as @AberatAlkarat_5 fulfilling a similar role to
a lesser degree.
In addition to the roles users played in the network, the time at which they
were influential is also an important aspect of the analysis. This is known as their
engagement profile, the extent to which other Twitter users engaged with them
over a given time period.
The engagement profiles of the top five most mentioned users in the network
shows two periods of particularly intense activity. It also shows that different
accounts were prominent at different times. For example, @wa3tasimu and
@turky_albinali were prominent in the first peak but not the second, while
@AL3gneg and @Minbar_S were prominent during the second peak.
This analysis demonstrates the need for agile counter-strategies, as accounts
become important at different times during the dissemination of content. In
addition, it provides additional context to the key actor graph; for example,
illustrating that @Minbar_s was an important conduit for information to a
particular community.
Summary of Findings
– Jihadist groups have become increasingly sophisticated in their use of social
media and mobile technologies.
– The “Islamic State”, in particular, has not only mastered the use of the Internet
and social media, but also produces and publishes a large amount of coherent
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visual content in Full HD video. This is quite evident in SAS4, which set the
standard for subsequent IS videos, showing a coherent application of theology
(=ideology) on conquered territory.
– SAS4 popularised foreign fighters Lavdrim Muxaheri (Kosovo) and Salmān
Turkı̄ (Bahrain), who gained their own online fan cultures within wider IS
fandom. Salmān Turkı̄ is idolized as a martyr and ‘kept alive’ by fan-created
content, whereas Lavdrim Muxaheri has been featured in other IS videos.
– IS pitches SAS4 as one of the first videos to show the ‘Reconquista’ of Iraq by IS
soldiers following the 2011 withdrawal of U.S. combat troops. Furthermore, it
is also one of the first videos to show a high degree of applied theology on
retaken/conquered areas in Iraq.
– The concept of “repentance” (tawba) features prominently among the applied
theology, and IS “weaponises” it to replenish its ranks and consolidate Sunni
tribal areas, as well as cities in Iraq. A strong point of the SAS4 video shows the
“Muslim identity”, as preached by AQ and now IS, put into practice as a
uniting identity marker to fight for the establishment of an “Islamic State” and
subsequently as “the caliphate”.
– Arabic was the language most associated with the initial release of SAS4, and
the majority of users stated a location in the Middle East, more specifically
Baghdad. However, European and North American locations were not un-
common.
– The release of SAS4 was announced through a resilient and dispersed network
on Twitter, backed and interlinked to jihadist online forums, blogs, and a rich
blend of file-hosting sites such as archive.org. This network had sufficient
interconnection and redundancy to continue to operate indefinitely in spite of
the current level of account suspensions or blog, forum, file-hosting link shut
downs.
– On each platform, especially on social media platforms, there are clusters of
mutually reinforcing accounts, which create a level of resilience that allows
jihadists to have a persistent presence on the platform. The release of SAS4
highlights the multiplatform zeitgeist, which has become a feature of the
jihadist social media phenomenon. Accounts on one social media platform are
used to reinforce the content on other social media platforms, creating mu-
tually reinforcing connections across platforms. This means users could turn
to Facebook or Google+ if a specific Twitter account is suspended to locate the
replacement Twitter account – or use the Arabic hashtags to find new accounts
on Twitter instantly.
– Most jihadists that take the propagation element (da’wa) of their activity
seriously have back-up accounts already set up and users following their
primary account are directed to also follow the back-up, in case of an account
suspension. This gives the networks further resilience and makes it easier for
Ali Fisher / Nico Prucha152
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-SA 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen 
ISBN Print: 9783847109389 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737009386
users to stay up to date with ‘trusted’ accounts that are verified by other IS
accounts not effected by account suspensions.
– The Twitter account run by the US State Department engaging jihadist ac-
counts in Arabic (@dsdotar) was silent on the day SAS4 was released, Saturday,
17 May, as well as Sunday, 18 May. By the time @dsdotar burst into action again
on Monday, 19 May, the video had been viewed over 150,000 times, with users
collectively spending the equivalent of over 680 days watching this one video.
Recommendations for Analysis
The online dissemination of video content such as 4 (SAS4) is rapid.
This is a network-based phenomenon, which requires an appreciation of the
relational aspects of digital technologies and social media. The complex nature of
these networks provides jihadist groups with a degree of resilience, meaning the
network is largely unaffected by current approaches and account suspensions.
Approaches to analysis could be more effective if focused on identifying
groups of users rather than individual accounts. Those charged with running
programs to challenge jihadist groups have the opportunity to increase their
impact by focusing on network disruption in addition to the current attempts to
counter specific content and individual accounts. In addition, there is a need for
agile counter-strategies, as accounts become important at different times during
the dissemination of content.
Jihadists do not restrict themselves to office hours. The release of the video on
a Saturday may have been a tactical decision, seeing as those employed to
challenge or disrupt the propagation of jihadist media are less likely to be active
over the weekend. This was ultimately illustrated by the two-day break in activity
from @dsdotar.
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Clemens Holzgruber
“Now You See Me – Now You Don’t”: Analysing Jihadists’
Online Privacy-Enhancing and Counter-Surveillance
Strategies
They want to know what you send, when you send it, to whom you send it to,
why, and how to use it against you. They monitor your social media. […]
The United States government, the government of the United Kingdom,
France, and elsewhere, want to jail you. They want you to suffer.
And they aren’t playing games.1
Introduction and Content
New media and communication technologies and their role as powerful in-
struments of transnational terrorism have been subject to fierce academic and
political debate in recent years, not least since the Islamic State’s (IS)2 apparently
sudden rise in 2014. Sunni extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and IS, in par-
ticular, have adapted quickly to our age of digital dependence and paranoia and
make extensive use of various online platforms to broadcast their message and
project their narrative.3 Platforms most commonly used are online social net-
works (OSNs) such as Twitter and Facebook, video-hosting websites like You-
Tube, online content-sharing web services such as Justpaste.it and Archive.org,
as well as private messaging services such as Telegram.4 There are several reasons
why migrating to the online sphere is considered a fruitful endeavor for terrorist
1 Remaining Anonymous Online, uploaded August 20, 2014, (https://justpaste.it/anonlyne)
(accessed September 3, 2017).
2 There has been confusion on how to name the Islamic State, as the group has changed its name
several times in the past years. In this chapter, I will refer to the group either as the Islamic State
or IS, which is the most recent name adopted after the declaration of the caliphate on June 29,
2014. For a chronology of the different names of IS, see: Aaron Y. Zelin, The War between ISIS
and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, Research Note 20, June 2014, p. 1.
3 See for example: Gabriel Weimann, Terrorism in Cyberspace. The Next Generation, New York:
Columbia University Press 2015, pp. 23ff.
4 Gabriel Weimann, Why do terrorists migrate to social media?, in Anne Aly/Stuart Macdonald/
Lee Jarvis/Thomas Chen (Eds.), Violent Extremism Online. New perspectives on terrorism and
the Internet, London: Routledge 2016, pp. 46ff.
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organizations; among other things, the simplicity of using the Internet and its
global reach, the low cost of accessing new technologies, and the generally
lacking ability of total government control. Hence, new media technologies and
the rise of OSNs have broadened the publicity of jihadi groups, increased the
speed of their information distribution, and widened the networks and audience
reached.5 While the majority of cyberterrorism researchers argue that terrorist
movements are among the primary beneficiaries of the Internet,6 there are some
who claim that the actual effects of new communication technologies are more
complex. In their view, the payoff for terrorist groups using these technologies
may not be as big as suggested, as new weaknesses may balance the benefits
arising from their online activities.7
One of the main threats jihadi movements face is that their enemies in general
and adversary governments in particular are likewise exploiting new techno-
logical tools for counter-terrorism measures. Since OSNs are built upon visi-
bility, enabling users to share personal information about their locations, ideas,
affiliations, and networks, they can also be considered to function as social
surveillance technologies.8 Although the visibility on OSNs allows terrorist
groups to exchange and share information on a broad scale, to reach new au-
diences, and to organize in a faster and more efficient manner, it is very likely
that the information distributed online is also obtained by third – and often
opposing – parties. Governments can benefit from the plethora of new data
available on the Internet to gain intelligence about sensitive information, such as
the location of terrorist leaders, military strategies, plans concerning new ter-
rorist attacks, the group’s internal workings, and so forth.9 In using new com-
munication technology, jihadists are thus confronted with an inevitable trade-off
dilemma: on the one hand, they became heavily dependent on Internet-based
media for communication and recruitment purposes, a field in which they have
proliferated ever since. Maintaining a strong online presence has therefore be-
come an essential aspect of the groups’ organizational structure, capabilities,
and long-term survival. On the other hand, governments have simultaneously
increased their ability to acquire sensitive information about these movements.
5 Weimann, Terrorism in Cyberspace, pp. 25ff.
6 See for example: Ibid., p. 25; Imran Awan, Cyber-Extremism: Isis and the Power of Social
Media, in Society 54ii (April 2017), pp. 140ff (accessed May 05, 2018). Martin Rudner, ‘Elec-
tronic Jihad’: The Internet as Al Qaeda’s Catalyst for Global Terror, in Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 40i (March 2016), pp. 14ff. (accessed May 05, 2018).
7 Manuel R. Torres Soriano, The Vulnerabilities of Online Terrorism, in Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 35iv (March 2012), p. 264 (accessed May 05, 2018).
8 Daniel Trottier, Social Media as Surveillance. Rethinking Visibility in a Converging World,
Surrey : Ashgate 2012, p. 11.
9 Ken Menkhaus, Al-Shabaab and Social Media: A Double-Edged Sword, in Brown Journal of
World Affairs 20ii (Spring 2014), pp. 322f. (accessed May 05, 2018).
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Online data leakage can have severe consequences for jihadists, thwart their
plans, and endanger members and group leaders, who are often subject to in-
carceration and targeted killings, which in turn can threaten the movement as a
whole.10 From their perspective, finding practical solutions to this dilemma is
vital for the future trajectory of jihadi movements and hence has been discussed
intensively within jihadi circles.
Although some research institutes have addressed and reported on how ji-
hadists try to counter government monitoring and to remain anonymous when
operating online,11 there is only limited and fragmentary academic research on
their counter-surveillance strategies. Brantly (2017) highlights how widespread
jihadi discussions about online operational security are, but only briefly ex-
amines the means and technology used for privacy-enhancing purposes. He only
mentions central issues such as the discussions regarding virtual private net-
works (VPN) in passing and omits other important strategies such as encryption
tools used, the subject of smartphone confidentiality, and cryptocurrencies.
Moreover, the article focuses solely on safety and privacy aspects and does not
address the steps to balance the trade-off dilemma discussed above.12 This
provides a useful starting point, but the issue requires deeper inquiry. Sinai
(2015) describes the innovation and adoption curves of jihadi movements, fo-
cusing on several cases in which jihadists have successfully as well as un-
successfully evaded government surveillance when committing and plotting
terror attacks, rather than analyzing online counter-surveillance strategies in
particular.13 To my knowledge, apart from these two contributions, the academic
literature only peripherally touches upon the issue of jihadi online operational
security.
Academic studies of the methods through which jihadists try to solve their
dual interest of maintaining a strong online presence and a broad audience reach
while trying to remain anonymous online are largely absent. The purpose of this
chapter is to fill parts of this research gap by synthesizing knowledge, providing
an evaluation of the privacy-enhancing tools used and the discussion among
10 Ibid., p. 323.
11 There are several institutes that track and report on jihadi online activities. These include the
Middle Eastern Media Research Institute (MEMRI), which runs the Cyber & Jihad Lab
monitoring project specializing in tracking and translating jihadi online content, and the
Flashpoint Institute, which provides business risk intelligence and has written several ar-
ticles on technologies used by jihadi movements with a focus on Big Data Analysis of Arabic-
language sources.
12 Aaron Brantly, Innovation and Adaptation in Jihadist Digital Security, in Survival. Global
Politics and Strategy 59i (January 2017) (accessed May 05, 2018).
13 Joshua Sinai, Innovation in terrorists’ counter-surveillance: The case of al-Qaeda and its
affiliates, in Magnus Ranstorp/Magnus Normark (Eds.), Understanding Terrorism Innova-
tion and Learning: Al-Qaeda and beyond, New York: Routledge 2015.
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jihadists, focusing on the period until the end of 2017. This contribution will set
the stage for further research on this matter. To provide the necessary context,
this chapter first discusses the evolution and different phases of jihadi media
activities and illustrates the importance of new communication platforms, as
well as the general perception of new media technologies by Al-Qaeda and IS.
Subsequently, an overview of the groups, organizations, and media outlets
publishing on the issue of online operational security is given. Next, it highlights
the steps taken to ensure the best ways for jihadists to mitigate monitoring by
adversary governments and institutions. This section outlines how jihadi pri-
vacy-enhancing strategies have evolved, as well as the current state of internal
jihadi discussions. Following this, the steps IS and Al-Qaeda have taken to solve
the trade-off dilemma of maintaining a strong online presence while simulta-
neously avoiding government surveillance are demonstrated. Finally, the find-
ings are summarized and conclusions about jihadi online operational security
are drawn.
The chapter is based on a qualitative reading of primary and secondary sources.
The section on the general media strategy by IS and Al-Qaeda is mostly a secon-
dary analysis of existing literature. The main part of this contribution, dealing with
jihadists’ online operational security and the measures applied to solve the online
trade-off dilemma, predominantly relies on primary sources found online and on
the Darknet, as well as articles published by research institutes reporting on jihadi
online activities. Although numerous jihadi manuals provide offline counter-
surveillance advice, this chapter only concentrates on the suggestions and meth-
ods used to hide their traffic online. As an analysis of the activities of all groups that
can be labeled as jihadi would go beyond the scope of this contribution, the focus is
on IS and Al-Qaeda, as well as some affiliated groups and organizations.14 There
are several reasons for this selection. IS and Al-Qaeda have attracted the greatest
interest from academics and journalists worldwide and have been vanguard
groups when it comes to the dissemination of propaganda and publications
concerning the safe use of the Internet. In addition, there is a complex network of
technical groups affiliated with IS and Al-Qaeda that write and share advice about
the latest online technologies and privacy features.
14 The issue of how to label actors and different currents within the spectrum of Islamist
movements has been discussed intensively among researchers. In this chapter, I will refer to
the Islamic States and Al-Qaeda as jihadi groups. For a more detailed discussion, see: Thomas
Hegghammer, Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of
Militant Islamism, in Roel Meijer (Ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s new religious movement,
London: Hurst & Company 2009. For a critical evaluation of Hegghammer’s categorization,
see Rüdiger Lohlker, The Forgotten Swamp Revisited, in Rüdiger Lohlker (Ed.), New Ap-
proaches to the Analysis of Jihadism: Online and Offline, Göttingen: Vienna University Press
2012.
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Jihadists’ strategic use of online media
Since the turn of the millennium, the Internet and other computer-mediated
forms of communication have impacted on and transformed Muslims’ religious
perception and conduct. By increasingly transferring religious debates and
practice to the online sphere, the Internet has led to the development of new
methods of configuration and organization within Islamic networks. As more
Muslims seek religious guidance and advice online, new hierarchies and ways in
which knowledge is accessed and transmitted have emerged.15 This applies in
particular to jihadi groups, who in the early 1990s were among the first to take
advantage of the opportunities created by the proliferation of new communi-
cation technologies. Ever since, they have steadily relocated more resources to
the Internet.16 As a consequence, the professional promotion and marketing of
their theology via the World Wide Web has become one of the central founda-
tions of jihadi movements.17 Over the past two decades, several shifts in their
Internet usage have taken place. According to Zelin (2013), the development of
jihadi media activities can be divided into four phases.18
The first phase started in the 1980s and consisted mostly of the distribution of
essays, magazines, newsletters, audiotapes of sermons, and videos of lectures
and battle scenes. The communication strategy was not online but rather relied
on the dissemination of physical material. The second phase took place in the
1990s when top-down websites formed the core element of jihadi communica-
tion. Individuals running the sites could exert full control of the information
spread, as audiences were not able to actively engage in discussions. This
changed in the third phase, beginning in the 2000s, when interactive forums
became more widespread. Although users were now able to participate in online
discussions and post material themselves, the content of the forums was strictly
administered and posts as well as users who ran counter the intended ideas of the
forum were deleted or banned so that the discussion would remain ideologically
homogenous. In the fourth stage, which started in recent years, OSNs replaced
forums and became the central hub for the dissemination of jihadi content.19
These new communication platforms lowered the barriers for involvement in the
global jihadi movement and enabled low-level members and online supporters
15 Gary R. Bunt, iMuslims: Rewiring the House of Islam, Chapel Hill: University of Carolina
Press 2009, pp. 7ff.
16 Weimann, Terrorism in Cyberspace, pp. 38ff.
17 Bunt, iMuslims, pp. 184f.
18 Aaron Y. Zelin, The State of Global Jihad Online. A Qualitative, Quantitative, and Cross-
Lingual Analysis, New America Foundation, January 4, 2013 (https://www.newamerica.org/
international-security/policy-papers/the-state-of-global-jihad-online/).
19 Ibid., p. 4.
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who do not have a direct link to jihadi organizations to become active and a
mouthpiece for the movement’s goals.20 In general, the changes within jihadi
communication can be described as: “a clear shift away from the highly or-
ganization-centric model advanced by Al-Qaeda, towards one where unaffiliated
sympathizers can interact with and, to some extent, shape propaganda content in
real-time by actively participating in its further dissemination, thus contributing
to the organisation(s) whose message they convey.”21
Online, practically everyone can join this movement at any time and become a
virtual warrior fighting for the aspired global Islamic revolution. Ali Fisher (2015)
describes the strategies applied by the jihadists groups to maintain a persistent
online presence and to benefit from OSNs despite current steps taken by gov-
ernments and social-media providers to counter these activities. He draws from
netwar concepts and describes how the media mujāhidı̄n22 operate “through a
dispersed network of accounts which constantly reconfigures much like the way a
swarm of bees or flock of birds constantly reorganizes in mid-flight.”23 Fisher
defines this phenomenon as a Swarmcast because, in contrast to traditional means
of communication, it does not operate through a clear distribution hierarchy
where the content producer is in full control of the message broadcast to the
respective audience. Instead, a loosely affiliated network of media mujāhidı̄n
download and save the content on their servers, which they can then again re-
publish via their accounts and through different online channels. This network
provides a vast and efficient distributing system, making it very difficult for au-
thorities and network providers to censor jihadi publications online.24
In tandem with the spread of new information technologies, jihadi move-
ments also added a new concept to their understanding of jihad: the term media
jihad. According to this doctrine, the duty of jihad may be performed not only
through combat engagement and acts of violence but also by actively partic-
ipating in the perceived “media war”.25 This media jihad is considered part of the
jihād bi-l-lisān (jihad with the tongue),26 which is deemed to be a central aspect of
20 Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Paradigmatic Shifts in Jihadism in Cyberspace: The Emerging Role
of Unaffiliated Sympathizers in Islamic State’s Social Media Strategy, in Journal of Terrorism
Research 7i (February 2016), p. 44 (accessed May 05, 2018).
21 Ibid., p. 37.
22 The term mujāhid (Pl. mujāhidı̄n) denotes a person who engages in Jihad (see the other
chapters).
23 Ali Fisher, Swarmcast: How Jihadist Networks Maintain a Persistent Online Presence, in
Perspectives on Terrorism 9iii (2015), p. 4 (accessed May 05, 2018).
24 Ibid., pp. 8–16.
25 Nico Prucha, Jihadist innovation and learning by adapting to the ‘new’ and ‘social media’
Zeitgeist, in Magnus Ranstorp/Magnus Normark (Eds.), Understanding Terrorism Innova-
tion and Learning. Al-Qaeda and beyond, New York: Routledge 2015, pp. 118ff.
26 Often also referred to as jihād bi-l-qalam (jihad with the pen).
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what jihadists perceive to be their religious duty of engaging in jihad.27According





the respective audience, providing counter-arguments to the traditional media
outlets, disseminating the movement’s ideas, reaching new adherents, calling
them to submit to its theology, join its fight, as well as to threaten and intimidate
their enemies.28
Given the vital role online communication has for jihadi movements, groups
such as IS and Al-Qaeda have raised the media mujāhidı̄n on the same level as
regular mujāhidı̄n fighting on the battlefield.29 The category of the media mu-
27 For more on the discussion on jihād bi-l-lisān see: Philip Holtmann, Virtual Leadership: A
Study of Communicative Guidance Patterns in Online Jihad, Diss. Phil. University of Vienna
2013, pp. 120ff.
28 See for example: Maktabat al-Himma, Mujāhid anta aiyuhā al-i
˘
lāmı̄, June 2015, pp. 13ff. and
23ff. (https://archive.org/details/mojahed_ilamee_is) (accessed August 3, 2017).
29 Ibid., pp. 20f. ; Holtmann, Virtual Leadership, p. 119.
Image featured in the fourth edition of Al-Qaeda’s Al-Risalah magazine
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jāhidı̄n is very inclusive and encompasses media operatives engaged in pro-
ducing recordings and reports from the frontlines and online supporters dis-
tributing jihadi content at the same time.30 The conviction that the engagement in
the media mujāhidı̄n is equal to military service is echoed in an IS publication
titled “Media Operative, You are a Mujāhid Too”, where it says:
“The media is a jihad in the path of Allah. […] And the media jihad against the enemy is
of no less importance than engaging in fighting the enemy.”31
Besides publishing and disseminating propaganda in support of jihadi groups,
the media mujāhidı̄n are also obliged to stay informed about current affairs,
government monitoring capabilities, the latest technological trends, and coun-
ter-surveillance methods. Several jihadi publications on this matter have called
on online activists to adapt, learn, and improve their technical skills.
“It is incumbent upon the media mujāhid to be seriously concerned with his security
[…] because the enemy is lurking and will not waste any chance to attack if the
opportunity arises. […] It is incumbent upon the media mujāhid to monitor the re-
sponses and comments of the enemy about his work […] And the media jihad is one of
the most important fronts which needs adaptation to the particular circumstances.”32
To emphasize the existential necessity of adequate counter-surveillance meas-
ures jihadi ideologues often invoke Islamic traditions and sources.33 One of the
most frequently quoted traditions in this context is the Quranic verse 4:71. It
reads: “O believers, take your precautions; then move forward in companies, or
move forward all together.”34 By referring to such sources, they stress that
finding the safest ways to operate online is not just a strategic gimmick but a
divine command and a clear obligation upon every mujāhid. The following
section shows how and through what means jihadists are trying to fulfill what
they perceive as their religious duty to apply the best online operational security
means possible.
30 Charlie Winter, ‘Media Jihad’: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare, in The
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, February 13, 2017,
p. 9 (http://icsr.info/2017/02/icsr-report-media-jihad-islamic-states-doctrine-information-
warfare/) (accessed May 05, 2018).
31 Maktabat al-Himma, Mujāhid anta aiyuhā al-i
˘
lāmı̄, p. 9. Translated by the author.









lāmı̄, March 2012, pp. 8f. (https://ia800300.us.archive.org/16/items/mars2012/9irawan_
jihed-i3lami.pdf) (accessed August 21, 2017). Translated by the author.
33 See for example: Abu Ubayda Abdullah al-Adm, Safety and Security Guidelines for Lone Wolf
Mujahideen and Small Cells, in Al-Fajr Media Center, (January 2016), pp. 7f. (https://cryp
tome.org/2016/01/lone-wolf-safe-sec.pdf) (accessed July 30, 2017).
34 Ibid., p. 11. Translation by : A.J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted, New York: Touchstone 1996,
p. 110. Other Quranic verses quoted in this context are 8:60 and 4:83.
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Tech-savvy jihadism
While jihadists have recognized the need to overcome government surveillance
measures throughout their existence, the techniques applied have changed over
the time. Determining the exact time at which jihadist debates over operational
security started is difficult. One of the earliest public statements in this respect
can be traced back to 2007, when the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) pub-
lished its first encryption tool, Asrar al-Mujahideen. However, the discussion
about the right online behavior was still limited at that time, as it took place in
password-protected forums with limited audience reach or consisted of articles
in Al-Qaeda’s Inspire dealing primarily with encryption technologies.35 In recent
years, public jihadist debates on online operational security and the means
applied have steadily increased and become more sophisticated. Many have
attributed this to the leaks by Edward Snowden, the former NSA contractor who
published classified information regarding the operational scope and technical
capabilities used by intelligence agencies. They claim that since the Snowden
leaks revealed massive surveillance of citizens by government institutions on an
unprecedented scale, this significantly raised the level of concern within jihadi
circles.36 Evaluating the exact influence the Snowden leaks had on jihadist
movements is difficult, as political interests often bias the results presented.
Having faced severe setbacks due to the interception of satphone and e-mail
communications, tech-savvy jihadists were well-aware of the extent to which
governments spy on ordinary citizens long before Snowden leaked any docu-
ments.37 His leaks have frequently been referenced in jihadist publications
aiming to raise awareness for operational security online.38 Additionally,
35 Steven Stalinsky/R. Sosnow, Al-Qaeda’s Embrace of Encryption Technology, Part I:
2011–2014, in MEMRI Cyber and Jihad Lab, April 28, 2014 (http://cjlab.memri.org/uncate
gorized/al-qaedas-embrace-of-encryption-technology-2007-2011/) (accessed May 05, 2018).
36 Steven Stalinsky/R. Sosnow, Al-Qaeda’s Embrace of Encryption Technology, Part II:
2011–2014, And the Impact of Edward Snowden, in MEMRI Cyber and Jihad Lab, April 28,
2014 (http://cjlab.memri.org/lab-projects/tracking-jihadi-terrorist-use-of-social-media/al-
qaedas-embrace-of-encryption-technology-part-ii-2011-2014-and-the-impact-of-edward-
snowden/) (accessed May 05, 2018).
37 Flashpoint Partners, Measuring the Impact of the Snowden Leaks on the Use of Encryption by
Online Jihadists, in Flashpoint, September 16, 2014 (https://fpjintel.com/public-reports/
measuring-the-impact-of-the-snowden-leaks-on-the-use-of-encryption-by-online-jihadists/)
(accessed May 05, 2018).
38 See for example: Stalinsky/Sosnow, Al-Qaeda Encryption Technology, Part II. ; Snowden is
also mentioned in numerous publications by the EHF, see for example: Electronic Horizons
Foundation, Khadamāt al-VPN, uploaded August 18, 2017 (https://pastethis.at/5SiW2ZfR)
(accessed September 6, 2017); Electronic Horizons Foundation, Taqrı̄r amnı̄
˘
an Windows 10
wa-sharikat Microsoft, uploaded August 17, 2017 (https://pastethis.at/C0Ahy31f) (accessed
September 7).
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Snowden’s revelations triggered privacy activists and tech-companies con-
cerned with online anonymity to develop new tools to limit the government’s
reach.39 Jihadists, in turn, began to use the very same technologies for their
extremist agendas, turning technologies developed for benign privacy purposes
into essential terrorist assets. It is thus clear that although Snowden alone cannot
be credited with the advance in jihadists’ operational security, his leaks have at
least partly shaped their perception of privacy-enhancing technologies.40 Over
recent years, an extensive library of jihadi literature exclusively about the issue of
operational security has been built up. As it is becoming increasingly difficult to
keep track of the numerous jihadist authors who publish on new technologies
and counter-surveillance measures online, the following section will highlight
the main channels, organizations, and contributors dealing with these matters.
Who is writing about online security strategies?
In recent years, jihadists have stepped up their efforts to provide their coun-
terparts with sophisticated technical knowledge and training. As of today, there
is a complex nexus of different organizations and outlets dealing with new media
technology and teaching the necessary skills to avoid government scrutiny. This
nexus operates through various channels, publishes in numerous languages and
tries to reach as many supporters as possible. While most publications found
online are in Arabic, more and more literature in other languages is becoming
available, mostly in English and French, but also in German and Dutch.
The main originators of jihadi-inspired information on privacy-enhancing
measures are technical groups writing in support of jihadi movements online.
Several technical departments affiliated with IS and Al-Qaeda specialize in up-
to-date knowledge about current technological trends and threats, raising
awareness about the importance of appropriate online-behavior, informing
supporters about steps to be taken in order to remain anonymous, providing
followers with guidelines on how to maintain an online presence in social net-
works, and in some cases even in developing tools and apps to protect the
communication of their fellow jihadists. In researching this topic, one faces
difficulties in establishing direct links between the jihadi groups themselves and
39 Robert Hackett, Snowden Leaks Advanced Encryption by 7 Years, U.S. Spy Chief Says, in
Fortune, April 25, 2016 (http://fortune.com/2016/04/25/snowden-encryption-james-clap
per/) (accessed May 05, 2018).
40 Rowan Scarborough, Islamic State, al Qaeda are big fans of Edward Snowden’s tweets, in The
Washington Times, October 16, 2015 (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/16/
islamic-state-al-qaeda-are-big-fans-edward-snowden/) (accessed May 05, 2018).
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the organizations distributing associated online content, and their actual rela-
tionship often remains obscure.
One of the most prominent organizations is the technical department of the
Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF),41 an independent media project that dis-
seminates propaganda material on jihadi activities. It used to operate via web-
sites and is now mostly present on Twitter and Telegram.42 As it primarily dis-
tributes publications in support of Al-Qaeda, a tangible affiliation between the
GIMF and the latter’s nucleus is likely.43 Apart from ideological propaganda, the
GIMF also has a technical department that mainly focuses on creating several
encryption technologies and publishes on emerging technologies as well as
counter-surveillance methods.44 From having been one of the first organizations
dealing with the issue of encryption and secure communication programs, its
outreach and role regarding online operational security have quietened down
recently.
Since its rapid rise, which culminated in the declaration of its caliphate in
mid-2014, IS has launched what many describe as the most successful jihadi
media campaign so far, moving its propaganda to OSNs and new online plat-
forms. At the same time, IS-affiliated groups also started to deal with issues
related to online operational security and have led the internal jihadi discussion
on privacy-enhancing methods ever since. While the GIMF’s concentrates on
encryption technology, IS-affiliated tech-companies have addressed a broad
number of topics, many of which will be discussed later on. Currently, one of the
central and most active IS-affiliated groups concerned with the dissemination of
technological knowledge is the Electronic Horizons Foundation (EHF). This is a
pro-IS organization that provides online supporters with technical expertise.
According to several reports, it is a collective project of various IS-affiliated
groups such as the The Technical Department of the Islamic State as well as
several Telegram channels and Twitter accounts focused on technical advice.45
The EHF regularly publishes articles and technical manuals and administrates
archives on Justpaste.it and Pastethis.at, where it collects all its previous items
and publications. Moreover, the EHF also operates a library-bot on Telegram that
41 For a detailed discussion on the GIMF, see Manuel R. Torres Soriano, ‘Between the Pen and the
Sword’: The Global Islamic Media Front in the West, in Terrorism and Political Violence 24v
(November 2012) (accessed May 05, 2018).
42 https://t.me/GIMF_Tech (accessed September 5, 2017).
43 https://t.me/GIMF_Sub2 (accessed September 5, 2017).
44 https://www.gimfmedia.com/tech/en/ (accessed August 5, 2017).
45 The Middle East Media Research Institute, Jihadi ‘Help-Desk,’ Tech Channels On Telegram
and Twitter offer Tech support, Tutorials, Up-To-Date Cyber Security Info, in MEMRI Cyber
and Jihad Lab, February 8, 2016 (http://cjlab.memri.org/lab-projects/tracking-jihadi-terro
rist-use-of-social-media/jihadi-help-desk-tech-channels-on-telegram-and-twitter-offer-tech-
support-tutorials-up-to-date-cyber-security-info/) (accessed May 05, 2018).
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serves as an archive of articles, videos, and banners published by the EHF.46
While most EHF publications are distributed in Arabic, it has recently started
translating its articles into other languages. So far, these include Arabic, English,
French, and Dutch.47
In addition to the organizations mentioned above, a significant amount of
information about operational online security is shared on jihadi online forums,
blogs, individual Telegram channels, and file-sharing sites such as Justpaste.it, as
well as in social media accounts of supporters or members or IS and Al-Qaeda.
Moreover, numerous articles published in jihadi online magazines deal with the
issue of online operational security. Such magazines include IS’s weekly Arabic
magazine Al-Nabā ˘and its French-language magazine Dār al-Islām. Al-Qaeda
also operates several foreign-language magazines that regularly address issues
related to online operational security, including the English-language Inspire and
al-Risalah. In December 2015, the first edition of a German-language tech
magazine called Kybernetiq was published, which concentrates on instructing
jihadi supporters about how to operate securely online. Currently, there are two
online editions of Kybernetiq as well as an additional website on the Darknet,
through which jihadist propaganda and privacy updates are distributed.48 While
most journalists have attributed Kybernetiq to IS, there is some evidence that it is
in fact run by Al-Qaeda supporters.49
Counter-surveillance measures and technologies applied
From their inception, jihadi groups took the issue of counter-surveillance seri-
ously and tried to educate their followers about the importance of hiding in-
formation from adversary governments. The early methods were rather simple,
46 https://t.me/change_log (accessed September 01, 2017); https://justpaste.it/EHF (last ac-
cessed August 01, 2017). The website was removed in August, 2017. Afterwards the EHF
moved its online archive to pastethis.at https://pastethis.at/f2EEpd41 (accessed September
14, 2017); Telegram.me/@HorizonsLibbot (accessed September 14, 2017).
47 https://pastethis.at/E48vQVv5 (accessed September 23, 2017).
48 http://kybrntqae2ceoele.onion/index.html (accessed September 14, 2017).
49 In the second edition of Kybernetiq, the editors make fun of reports that link the magazine to
IS, stating that after the first edition was published “it was circulated that we were members of
the Islamic State. Our denials even increased their speculations.” Kybernetiq 2nd edition,
November 2016, p. 1. (http://kybrntqae2ceoele.onion/2016/11/12/Vorwort-Kybernetiq-Aus
gabe-002.html) (accessed September 14, 2017). Translated by the author. Shortly afterwards,
an English version of an article featured in the second edition of Kybernetiq was re-published
in the 4th edition of Al-Qaeda’s Al-Risalah magazine and featured on the Kybernetiq
homepage. Although this does not explicitly prove that the editors of Kybernetiq are actually
affiliated to Al-Qaeda, it makes it likely.
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such as avoiding unnecessary suspicion or using dead drop e-mail accounts.50
Over time, jihadists’ discussions of various privacy-enhancing methods have
become more advanced and have addressed various new technologies. Today,
anyone seeking to stay anonymous online can choose from a number of user-
friendly applications and programs that are not only easy to obtain and handle
but also claim to offer the latest privacy-enhancing technology. It therefore often
seems as if taking the necessary precautions to avoid transmitting sensitive
information is straightforward and does not require advanced technical skills.
Jihadi tech organizations are well aware that the situation is much more com-
plicated and frequently stress the importance for online supporters to be well-
informed on the technologies available and the capabilities of government sur-
veillance, as shown in the following example:
“The carelessness of the supporters (ans
˙
ār) regarding the security aspect will make
them easy prey for the regional and international intelligence agencies. […] Indeed, the
mujāhidı̄n are the primary target, and the intelligence agencies seek to collect in-
formation about them using all means possible […] The issue is dangerous and should
not be underestimated.”51
Being cognizant of their enemies’ capabilities, IS and Al-Qaeda now intensively
discuss the effects of using technologies such as smartphones and crypto-
currencies and heavily rely on encryption technologies, VPNs, particular
browsers, and live operating systems.
Encryption Technologies
The employment of encryption technologies is one of the earliest and essential
aspects of the jihadi strategies to mitigate adversarial online surveillance.52 In
general, the use of encryption technology by jihadists can be separated into two
periods. During the first period, jihadi movements pre-eminently focused on
developing their own tools, an endeavor, which was spearheaded by the technical
50 Magnus Ranstorp, The virtual sanctuary of al-Qaeda and terrorism in an age of globalization,
in Johan Eriksson/Giampiero Giacomella (Eds.), International Relations and Security in the
Digital Age, New York: Routledge 2007, pp. 51f. A dead drop account is a way to conceal one’s
e-mail traffic. Rather than sending the e-mails, the written message is saved in the draft
folder, which then can be read by anyone who has access to the e-mail account.
51 Electronic Horizons Foundation, Maqālāt amniyya. Amnuka
˘
alā Twitter, uploaded January
11, 2016 (justpaste.it/twittersec) (accessed July 11, 2017). Translated by the author.
52 Several articles published in jihadi magazines emphasize the importance of encryption
technology and provide general introductions to this matter. See: Al-Nabā ˘61st edition,
December 2016, p. 8 (http://jihadology.net/2016/12/29/new-issue-of-the-islamic-states-
newsletter-al-naba-61/) (accessed September 14, 2017).
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department of the GIMF. But in recent years, jihadists have shifted to external
encryption services developed by privacy activists, a practice that proliferated
especially in the aftermath of the Snowden leaks.
In 2007, the GIMF launched its encryption software called Asrar al-Muja-
hideen (Secrets of the Mujāhidı̄n), which was the first jihadi self-made en-
cryption software. According to the GIMF, the Asrar al-Mujahideen software was
created based on the assumption that programs developed by non-jihadi spe-
cialists cannot be trusted and in the belief that intelligence agencies may be
planting such programs to monitor their communication more thoroughly.
Hence, the GIMF urged jihadi supporters to trust only their own software,
claiming that it guaranteed the highest level of privacy.53 The software was up-
dated in 2008 and the new version launched as Asrar al-Mujahideen 2.0. This
could be used to send encrypted messages through a process similar to PGP
(Pretty Good Privacy), using asymmetric encryption keys of 2048-bit length.54
Several high-ranking jihadi figures have lauded the confidentiality provided by
Asrar al-Mujahideen 2.0 and have endorsed its use.55
In 2013, the GIMF added another program to its toolbox, this time an en-
cryption feature that could be utilized as an add-on to several instant messaging
programs. Called Asrar al-Dardarshah (Secrets of Chatting) it was described as
the “first Islamic encryption plugin.”56 When launching the Asrar al-Dardarsh
software, the GIMF bragged about the up-to-date technology used, noting that
“Asrar al-Dardarshah offers the highest levels of encryption for secure com-
munication through instant messaging. […] It […] secures communications
with the greatest degree of secrecy and is based on the highest standards reached
by cryptography and digital telecommunications engineering.”57 Reflecting a
general shift from e-mail services to messaging apps and OSNs, the creation of
Asrar al-Dardashah reveals the GIMF’s efforts to keep jihadist networks up to
date and adapt associated communities to emerging online trends. The most
recent encryption program developed by GIMF is Tashfeer al-Jawwal (mobile
encryption program), which was released in September 2013 and quickly re-
53 Global Islamic Media Front, Download Asrar al-Mujahideen (https://www.gimfmedia.com/
tech/en/asrar-al-mujahideen) (accessed August 5, 2017).
54 Ibid.
55 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula especially has promoted Asrar al-Mujahideen and has
dedicated two articles in the first and second edition of its Inspire magazine to the program.
Inspire 1st edition, June 2010, pp. 41–43 (https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/aqap-
inspire-magazine-volume-1-uncorrupted.pdf) (accessed September 14, 2017); Inspire 2nd
edition, Fall 2010, pp. 58–60 (https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/inspire-magazine-
2.pdf) (accessed August 9, 2017).
56 Global Islamic Media Front, Download Asrar al-Dardarshah (https://www.gimfmedia.com/
tech/en/asrar-al-dardashah/) (accessed August 5, 2017).
57 Ibid.
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placed by an improved version.58 Tashfeer al-Jawwal runs on Android or Sym-
bian smartphones, employs asymmetrical encryption and enables encoding
messages and files as well as sending and receiving 400-letter messages. Addi-
tionally, it uses the Twofish encryption algorithm with cipher block chaining and
claims to have the same strength as advanced encryption standards (AES).59
Up until 2013, the GIMF was virtually the only jihadi tech organization cre-
ating encryption. In December that year, however, the Al-Fajr Technical Com-
mittee (FTC), an organization whose members and group affiliation is unknown,
released its asymmetric encryption program Amn al-Mujahid (Security of the
Mujāhid).60 A second version specifically for Android systems followed suit. The
program relies heavily on previous encryption tools and does not significantly
differ from previous technology developed by the GIMF.61
IS has also taken to developing encryption programs, launching its own Asrar
al-Ghurabaa (Secrets of the Strangers) in 2013 after splitting from Al-Qaeda.62
Little is known about Asrar al-Ghurabaa, which is likely due to a lack of trust in
this program. Shortly after the release of Asrar al-Ghurabaa, the GIMF published
a statement in which they advised against using the app, stating that “the pro-
gram is suspicious and its source is not trusted.”63
While the programs mentioned above used to be state-of-the-art instruments
in jihadi encryption activities, several recent publications have sharply criticized
and advised against the use of self-made jihadi encryption software. An example
of this is an article published in the first edition of the German-language jihadi
tech magazine Kybernetiq examining the Asrar al-Mujahideen software.64 The
author warns supporters against using any encryption software with a mujāhid
branding, as they have several weaknesses. First, he argues that the software has
not been updated since 2008 and that intelligence agencies have deciphered the
58 Global Islamic Media Front, Download Mobile Encryption (V 1.1) (https://www.gimfmedia.
com/tech/en/download-mobile-encryption/) (accessed August 5, 2017).
59 Ibid.
60 The announcement text for Amn al-Mujahid was published on the Jihadi forum Shumukh al-
Islam and is retrievable online via Jihadology.net: Al-Fajr Media Technical Committee,
‘Surprise’-Program (Security of the Mujāhid) – For Safe Encrypted Communication, De-
cember 10, 2013 (http://jihadology.net/2013/12/10/new-statement-from-al-fajr-medias-tech
nical-committee-surprise-program-security-of-the-mujahid-for-safe-encrypted-communi
cation/) (accessed September 06, 2017).
61 Ibid.
62 Stalinsky/Sosnow, Al-Qaeda Encryption Technology, Part II.
63 Global Islamic Media Front, Warning About the Use of the Program Asrār al-Ghurabā’,
December 4, 2013 (http://jihadology.net/2013/12/04/new-statement-from-the-global-islamic-
media-front-warning-about-the-use-of-the-program-asrar-al-ghuraba/) (accessed September
6, 2017).
64 Kybernetiq 1st edition, December 2015, pp. 4f (http://kybrntqae2ceoele.onion/download/
kybernetiq_001.pdf) (accessed July 30, 2017).
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algorithms and technology used. Second, the 2048-bit key employed by Asrar al-
Mujahideen is not up to date, as there are several programs available which use
more secure encryption keys.65 Third, and most critically, if using a program that
has a jihadi label and is used only by jihadists one quickly becomes “branded [as
if one were wearing] a stamp on one’s forehead saying ‘Look Intelligence
Agencies, I am using a jihadi encryption program’.”66 He concludes that using
jihadi software such as Asrar al-Mujahideen can be a severe security risk and
attract the attention of the intelligence apparatus.67
While it is likely that many still use the programs discussed above, the focus of
most currently active tech-savvy jihadi groups has increasingly shifted from
developing their own security tools to finding, evaluating, and explaining the
best programs available. The Signal, Threema, and Pidgin applications are
mentioned particularly often.68 Recent jihadi publications describe Signal as the
most secure and advanced encrypted messaging tool.69 The EHF, for example,
has published an article about Signal, claiming that it was not only created by the
developer of PGP encryption Philipp Zimmermann but has also been used and
recommended by Edward Snowden, a fact which they view as a clear proof of its
quality. In contrast to other encrypted messaging tools, Signal is an open-source
software program and thus continuously improved by encryption experts. Its
software is therefore always equipped with the latest encryption technology.70
Other, slightly different apps are critically evaluated and advised against by
jihadi technological departments. Threema, an application that claims to pro-
vide the most advanced encryption technology, for example, is regularly de-
scribed as being insecure, not only because it is closed-source software, but also
because it does not support essential encryption features, among others Forward
Security.71 Forward Security is a popular cryptography tool that creates random
keys based on an unpredictable algorithm for each new session. This means that
65 Ibid., p. 5.
66 Ibid., p. 5. Translated by the author.
67 Ibid., p. 7.
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August 16, 2017 (https://pastethis.at/v9n9gJdB) (accessed September 6, 2017). Other pro-
grams discussed include Gajim, Conversations and WhatsApp.
69 Electronic Horizons Foundation, Al-Dalı̄l al-shāmil Signal.
70 Ibid.
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even if a person’s key has been compromised once it does not threaten previous
or future communication.72
With regard to encrypted e-mail services, most jihadi tech-groups dealing
with the privacy of e-mail servers advise against using the most widely used
providers, such as Gmail, Yahoo, and Outlook, since these demand and pass on a
lot of private and sensitive information and do not provide high security
measures to protect one’s privacy.73 Instead, it is recommended using e-mail
services that apply PGP encryption, such as ProtonMail, Tutanota, and Hush-
Mail.74
Finally, encryption is not limited only to messaging. It can also be used to
protect documents and data, which is considered an absolute necessity among
jihadists. The most-praised software for this purpose is Veracrypt. It is a free,
open-source software used to encrypt files and documents that is regularly
mentioned in connection to Live Operating systems such as Linux and Tails.75
Encryption is one of the most important technologies used by jihadists to
protect their messages and hide data transferred via networks, the Internet,
mobile phones, and so forth. They have long made use of and are well informed
about current developments in encryption technology. According to recent
publications, several jihadi tech experts have grown skeptical of technology with
a mujāhid label and advise supporters to rely on non-jihadi programs, which are
viewed as more advanced, less conspicuous, and providing better privacy online.
Although the GIMF has lately gone silent on this matter, it is likely that the
developers still believe that their programs are more secure and that software
created by non-mujāhidı̄n are precarious. This may indicate a disagreement
among different jihadi tech-groups over which software can be deemed trust-
worthy.
VPN Services
Another major measure by jihadists to obscure their online footprint are VPN
services. Jihadists have been using VPNs extensively, and much of the literature
at hand directly or indirectly deals with VPNs. According to a report by the
Flashpoint institute, jihadists have been using VPNs since 2012, when they
72 Ibid.
73 Electronic Horizons Foundation, Khadamāt al-barı̄d al-iliktrūnı̄ al-mushaffar, uploaded
August 21, 2017 (https://pastethis.at/QG8SKj0d) (accessed September 6, 2017).
74 Ibid.






al istikhdām barnāmaj Veracrypt li-tashfı̄r al-
milaffāt, uploaded August 18, 2017 (https://pastethis.at/g96xZoH2n) (accessed September 6,
2017).
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started applying Cyber Ghost VPN.76 Their VPN use has since become more
advanced, not only providing basic recommendations and suggestions but, with
the availability of many different VPN services, jihadists started publishing
detailed manuals on how to use VPNs and critically assess the strength and
weaknesses of various services. Today, there is a large jihadi library dealing with
all issues related to VPNs.
There are several services recommended by jihadi movements, some of the
most popular are NordVPN, OpenVPN, HideMeVPN, F-Secure Freedom.77 In an
article dealing with VPN services for Android systems, the EHF provides several
guidelines on how to use them and compares different programs. According to
the article, NordVPN “is considered one of the best private virtual services.”78
The article explains that NordVPN uses a double encryption method to protect
the users’ data, as well as two layers of VPN by running all traffic through the
“The Onion Router” (TOR) network. Moreover, NordVPN is recommended due
to its robust protocols and several features supported by the application, such as
the ability to use bitcoin. One of the additional functions that distinguish
NordVPN from other services is that it forces users always to use VPN when
surfing online.79
However, the article notes that not all VPN services guarantee online ano-
nymity and are not as secure as often claimed. One of the VPN services criticized
by the EHF is the Chinese software PureVPN. Its general evaluation is very
critical stating that “we do not recommend depending on PureVPN.”80 PureVPN,
as well as other weaker VPN services, should be therefore avoided and only be
used if it is impossible to access stronger software.81 When using more vulnerable
services, the EHF states, one always risks leaking data and the IP address.
Moreover, the article warns that there many VPN services are in fact scams used
by governments to make it easy to spy on those seeking anonymity online. It
states:
“Many VPN services do not provide the best security demands on the Internet. […]
These VPN services invade your privacy and sell your information to companies […] as
well as intelligence agencies.”82
76 Laith Alkhouri/Alex Kassirer, Tech for Jihad: Dissecting Jihadists’ Digitial Toolbox, Flash-
point, July 2016, p. 3 (https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Tech
forJihad.pdf) (accessed May 05, 2018).
77 Electronic Horizons Foundation, Al-Khadamāt al-iftirād
˙
iyya VPN fı̄ anz
˙
imat Android,
uploaded August 16, 2017 (https://pastethis.at/K8T25rr5) (accessed September 6, 2017).
78 Ibid.
79 Electronic Horizons Foundation, Al-Khadamāt al-iftirād
˙
iyya.
80 Ibid., Translated by the author.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., Translated by the author.
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Statements like this demonstrate that jihadi tech organizations recommend
supporters to proceed very carefully when choosing a VPN service, arguing that
intelligence agencies are always trying to deceive them by creating new and fake
programs.
These are just some examples of the broad range of jihadi publications on
VPN services. The literature available on this issue demonstrates that jihadists
take the matter of masking IP addresses very seriously and view VPN services as
one of the pillars of counter-surveillance. Moreover, it shows that tech-savvy
jihadists have a good understanding and overview of the services available as
well as the benefits and disadvantages of each service. Their sophisticated un-
derstanding of VPN services has evolved over the years and jihadi tech groups
regularly publish on this issue so that online supporters stay up-to-date on the
latest VPN technologies available.
Browsers
Using the right web browser to hide one’s identity online is another widely
discussed topic among jihadists, who urge their supporters to stay away from
browsers which they believe to be unsafe and monitor their online behavior. The
TOR (The Onion Router) network is the favored and most often mentioned
browser in jihadi literature. Early on, jihadists endorsed the TOR network and
started using it when operating online. It is often described as “one of the most
important instruments in our defensive weapons stockpile. It veils and ano-
nymizes our sources. It basically makes us invisible from controllers, bypasses
Firewalls and provides uncensored Internet-access.”83
Although TOR is generally considered to be the preferred choice among ji-
hadists, in a publication in Al-Qaeda’s Al-Risalah magazine written by the Ky-
bernetiq editors titled “The Dark Side of the Onion” the author cautions sup-
porters that improper use of TOR can void the security provided by the browser.
The article states that today several intelligence services and individual hacking
groups are actively trying to attack and infiltrate TOR, exposing the network’s
users to new security threats.84
The TOR network consists of three different nodes, the Entry Guard, which
encrypts the data and sends it to the second node called the Relay Server, where
the data is encrypted a second time. Eventually, the connection to a website is
83 Al-Risalah 4th edition, January 2017, p. 41. (http://jihadology.net/2017/01/10/new-issue-of-
the-magazine-al-risalah-4/) (accessed September 6, 2017). A longer version of the article was
first published in the 2nd edition of Kybernetiq. Later, an English translation by the Ky-
bernetiq editors was re-published in the 4th edition of Al-Qaeda’s Al-Risalah magazine.
84 Ibid., pp. 41ff.
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finalized via an exit node, which can be described as the gateway where the data
leaves the TOR network and is transferred to the Internet. The encryption
technology and relays mask the user’s IP address by making it seem as if the
traffic originated from the exit relay, which can be located anywhere in the world.
According to the Kybernetiq article, exit nodes can be a security threat for
jihadists, as the article states:
“Although your IP-Address is masked, the person in control of the traffic in between the
Exit-Node and the Website you are entering is the one who controls all the traffic that
goes through it. The attacker can now actively manipulate and remove the encryptions
applied to your network traffic and even passively switch off security protocols (that
mask) what you do within the Tor network”.85
In the second edition of Kybernetiq, the editors also provide a sample case to
demonstrate that “operating your own TOR Exit Node is a cakewalk”86 and that it
is relatively straightforward to manipulate the exit node to obtain private data of
users browsing via the TOR network.87 To avoid this kind of leakage, the author
advises taking several measures, such as regularly updating the TOR browser,
preventing unnecessary plugins and add-ons, always using end-to-end en-
Image featured in the fourth edition of Al-Qaeda’s Al-Risalah magazine
85 Ibid., p. 41.
86 Kybernetiq 2nd edition, p. 11. Translated by the author. [Emphasis in original]
87 Ibid., pp. 11f.
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cryption software, and rejecting any new SSL certificates.88 Although the author
still views TOR as the securest browser available, he concludes “that we should
not rely solely on TOR. It is important to know how TOR should be used. […]
Intelligence agencies such as the NSA and GCHQ are also operating exit nodes
and are trying […] to control and monitor the TOR network.”89
Other jihadi-approved browser applications are Orbot or Orfox. Orbot pro-
vides a browser that enables TOR on Android systems.90 Orfox also works in a
similar way, with some minor modifications, which makes it possible to enter the
TOR network with an Android operating system and the Mozilla Firefox
browser.91 For other browsers such as Google Chrome and Opera, which are
perceived as being unsafe, jihadi tech organizations always advise using them in
combination with VPNs.92
TOR is one example that shows that when it comes to obscuring their online
Image published in the 2nd edition of the German-language magazine Kybernetiq showing the
structure of the TOR network and warning about the dangers of unsafe exit-nodes
88 Ibid., p. 9. SSL stands for secure sockets layer. It is a protocol which creates a secure con-
nection between a client and the server over which to send information. However, SSLs might
end up having the opposite effect when using TOR.
89 Ibid., p. 14. Translated by the author.
90 Dār al-Islām 10th edition, August 2016, pp. 40f. (http://jihadology.net/category/dar-al-
islam-magazine/) (accessed September 8, 2017).
91 Electronic Horizons Foundation, Al-Dalı̄l al-shāmil li-TOR ‘Orbot’ Android, uploaded August
16, 2017 (https://pastethis.at/KHf2HB5y) (accessed September 6, 2017).











āfat Surfeasy, uploaded March 15, 2017, (https://ln.sync.com/
dl/0c9c91700/jqeexwbx-d6hqnjs5-2remrjw3-juwijgnv) (accessed September 6, 2017).
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traffic jihadists make extensive use of western technology developed for well-
intended privacy purposes. The TOR network is very popular and used in many
countries to avoid censorship regimes, which can make it a useful tool for
countering political oppression. However, jihadists have seized TOR for their
own agenda and consider it the essential browser for their online undertakings.
While the jihadi literature on browsers has increased over time and today deals
with several different browsers, the majority of sources available still focus on
TOR. Despite the current doubts about the actual privacy provided, jihadists
have yet to find a better alternative.
Live Operating Systems
An increasing number of jihadi publications dealing with privacy-enhancing
techniques address the issue of live operating systems (LOS). Jihadi tech groups
regularly warn their supporters that most operating systems are not safe. A
recent example is an EHF article dealing with Windows 10, which was exposed to
criticism due to privacy concerns.93 According to the article, Windows is well
known for monitoring and selling information about its users and with Windows
10, they “developed a system that infiltrates the privacy of its user rigorously.”94
As a consequence, most OS, such as Windows 10, should not be trusted and are
best avoided. Instead, jihadi supporters should shift towards more secure LOS,
with Linux95 and Tails as the preferred systems.96
Linux provides a well-established open-source operating system, as well as a
variety of software options which can be customized by the user. In the second
edition of Kybernetiq, the author addresses Linux, stating: “Windows is not an
open-source operating system. […] Most malware, such as viruses, worms, and
trojans, target Windows users. […] We therefore only use open-source operating
systems such as […] Linux.”97 The article also highlights that Linux is easy to use,
93 Conner Forrest, Windows 10 violates your privacy by default, here’s how you can protect
yourself, in TechRepublic, August 4, 2015 (http://www.techrepublic.com/article/windows-10-
violates-your-privacy-by-default-heres-how-you-can-protect-yourself/) (accessed May 05,
2018).
94 Electronic Horizons Foundation, Taqrı̄r amnı̄
˘
an Windows 10. Translated by the author.
95 Linux refers to the Linux kernel, as well as several programs, tools, and services. The program
is therefore also often referred to as GNU/Linux because many of the programs used are
actually GNU tools. For the purpose of this chapter and to increase readability, I will refer to
the different programs and services simply as Linux.
96 Ibid. Another OS discussed by the EHF is the security-focused Qubes OS, see: Electronic
Horizons Foundation, Madkhal ilā niz
˙
ām Qubes OS, uploaded August 18, 2017 (https://
pastethis.at/M9i6T99W) (accessed September 13, 2017).
97 Kybernetiq 2nd edition, p. 21. Translated by the author.
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does not need a high-end computer but runs even on older models, and is a very
safe way to operate online.98 The EHF has published a whole series of articles on
Linux, giving a step-by-step introduction on how to download and use the LOS
most effectively.99 It argues that the strong kernel of the Linux system and its
continuous development makes it more independent than other OS.100 Moreover,
since Linux enables users to control and choose several system configurations
and the software applied, users should not be afraid of programs or updates that
make it easy to hack the computer. Hence, the EHF views Linux as an easy to use
and fast OS, which can be used in combination with other privacy-enhancing
programs, such as most VPN services, encryption software, and the TOR net-
work.101
While Linux is considered to provide a good level of privacy, most jihadi
publications recommend supporters to use Tails (The Amnesiac Incognito Live
System). In a training manual for lone wolves published on IS and Al-Qaeda
Twitter accounts titled “Safety and Security Guidelines for Lone Wolf Muja-
hideen,” it states “if you need to spend more time on the Internet, we HIGHLY
suggest you use Tails OS on your computer for your Jihad-related work.”102 Tails
is an operating system based on the Linux kernel, which focuses on protecting
the identity and privacy of online traffic. Additionally – and this is the main
reasons why it is the preferred operating system of jihadists – Tails OS is built and
relies on the TOR network, forcing users to always connect with TOR when using
the Internet.103 Furthermore, Tails comes with several high-end cryptography
programs, with users being able to encrypt not only the USB or external hard
disk but also e-mails and instant-messaging services.104
Smartphone Confidentiality
Smartphones are some of the key tools used in jihadi messaging, allowing them
to disseminate propaganda and information with ease and reach a global audi-
ence instantly. Despite the great opportunities provided by smartphones, tech-
savvy jihadists consider them a dangerous means of communication. Several
98 Ibid., p. 21.




ām Linux, uploaded July 26,
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102 Abdullah al-Adm, Safety and Security Guidelines, p. 29. [Emphasis in original]
103 Electronic Horizons Foundation, Al-Dalı̄l al-shāmil li-niz
˙
ām al-tashghı̄l Tails, uploaded
August 18, 2017 (https://pastethis.at/P4pmvN3I) (accessed September 7, 2017).
104 Ibid.
“Now You See Me – Now You Don’t” 179
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-SA 4.0
© 2019, V&R unipress GmbH, Göttingen 
ISBN Print: 9783847109389 – ISBN E-Lib: 9783737009386
blogs and publications by jihadi tech organizations have warned their supporters
about or strictly advised against the use of smartphones.
The second edition of Kybernetiq features an article titled “Utopia: Security
on Smartphone: Who is actually behind the attack?”, which illustrates the
dangers of smartphones, describing them as “our electronic ankle monitor,
which we are installing ourselves voluntarily.”105 The author argues that smart-
phones are likely to be the main reason why several high-ranking jihadists have
been targeted in the past, mentioning the assassination of a sniper instructor on a
training base as precedent.106 He warns users against the illusory feeling of being
secure after strengthening the privacy features on their phone. Even if they use
software hiding their GPS, he notes that there are several other ways to locate a
smartphone, such as silent SMS that can track the whereabouts of users even if
their phones are switched off.107 Moreover, intelligence agencies can easily obtain
the smartphone’s ISMI (international mobile subscriber identity)108 which can
catch the phone-signal by using two or three MAC addresses (media access-
control address).109 Several smartphone apps also automatically send a signal
and are constantly looking for nearby Wi-Fi stations. The signal is thereby
obtained by tracking systems such as Google, which then forward the exact
location to intelligence agencies.110 Due to such drawbacks, several jihadi writers
on operational security are convinced that the disadvantages of smartphones
outweigh their benefits, and statements like the following are common: “Liberate
yourself and those close to you from these chains! My dear brother, next time you
are looking for a spy just look inside your pocket.”111
However, if jihadists supporters cannot get rid of their smartphones, several
applications are recommended that should help to reduce the risks mentioned
above.
First, users are advised to download applications that let them control apps’
permissions. Several apps have permissions to access data from smartphones,
such as the contacts, photos, and the locations of users. Using apps such as APK
Editor allows smartphone owners to take any downloaded apps and alter their
105 Kybernetiq 2nd edition, p. 29. Translated by the author.
106 Ibid., p. 29.
107 Silent SMS, also known as Short Message Type 0, are messages that do not appear on the
receiver display or trigger any signal, but are merely sent in order to track to location of the
phone user.
108 The ISMI is a unique identification associated with cellular networks, which is sent to the
network and makes it possible to identify the phone user. Additionally, it can be used to
acquire other details, such as the location of the user.
109 A MAC address is a unique identifier of the hardware of network adapters.
110 Ibid., p. 29.
111 Ibid., p. 29. Translated by the author.
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coding so that they can control and limit the permissions and data obtained by
the smartphone provider.112
Second, although jihadi tech groups view Android as a very useful smart-
phone operation system, one of the negative aspects is that it is owned by Google,
which is claimed to be very active when it comes to invading its users’ privacy
and known for selling sensitive information to intelligence agencies. The EHF
thus warns its followers against using any of these services, and has issued a
tutorial on how to either protect one’s data from the Google service or, if one has
a routed phone, how to de-install Google services.113
Thirdly, jihadi tech experts warn about keylogging or keyboard capturing,
which describes the action of recording every key stroke on a keyboard without
Image featured in the second edition of Kybernetiq magazine, showing numerous smartphones
in the background. The caption reads: “53 spies are hidden in this picture. Can you find them
all?”







bı̄qāt, uploaded August 16, 2017 (https://pastethis.at/Ahd618V2) (accessed
September 3, 2017).
113 Electronic Horizons Foundation, Dawrat amn al-hawātif al-dhakiyya. Al-Takhallus
˙
min
khadamāt Google li-l-Android (telegram.me/@HorizonsLibbot) (accessed September 7,
2017).
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the writer knowing their activities are being monitored. The EHF suggests using
the Hacker’s Keyboard app, which it claims is protected against keylogging.114
Finally, as we have seen above, jihadi tech organizations call on their sup-
porters to limit all access authorization on the IOS or Android systems, such as
location tracking, the ability of apps to access one’s private data, and the au-
thority for the Wi-Fi system to continually look for new Wi-Fi connections,
thereby giving away the geographical location. Additionally, they advise them to
rely exclusively on encrypted messaging services.115
The issue of smartphones is vast and touches most other strategies applied,
such as the use of TOR, VPN services, encrypted e-mail, messaging programs,
and so forth. However, in recent publications, jihadists have started addressing
the issue of smartphones separately, as they realize the dangers members and
supporters run when constantly carrying a “spy” in their pocket. Several
publications have urged supporters to get rid of smartphones altogether. This
shows that in some cases jihadi tech departments advise against using new
technologies if they are concerned that their drawbacks might outweigh their
benefits.
Cryptocurrencies and Bitcoin
As of today, there are several cryptocurrency services available, with bitcoin
leading the field. As cryptocurrencies provide a money transfer method that is
hard to track and guarantees a high level of online privacy, several authors have
suggested that jihadi movements will make use these technologies.116 But so far
there has been only limited evidence of jihadists’ use of cryptocurrencies.
In 2014 the Twitter user @AmreekiWitness – an online supporter of IS –
published an article under the pseudonym Taqi’ul Deen al-Munthir titled “Bit-
coin wa-S
˙
adaqāt al-Jihad” (Bitcoin and the Charity of Jihad). This was the first
source connecting jihadi movements to cryptocurrencies and highlighting their
benefits for their cause. It provides a general outline of how bitcoin functions,
some advice on how to use it most securely and also describes the strategic
114 Electronic Horizons Foundation, Al-H
˙
imāya min al-Keylogger, uploaded August 16, 2017
(https://pastethis.at/bMA947mG) (accessed September 7).







bı̄qāt, uploaded March 15, 2017 (https://ln.sync.com/dl/f8869f8b0/ymcqy5v2-m9anrq
t4-rejecvu3-tkgn88zd)(accessed September 5, 2017).
116 Bruno Halopeau, Terrorist use of the Internet, in Babak Akhgar/Andrew Staniforth/Fran-
cesca Bosco (Eds.), Cyber Crime and Cyber Terrorism Investigator’s Handbook, Waltham:
Syngress 2014, pp. 128ff.
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advantages of cryptocurrencies.117 The first benefit the author highlights is the
ability to circumvent other financial institutions that track money transfers, a
problem which he argues had made s
˙
adaqa (charity) next to impossible for
jihadi movements.
“One cannot send a bank transfer to a mujahid or suspected mujahid without the kafir
(unbelieving) governments ruling today immediately being aware […] A proposed
solution to this is something known as Bitcoin.”118
Secondly, using bitcoins is also viewed as a way in which users can circumvent
one of the doctrinal problems outlined by Salafi jihadist movements, who argue
that by using the currencies of oppressor (t
˙
āghūt) states, Muslims effectively
support the economies of their enemies and legitimize their rule. @Amreeki-
Witnees is convinced that the use of digital money provides an alternative that
enables Muslims to avoid state currencies and thus challenge the authority of all
states not exclusively executing God’s law.119 He concludes by outlining the
benefits that bitcoin can have for IS:
“To set up a totally anonymous donation system that could send millions of dollars
worth of Bitcoin instantly from the United States, United Kingdom, South Africa […] or
wherever else right to the pockets of the mujahideen, very little would be done […]
DawlatulIslam [The Islamic State] would simply need to set up a wallet and post their
wallet address online. Then, Muslims from across the globe could simply copy the
wallet address, login to their Dark Wallets, purchase whatever amount of Bitcoin they
wish to send, and send them over. This system has the potential to revive the lost sunnah
of donating to the mujahideen, it is simple, easy, and we ask Allah to hasten its usage for
us.”120
In January 2017, Indonesia’s anti-money-laundering agency revealed the first
public instance of the jihadi use of cryptocurrencies.121 According to the report,
an Indonesian national called Bahrum Naim, a foreign fighter in the ranks of IS,
used online money transfer systems to fund terrorist activities of IS supporters
in Indonesia. The money was reportedly used to support widows and families of
117 Taqi’ul-Deen al-Munthir, Bitcoin wa-Sadaqat al-Jihad: Bitcoin and the Charity of Violent
Physical Struggle, July 2014 (https://alkhilafaharidat.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/btcedit-




121 Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, Militant Bahru Naim used PayPal, bitcoin to transfer funds for
terror attacks in Indonesia, in The Straits Times, January 9, 2017 (http://www.straitstimes.
com/asia/se-asia/militant-bahrun-naim-used-paypal-bitcoin-to-transfer-funds-for-terror
-attacks-in) (accessed May 05, 2018).
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jihadists fallen while fighting for IS and to provide money for weapons, training,
and da
˘
wa (spreading of the faith).122
Although information about and sources on the use of cryptocurrencies is still
limited, the case of Bahrun Naim and the article by @AmreekiWitnees indicate a
keen interest in this and the potential that jihadists will increasingly take ad-
vantage of cryptocurrencies in the near future.
The technologies discussed in this section show that in recent years jihadists
have grown more advanced in their understanding and use of privacy-enhancing
technologies. However, when it comes to measures taken to mitigate government
surveillance, they have not reinvented the wheel but instead are using the most
popular and widespread tools available. Most of the programs employed were
developed by Western privacy activists or tech-companies and have been seized
for their radical agendas. Every new piece of software that aims at providing
more freedom and less government scrutiny online is likely to be incorporated in
their defensive arsenal. This reveals an inherent problem of privacy-enhancing
technologies: while the cloak of anonymity provided can help to protect the
privacy of everyday users and often even limit political oppression within au-
thoritarian regimes, it also creates new avenues for criminal and extremist be-
havior. The same applies to current efforts by governments and OSNs to restrict
the publicity of jihadi content online, to which jihadists supporters have re-
sponded immediately, finding new ways to return to these platforms by using
some of the programs mentioned above.
Jihadists attempts to solve the online trade-off dilemma
While remaining anonymous is one of the central demands of jihadi groups,
concentrating their efforts on obtaining online operational security frequently
correlates with a shift towards limited-audience platforms. While Twitter used to
be the most widely used platform for distributing their propaganda,123 after
being exposed to account takedowns, stricter platform policing, and large-scale
spam attacks,124 jihadi groups were forced to move to other, more secure plat-
122 Ibid.
123 Jytte Klausen, ‘Tweeting the Jihad’: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in
Syria and Iraq, in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38i (January 2, 2015) (accessed May 05,
2018).
124 Andrew Griffin, Anonymous ‘Op ISIS’: Online Activists spam suspected extremists with
‘Rickrolls’ and call them ‘Daeshbags’ in Revenge for Paris Attacks, in The Independent,
November 19, 2015 (http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/an
onymous-op-isis-online-activists-spam-suspected-extremists-with-rickrolls-and-call-
them-daeshbags-a6740811.html) (accessed May 05, 2018).
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forms as an alternative.125 An example of this repercussion is the increasing focus
of jihadi online activities on the encrypted messaging service Telegram, which
enables relatively safe online communication with little government scrutiny.126
Since early 2016, Telegram emerged as the main hub for jihadi propaganda
distribution.127 By moving to Telegram, jihadi groups ensure that their online
network remains intact, as followers are not only able to follow the links provided
but download the content directly via Telegram and then re-distribute it on other
platforms and channels. Yet the focus on Telegram has presented IS and Al-
Qaeda with strategic problems, as it mostly works via unidirectional channels
where information can be distributed but recipients cannot comment or interact
or only through strictly administered chat rooms.128 Additionally, chats and
channels are not public and can only be accessed through invitation links that are
shared and advertised on existing jihadi online platforms, making the content
disseminated online only available for those actively following the jihadi online
network.129 Thus, despite the security provided, in the long term the limited
audience of encrypted messaging services can jeopardize jihadi movements’
general media strategy. Prucha (2016) has argued that “[t]he secrecy and en-
cryption of Telegram is harmful to IS’ swarming operations as the networks
which are sustained on Telegram lack the outreach as well as the opportunities
for projecting influence, which Twitter in particular allowed.”130
Aware of these drawbacks, jihadi groups have found several countermeasures
against the increasing isolation on Telegram that enable them to return to and
compensate for the loss of publicity on social media platforms.
Campaigns to mobilize the media mujāhidı̄n on public OSNs
Throughout the past years, IS has launched numerous campaigns in which it
urges online supporters to intensify their activities in the media jihad and
stresses the importance of being active on public OSNs. These campaigns include
posters, flyers, and comments as well as longer publications aimed at reversing
125 These platforms include Telegram, as well as WhatsApp.
126 WhatsApp has also become a popular application among jihadists. However, Telegram is
still the preferred platform.
127 Mia Bloom, Hicham Tiflati and John Horgan, Navigating ISIS’s Preferred Platform: Tele-
gram, in Terrorism and Political Violence (July, 2017), p. 1 (accessed May 05, 2018).
128 Ibid., pp. 3ff.
129 Ibid., p. 1.
130 Nico Prucha, IS and the Jihadist Information Highway – Projecting Influence and Religious
Identity via Telegram, in Perspectives on Terrorism 10vi (December 2016), p. 56 (accessed
May 05, 2018).
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the decreased online presence of IS sympathizers on Twitter, Facebook, and
YouTube.
One example is an article published by the IS affiliated Al-Battār Media Foun-
dation, titled “Oh Supporters (ans
˙
ār) – Return to the Battlefield.”131 The article
states that the shift and increasing focus by IS supporters on secure platforms
such as Telegram was a strategic error. It argues that as long as they are unable to
join the ranks of IS, every supporter is religiously obliged to engage in the online
battle by distributing IS publications, creating accounts on OSNs and defying the
current policies to take down jihadi social media accounts. The author stresses
the importance of platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube in the
media jihad due to their broad audience reach. He warns that by merely focusing
on Telegram jihadists are running into danger of merely preaching to the choir,
as the audience on Telegram is limited to those already convinced of the jihadi
cause. Telegram, therefore, is not very efficient when it comes to achieving
several features essential to the media jihad, such as the duty to openly refute
adversaries, counter lies about jihadi movements, win over new sympathizers,
and convince those hesitant to become an active supporter or join the ranks of
Banner distributed by the IS affiliated Ashhaad Media organization via Telegram, urging sup-
porters to become active in the media jihad






ūdū ilā maydān al-nizāl, August 6, 2016
(https://up.top4top.net/downloadf-42590wp43-rar.html) (accessed August 5, 2017). A si-
milar article, warning IS supporters against isolating themselves on Telegram, was pu-
blished in July, 2016 by the Al-Wafā ˘Foundation, a jihadi media outlet regularly publishing
articles in support of the Islamic State. For a discussion of this article, see: Prucha, Jihadist
Information Highway, pp. 55f.
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IS.132 He concludes by saying that forcing jihadist media outlets onto platforms
such as Telegram is a deliberate policy by IS’s enemies, who intended to isolate IS
supporters and ban them from Twitter and Facebook. While he considers
Telegram to be a secure platform for content distribution, he is convinced that
returning to more public OSNs is a necessity to increase audience reach and
counter the strategies of adversary governments.133
“Yes, no one denies the importance of Telegram, but it is not the battlefield where the
presence of the supporters (ans
˙
ār) is an absolute necessity. So this is a warning against
the dependence on Telegram and against leaving Twitter and Facebook.”134
This article is just one of many IS publications, posts, and statements that aim to
raise awareness among sympathizers about the importance of returning to
public OSNs, urge them to be persistent in their media efforts, and counter
attempts to takedown jihadi content by OSN providers.
Creating Twitter and Facebook accounts by using fake phone
numbers and VPNs
In addition to raising awareness among online supporters, jihadi tech organ-
izations have focused on circulating tutorials on how to grow their presence on
public OSNs by using online services that provide them with fake phone num-
bers. The aim of these tutorials is to teach jihadi supporters how to quickly
(re-)open new Twitter and Facebook profiles or access an already established
reservoir of backup accounts without compromising their privacy.
The audio, visual, and text tutorials on this issue are plentiful. Most of them
suggest using the Android App Talkatone, Next Plus, Textplus and for IOS sys-
tems Sudo and Textnow, which enable users to talk and send messages online free
of charge.135 It is relatively easy to get a fake phone number for any of these
services: users need to create an account and afterward receive a phone number
specifically for the app that is different from their actual phone number. Reg-
istration is easy and can be done by using an encrypted e-mail service. These






134 Ibid., Translated by the author.
135 Electronic Horizons Foundation, Dalı̄l tat
˙
bı̄qāt al-arqām al-wahmiyya li-anz
˙
imat Android





imat IOS (IPhone wa-IPad), uploaded August 24, 2017 (https://pastethis.at/
u14951e8) (accessed September 1, 2017).
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phone numbers can then be used to re-register on OSNs such as Facebook and
Twitter.136
Additionally, jihadi tech organizations advise their supporters to download
the App-Cloner application, which enables them to create and install multiple
copies of existing apps on their mobile phones.137 They can thereby create copies
of applications such as Facebook and Twitter, which usually only allow one
account per device, and use them simultaneously. An additional feature of App-
Cloner is that after duplicating the application, users can change the look, name,
and coding of the app, enabling them to increase the privacy measures when
accessing OSNs on their smartphones.138
Another frequently mentioned way to register unlimited numbers of OSN pro-
files was presented in an EHF video tutorial in which they demonstrate and
encourage an easy and efficient method of creating stocks of OSN accounts by
136 Ibid.
137 Electronic Horizons Foundation, App Cloner, uploaded August 13, 2017 (https://pastethis.
at/sehHWVPX) (accessed August 20, 2017).
138 Ibid.
Screengrab from the EHF series on how to create social-media accounts using VPN services. The
caption reads: “If they request a phone number, change the geographical location (IP Address),
eliminate the tracking of the browser.”
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simply using VPN services. According to these tutorials, if OSNs demand a
phone number, changing the IP address via VPN services is enough to start
creating new accounts. Scores of backup accounts can thus be registered in a very
short time.139
Distributing and Hacking OSN Accounts
In addition to providing the tutorials described above, IS has tried to support its
users with new OSN profiles either by trying to hack the accounts of other users
or to provide donated accounts to avoid suspension. In recent years, pro-IS
hacking groups such as the Caliphate Cyber Terrorism Army (CCTA) and the
United Cyber Caliphate (UCC) have continuously hacked Facebook and Twitter
accounts and boasted about their successes by posting pictures of their booty
online.140 In August 2016, the UCC claimed to have hacked more than 10,000
Twitter accounts.141 The latest documented report on jihadi groups hacking
social-media profiles was published in April 2017,142 demonstrating that or-
ganizations such as the CCTA are very active in this field. Lately, several IS-
affiliated groups have also taken to creating a reserve of social media accounts
and providing other jihadists with access to OSNs. Some of these organizations













Twitter (bidūn raqm hātif) min
khilāl tat
˙




Firefox li-Android wa-IPhone, uploaded March
15, 2017 (https://ln.sync.com/dl/1e1407170/vtk43cgp-m4thyjqa-zw6wjapf-a2pe9243) (ac-
cessed September 1, 2017); Electronic Horizons Foundation, Sharh
˙
al-tasjı̄l fı̄ Twitter min
khilāl tat
˙






ām Android, uploaded March 15, 2017
(https://ln.sync.com/dl/f4190c780/spja3c9i-8hj84hyq-bxp8tw3s-icaywxgc) (accessed Sep-
tember 1, 2017).
140 The Middle East Media Research Institute, Pro-ISIS Hacking Group Shows Off Its Prowess
At Hacking Facebook Accounts, Calls for Killing of German Pilot, in MEMRI Cyber and
Jihad Lab, March 16, 2017 (http://cjlab.memri.org/lab-projects/monitoring-jihadi-and-
hacktivist-activity/pro-isis-hacking-group-shows-off-its-prowess-at-hacking-facebook-ac
counts-calls-for-killing-of-german-pilot/) (accessed May 05, 2018).
141 The Middle East Media Research Institute, In Response to Twitter’s Crackdown on Ex-
tremist Accounts Pro-ISIS Hacking Group Alleges it hacked 5000 Accounts on the Platform,
in MEMRI Cyber and Jihad Lab, August 23, 2016 (http://cjlab.memri.org/lab-projects/tra
cking-jihadi-terrorist-use-of-social-media/in-response-to-twitters-crackdown-on-extre
mist-accounts-pro-isis-hacking-group-alleges-it-hacked-5000-accounts-on-the-platform/)
(accessed May 05, 2018).
142 The Middle East Media Research Institute, Pro-ISIS Hacking Group CCTA Continues
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claim to be equipped with several thousand OSN accounts.143 The accounts ac-
cumulated by these groups are considered as a supply that can be tapped at any
time by online jihadi supporters who are experiencing difficulties in creating
new OSN profiles.
Through these simple means jihadists hope to increase their presence and re-
establish their strength on OSNs. Whether such strategies are successful or not
can be a decisive factor and shape the future of jihadists’ online activities and
messaging strategies.
Conclusion and outlook
The purpose of this chapter was to explain how jihadi movements try to balance
their dual interest of maintaining a presence on the Internet and OSNs while at
the same time remaining anonymous when operating online. The preceding
discussion contributes to our understanding of jihadists’ media use by adding an
in-depth analysis of the changes in and the current state of the inner-jihadist
debate as well as the steps taken to improve their privacy skills and mitigate the
risk of being online.
Building upon previous research on jihadists media use, it has been shown
how, from the early 1990s, jihadi groups shifted their strategic focus to the online
sphere and became dependent on new communication technologies for strategic
and organizational purposes. Their dependency on these new online commu-
nication technologies has pushed them to find new and innovative methods, to
learn about the latest technological trends, and finally adapt to the constantly
changing political, social, and media environments.
However, the increase in jihadists’ use of new online communication is es-
sentially a double-edged sword, as it provides their adversaries with a significant
amount of sensitive data. Jihadi groups have become increasingly aware of these
new threats online and are taking the issue of operational security very seriously.
To be one step ahead of intelligence agencies, they try to stay up-to-date about
the latest trends and employ a variety of different measures to conceal their
online activities.
At the same time, jihadists fear that relying on privacy-enhancing tools may
end up hurting their overall media strategy, as withdrawing to safe and en-
crypted platforms often goes along with a limited audience reach. To maintain an
online presence on OSNs, jihadists have urged their supporters to return to the
biggest ones – Twitter and Facebook – and have used several technologies to
(re)create accounts that had been taken down.
143 The Middle East Media Research Institute, Response to Twitter’s Crackdown.
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It is clear that for jihadi movements such as IS and Al-Qaeda, the oppor-
tunities provided by the Internet have become indispensable strategic assets.
Going back to old recruitment patterns and means of communication seems
impossible. It is therefore likely that the current cat-and-mouse game between
governments and jihadi groups, in which governments constantly try to increase
their reach and the data collected while jihadi movements at the same time
attempt to enhance their technical skills and find new methods and strategies to
avoid government scrutiny, will continue in the years to come.
Despite all of the increasing discussions and efforts taken to protect their
online activities, jihadists are still convinced that when operating online, there is
no strategy or tool that can absolutely guarantee online privacy. Unsurprisingly,
the case of Osama Bin Laden is often mentioned in this context.144 The docu-
ments found in his hiding place in Abbottabad, Pakistan, reveal the vigilant
counter-surveillance measures he applied and how he abstained from any
communication via the Internet or phones. Instead, Bin Laden exclusively relied
on communication via courier-delivered letters.145 After facing reversals on the
battlefield and seeing some of their leaders targeted, IS took similar steps to
reduce the online trail of their fighters. According to a leaked internal memo
distributed in May 2017, IS prohibited all of its fighters from using social media,
due to the threat of data leakage. Any violation of this new policy is threatened
with punishment.146 Such documents show that that jihadists’ trust in online
privacy-enhancing technologies is not absolute. The bigger the risk or, the more
important the individual for the group, the more likely it is that he will refrain
from using online communication, instead depending on couriers or physical
messages that cannot be replicated, are difficult to trace, and are immediately
destroyed after delivery.
With more and more high-ranking commanders and fighters keeping a low
profile online, encouraging online supporters – many of which are only loosely
affiliated to Al-Qaeda and IS – to engage in the media jihad has become essential
for and given priority in their current online strategy. Mobilizing these dispersed
and decentralized networks of media mujāhidı̄n and instructing them on how to
avoid scrutiny when operating online is, therefore, one of the central issues that
will decide about the future trajectory of jihadist movements and the durability
of their media engagement.
144 See for example: Al-Risalah 4th edition, pp. 42f.
145 Sinai, Terrorists’ counter-surveillance, p. 205.
146 The Middle East Media Research Institute, ISIS Forbids Its Fighters To Use Social Media, in
MEMRI Cyber and Jihad Lab, May 22, 2017 (http://cjlab.memri.org/lab-projects/tracking-
jihadi-terrorist-use-of-social-media/isis-forbids-its-fighters-to-use-social-media/) (ac-
cessed May 05, 2018).
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al-Bukhari 121, 137
al-dhubbah, Amir 122
al-Hanafı̄, Abū al-Hasan 37
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